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I. THE POLITICS OF PROFESSIONAIJSM
A. The Cultural Logic of a Political Crisis'
This Article is a case study of the California State Bar lawyer disci-
pline system in crisis. The Bar's lawyer discipline system is the official
state mechanism for regulating the professional conduct of California's
more than 100,000 lawyers. The State Bar in California self-regulates2 as
an adjunct of the judicial branch of government.3 The State Bar oper-
ates in this capacity as a quasi-governmental body while at the same
time functioning as a professional organization, of which one role is to
represent the collective interests of California lawyers.4 This is truly an
extraordinary status. Unlike most other occupational groups, the legal
profession has long eI\ioyed the privilege of regulating itself largely free
from state or other external interference.
1. I borrow this term from and share a methodological affinity with Robert
Hayden. See Robert M. Hayden, The Cultural Logic of a Political Crisis: Common
Sense, Hegemony and the Great American Liability Insurance Famine of 1986, 11
STuD. IN 1.., POL., & Soc. 95 (1991).
2. The term "self-regulation" generally refers both to control over admissions and
over standards in addition to the promulgation and enforcement of ethical rules that
guide professional practice (as, for example, In the process of disbarment). ThIs study
focuses on the latter aspect of self-regulation.
3. State courts in col\lunction with bar associations have been a central locus of
lawyer regulation since the late nineteenth century. See generaUy RoSCOE POUND, THE
LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES: WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE DE-
VEWPMENT OF BAR AsSOCIATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1953); CHARLES WARREN, A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR (1911). See also Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent Pow-
er of the Courts to Regulate the Practice of Law: An Historical Analysis, 32 BUFF. I..
REV. 525 (1983) (examining the relationship between courts, bar associations, and
other mechanisms of lawyer regulation in American history). Although state supreme
courts nominally exercise the ultimate power and control In regulatory matters, the
courts typically play a relatively passive role In the discipline process and rather
perfunctorily approve of bar association Initiatives In these matters. See, e.g., SHARON
TISHER ET AL., BRINGING THE BAR TO JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SIX BAR As-
SOCIATIONS 9()'94 (1977) (A Public Citizen Report). Thus, "self-regulation" Is the system
of professional discipline of lawyers by state bar associations under the nominal re-
view of the states' highest courts. See id. at 86-111.
4. See generally Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990) (discussing the dual
role of bar associations). In KeUer, the Court recognized that bar associations in
those states. retaining self-regulatory powers operate as quasi-governmental agencies
that not only share some characteristics of purely private business or trade associa-
tions, but also operate as representatives of the state in discipline and other regulato-
ry matters. Id. at 11.
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B. The Claim for Self-Regulation
Lawyer self-regulation has long been defended as a necessary con-
comitant to an independent and effective profession that can seIVe
public interests and not solely professional interests.6 The thrust of
such an argument is that lawyers, and other specialized professions,
possess complex and esoteric knowledge and skills; therefore, they
should be allowed to self-regulate because they alone have the special-
ized knowledge to understand the unique nature of their profession's
problems and hence, to apply effective cures. Outside interference in
this process, commentators argue, would undermine the profession's
public orientation and subject it to regulation that is harmful to both
the profession and the public.
There are three essential claims that underlie this position. First, only
lawyers can understand the legal complexities involved in regulation;
because nonlawyers have no basis for understanding the issues involved
or the context in which the lawyer's behavior needs to be understood.
Second, lawyers, by virtue of their training and professional socializa-
tion, possess both the technical skills and the proper ethical orientation
to self-regulate. Finally, the profession has upheld its end of the bargain
5. See, e.fI., POUND, supra note 3, at 4-11; Talcott Parsons, A Sociologist Looks at
the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (1964); see also Robert B.
McKay, The Future of Professional Independence for Lawyers, in THE LAWYER'S PRo-
FESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE: PRESENT THREATSIFuTuRE CHALLENGES (Tort & Ins. Practice
Sect, ABA ed. 1984); Archibold Cox, The Conditions of Independence for the Legal
Profession, in THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE: PRESENT THREATSIFuTuRE
CHAlLENGES (Tort & Ins. Practice Sect, AB.A ed. 1984). This theme is also a staple
of bar association rhetoric. See, e.g., Charles S. Vogel, The Bar in the Balance, 9 L.A
LAW. 6, 6 (1986).
We owe it to ourselves to retain a system of self-regulation. Even though a
prima.ly objective for the discipliruuy system is the protection of the public,
its other purpose is to retain the independence and integrity of lawyers. After
all, lawyers serve as advocates of others and sometimes must urge unpopular
and controversial causes. If their regulation is under the control of a popu-
larly appointed agency, will their independence be compromised? I submit
that the independence of lawyers Is crucial to a democratic society. They
cannot retain that independence If they do not remaln a self-regulated profes-
sion.
Id. at 6. For an excellent discussion sorting through many of the various claims re-
garding professional independence, see generally Robert W. Gordon, The Independence
of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988).
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to carry out its self-regulatory duties, which should justify continued
lawyer control over the disciplinary process.6
Each of these claims, however, has been increasingly viewed as prob-
lematic. While it is true that some discipline cases deal with complex
and esoteric issues, this is certainly not the norm;7 consequently, it is
not self-evident that only lawyers are capable of understanding the
issues involved in lawyer regulation. The claim that self-regulation fur-
thers the public interest is similarly suspect precisely because of the in-
herent conflict of interest involved in regulating members of one's own
profession.s Moreover, while lawyer self-regulation is a primary means
of regulation, it is by no means the sole (or necessarily the most im-
portant) mechanism for social control of lawyers' professional behav-
ior.9
1. The California Example
Despite these concerns, the California State Bar's claim to self-regula-
tion remained secure for almost sixty years following its inception in
1927. However, during the mid-1980s and early 1990s, this traditional
prerogative of the Bar has come under fierce attack. The State Legisla-
ture, responding in part to public outrage,1O criticized the Bar for hav-
ing a discipline system that was perceived to be slow, unresponsive,
and overly-protective of the interests of lawyers rather than the public
interest. This attack culminated in a threat by the Legislature to divest
the Bar of its self-regulatory powers. II
6. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 20, 21 (West 1986).
7. See, e.g., Eric H. Steele & Raymond T. Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and Profes-
sional Regulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 919 (showing that most lawyer disci-
pline complaints typically deal with issues of basic competence).
8. See, e.g., Kay A. Ostberg, The Crmflict of Interest in Lawyer Self-Regulation, 1
PROF. LAw. 6 (1989).
9. There are many forms of social control, both formal and informal, that shape
professional behavior. See generaUy JEROME E. CARUN, LAWYERS' ETHICS: A SURVEY OF
THE NEW YORK CITY BAR (1966) (ana\yzing informal social controls in legal practice).
See also David Wilkins, W1w Should Regulate Lawyers?, 106 HARv..1.. REV. 799, 801
(1992) (providing an excellent discussion and overview of formal controls affecting
lawyers).
10. A six-part Investigative reporting series In the San Jilrancisco Examiner telllng-
ly entitled The Brotherlwod: Justice for Lawyers, created a tremendous public re-
sponse. K. Connie Kang et aI., The Brotherhood: Justice for Lawyers, S.F. EXAMlNER,
Mar. 24-29, 1986. The public response to this series Included a large number of news-
paper editorials and letters to the editor calling for external investigation and reform
of lawyer discipline In California. See irifra part II.A.2. for a discussion of the legisla-
tive criticism and action.
11. See Joint Interim Hearing on UU] Attorney Discipline Function of the State
Bar of California; Senate Task Force on the State Bar Discipline System, Sept. 30,
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To be sure, the legal profession in California and elsewhere had pre-
viously been the target of public outrage over ineffective discipline. For
example, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a special committee of the
American Bar Association surveyed and evaluated lawyer discipline
systems nationwide in response to public criticism of the Bar.12 This
committee reported that the status of disciplinary enforcement in the
legal profession was nothing less than "scandalous."13 Moreover, promi-
nent public figures such as former Chief Justice Warren Burger, have
also focused attention on the perceived defects of lawyer discipline. 14
Nevertheless, the 1980s' attacks on lawyer discipline in California
took on an ominous tone missing from much of the earlier nationwide
criticism. From the beginning, the critique in California focused on the
presumed inability of the organized Bar to promote the public interest
over narrower professional interests. 16 In this critique, opponents chal-
lenged the legal profession to justify why it should be treated different-
ly from other occupational groups. An important part of the debate in
California thus centered on the legitimacy of lawyer self-regulation and
not merely its efficacy. The Bar responded to this debate by attempting
to redefme its proper role in the lawyer discipline system and by reas-
serting the special status of law as a "profession."
Despite this formidable challenge, and notwithstanding the substan-
tial changes in the lawyer discipline system that were produced in its
wake, the State Bar retained its regulatory powers. In fact, as the rather
narrow parameters of the Bar's enforcement authority were expanded,
these powers were enhanced. The resources expended on the discipline
system were increased substantially, and the lawyer discipline bureau-
cracy was better staffed and organized. Ironically, in the short space of
several years, the Bar's disciplinary system was transformed from the
1985 [hereinafter Joint Interim Hearing]. See also Philip Carrizosa, Task Force Urges
Stripping State Bar of Discipline Cases, L.A DAILY J., Sept. 19, 1985, at 1.
12. See American Bar Association Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary
Enforcement, Problems and Recommendations in Disciplinary Eriforcement, Final
Draft, June 1970 (AB.A 1970) [hereinafter Clark Report) (report by panel chaired by
retired Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark).
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., George M. Gold, Burger Urges Rtiform of Lawyer Discipline, 9 B.
LEADER 29 (1984); Thomas H. Henderson, Jr., Burger Critiques Discipline, 8 DIST.
LAw. 8 (1984).
15. See, e.g., Joint Interim Hearing, supra note 11. The task force recommended
that the State Legislature establish a lawyer regulatory agency independent of the
State Bar. Id. at 115-16.
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subject of criticism to an object of emulation for other professional
regulatory bodies.16
This study explores the meaning of the crisis in California's lawyer
discipline system,17 examines the changes in lawyer discipline pro-
duced in response to this crisis, and analyzes the aftermath of these
changes. IS The central argument in this analysis is that the "crisis" of
professional self-regulation in California that occurred between 1985-92,
while always a very real political crisis, is best understood as a crisis of
"cultural authority"19 for the legal profession. From this perspective,
what was at stake in the debate over lawyer discipline was not only the
role of the Bar in lawyer self-regulation, but its very legitimacy as a
"profession." Such an interpretation forces a reassessment of traditional
theories developed in the sociology of professions and the sociology of
law.
2. WhY Self-Regulation?
Until recently, professional associations like the California State Bar
were "one of sociology's least researched phenomena."2O Yet such orga-
nizations are the collective voices of often powerful professions, and
they potentially wield enormous influence in society. Thus, while it may
be misleading to assume that bar associations are necessarily represen-
tative of the legal profession as a whole,21 they clearly play a promi-
nent role in shaping and articulating professional values and ideology.
For these reasons alone the choice to study a major bar association is
justified. But why focus so narrowly on self-regulation? Bar associations
16. See, e.g., Robert C. Fellmeth, Physician Discipline in California: A Code Blue
Emergency, report Issued In April, 1989 by the Center for Public Interest Law, Uni·
versity of San Diego.
17. See inJra part n.A.2.
18. See inJra part II.B.
19. For a useful explication of the term ·cultural authority", see PAUL STARR, THE
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE RISE OF A SOVEREIGN PROFESSION
AND THE MAKING OF A VASr INDUSTRY 9-17 (1984).
20. TERENCE C. HAwDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND PROFES-
SIONAL EMPOWERMENT xill (1987). At least with regard· to the legal profession, this
situation of neglect is changing. See generally MICHAEL J. POWElL, FROM PATRICIAN TO
PROFESSIONAL EIJTE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR AssoCIATION
(1988); Corinne L. GUb, Self·Regulating Professions and the Public Welfare: A Case
Study of the California State Bar (1956) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Radcliffe College)
(providing a very useful early study of the California State Bar).
21. For a vehement argument that bar associations are run by elites within the
bar, see generally JEROLD AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE
IN MODERN AMEmCA (1976). More careful empirical studies suggest, however, this is
simply not true or at least, should be considerably qualified. See generally HAwDAY,
supra note 20; POWELL, supra note 20.
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do many things. In addition to attorney discipline, an association may
administer bar exams, client trust funds, or continuing legal education,
it may lobby state legislatures or other governmental agencies, it may
flle amicus curiae briefs in pending cases, and it may take positions on
pressing social and political issues of the day or participate in law re-
form activities.22
Nevertheless, although little scholarly consensus exists as to its sig-
nificance, self-regulation has traditionally been considered theoretically
central to the professional enterprise. Structural-functionalist theory, for
example, views self-regulation as a necessary concomitant to profes-
sionalism.23 As one scholar notes, "If structural functionalism had to
distinguish professions by means of a single characteristic, self-regula-
tion would be a prime candidate."24 In "this perspective, self-regulation
is posited as a mechanism to ensure adequate professional discipline
and to maintain necessary professional independence from the state. In
contrast, theories critical of the professions perceive self-regulation as a
principal means of enhancing collective professional status, of legiti-
mating a monopoly market for professional services, and of forestalling
intrusive state regul~tion. Self-regulation from this vantage point is an
"essential element~ onaWyers' "claim to professional status" itself.25 An
emerging cultural perspective on professions focuses on the symbolic
role of legal ethics and claims for self-regulatory powers. This model of
professions stresses that professional authority is socially constructed
(and, indeed, needs to be re-constructed over time) and it points out
the central role of self-regulation in this process.25 Lastly, this perspec-
tive raises the possibility for understanding professional ideology, as
articulated in professions' claims for superior ethicality, as a form of
hegemonic control that both shapes professions and is shaped by them.
22. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 16 (1990) (recognizing numerous
functions of the California State Bar Association, including that bar association dues
may be used to fonnulate professional ethics and to discipline its members). See
generaUy HALuDAY, supra note 20; POWELL, supra note 20.
23. RICHARD ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 37 (1989).
24. [d.
25. Richard Abel, Toward a Political Economy of Lawyers, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 1117,
1177 (1981).
26. See generally ANDREW ABBOIT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE
DIVISION OF EXPERT LABoR (1988).
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a. The functionalist model: professional communities and the
public interest
Functionalist theories of professions have their intellectual roots in
Durkheimian sociology, which emphasizes the social control function of
professional ethics.27 The central theme in Durkheirnian sociology is
the problem of social solidarity.28 This concern for social order domi-
nates Durkheim's major works-which explore the nature, causes, and
consequences of social alienation or anomie-and forms the basis for
his understanding of the role of professions in modem society.29
In Durkheim's view, modernization brought with it forces of social
differentiation, industrialization, urbanization, and secularization. These
forces attenuated the social institutions-such as the family and reli-
gion-that serve as a source of moral authority in society. For
Durkheim, contemporary society was characterized by unrestrained
economic egoism, which no society can long endure:
It is this anomic state that is the cause, as we shall show, of the incessantly recur-
rent conflicts, and thus the multifarious disorders of which the economic world
exhibits so sad a spectacle. For, as nothing restrains the active forces and assigns
them limits they are bound to respect, they tend to develop haphazardly, and
come into collision with one another. . . . Human passions stop only before a
moral power they respect. If all authority of this kind is wanting, the law of the
strongest prevails, and latent or active, the state of war is necessarily chronic.3D
For anomie to be eradicated, Durkheim argued, "there must then exist,
or be formed, a group which can constitute the system of rules actually
needed," and thus provide the necessary moral authority for successful
social existence.51 Drawing on the historical example of the medieval
guild, Durkheim looked to occupational groups to perform this function,
serving as a "corps intermediaires," to instill moral values and discipline
and to maintain social order:
What we especially see in the occupational group is a moral power capable of
containing individual egos, of maintaining a spirited sentiment of common soU-
27. See Emile Durkheim, Prriface to the Second Edition of EMILE DURKHEIM, THE
DMSION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY I, 1-31 (1933) [hereinafter PREFACE); EMILE DURKHEIM,
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CMC MORALS 1-41 (Cornelia Brookfield trans., 1967).
28. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DMSION OF LABOR IN SoCIETY 49 (George Simpson trans.,
1933).
29. [d. Durkhelm's theory does not focus specifically, or exclusively, on "profes-
sions" as distinguished from other occupational groups. Nevertheless, It is clear the
modem Anglo-American professions such as law and medicine are prototypical exam-
ples of occupational groups that fit Durkhelm's model. Moreover, the sociology of
professions is certainly the field most influenced by this aspect of Durkhelm's work.
30. PREFACE, supra note 27, at 2-3.
31. [d. at 6.
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darity in the consciousness of all workers, of preventing the law of the strongest
from being brutally applied to industrial and commercial relations."
Durkheim found the state ill-suited to this task,33 Rather, it is the cor-
poration or occupational group that Durkheim considered most able to
assume this integrative function because it alone is intimately lrnowledge-
able about the occupational activity requiring regulation.34 In this view
of the state, Durkheim mirrors De Tocqueville's famous comments on the
American legal profession as playing an intermediary role between the
potential excesses of an interventionist state and those of a democratic
lay public.55 Thus, occupational self-regulation is a central dynamic in
Durkheim's vision of modem democratic society.
Parsonsian functionalist theory36 shares Durkheim's macrosociological
concern with the social control function of professions, but also devel~
ops a model of social control of professions that has been both influen-
tial and much criticized.
In his work on the sociology of professions, Parsons explored the
emergence and significance of professions as a unique historical form of
social organization, describing them as one of the most crucial structural
developments of modern society.37 Like Durkheim, Parsons viewed
utilitarian theory, with its emphasis on rational, economic elements, neg-
atively. In his theoretical work in general and in his focus on professions
in particular, Parsons emphasized that normative, non-rational elements
are a significant factor in human action.38 Parsons' theoretical work on
professions argued against the idea that professional behavior can be
adequately explained solely on instrumental grounds.39 In contrast to
other occupational groups, which are motivated primarily by self-interest,
Parsons characterized professions as "collectivity-oriented" and as having
nonns that are not based on the market.40
Parsons viewed the legal profession's role in the social structure as
similarly beneficial. Like Durkheim, Parsons argued for understanding the
32. [d. at 10.
33. [d. at 5.
34. [d.
35. See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 272-80 (1945).
36. See TALCOTI PARSONS, ESSAYS IN SoCIOLOGICAL THEOI!Y 9 (1954).
37. Talcott Parsons, The Professions and Social Structure, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGI-
CAL THEoRY 34, 34-49. (1954).
38. See generally PARSONS, supra note 36.
39. See generally id.
40. See, e.g., Parsons, supra note 5, at 375 n.2.
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role of the legal profession as exerting moral control between the indi-
vidual and the state.4! Parsons stressed the "dual character" of the legal
profession: it operated between state authority and norms of the individ-
ual, "whose conduct or intentions mayor may not be in accord with the
law."42 The role of lawyers in this situation was "integrative." As Parsons
wrote:
(T)he lawyer stands as a kind of buffer between the illegitimate desires of his cli-
ents and the social interests. . . the sociologist must regard the activities of the
legal profession as one of the very Important mechanisms by which a relative
balance of stability is maintained in a dynamic and rather precariously balanced
society."
Again, as with Durkheim, self-regulation in Parsons' scheme is a neces-
sary attribute of professionalism. For the legal profession to maintain its
intermediary and integrative role between the state and society, it must
retain its independence from both. State or public intrusion into lawyer
regulation serves to undermine this socially beneficial autonomy.
There is a second dimension of Parsons' treatment of professions. In
addition to his macrosociological concern with the social-integrative
function of professions, Parsons developed a more micro-sociological
theory of professions that focuses on the problem of social control of
professions themselves.44 Parsons recognized that professions serve so-
cially useful roles as well as sensitive and potentially threatening roles.
Their position as experts requires that the general public trust them to
use their expertise wisely, but also brings with it an obligation not to
abuse the "asymmetry of expertise" that characterizes their relationships
with clients.46 In this view, there is a social compact implicit in profes-
sional status. Additionally, the institutional arrangement best situated to
ensure that the terms of the compact are met is a system of collegial
control through professional codes of ethics-which are presumed to
hold professions to a higher moral standard than other occupations-and
disciplinary oversight by professional colleagues, which is the essence of
self-regulation.
Goode furthered this structural-functionalist analysis of professions
and made explicit the theorized social pact between professionals and
the community they serve.46 Goode argued that the professions are a
distinct community because they share common backgrounds, common
41. [d. at 370-85.
42. [d. at 381.
4:3. [d. at 384-86.
44. [d. at 373-74.
46. [d. at 370-85.
46. See generally William J. Goode, Community Within a Community: The Profes-
sions, 22 AM. SOc. REV. 194 (1967).
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specialized language, common values, and a common sense of identity.47
The professions share a higher standard of behavior and training than
the lay community and, because of this, er\ioy special social advantages,
discretion, and autonomy denied the larger society.48 These advantages,
however, come at a price. The professions must adhere to the high stan-
dards that they assert guide their behavior; the failure to do so will invite
outside control:
The larger society has obtained an indirect social control [of professions] by
yielding direct social control to the professional community .... [T]hey frequent-
ly argue that the most effective technique for avoiding lay control over the profes-
sional community is to maintain strong control over its members .... Failure to
discipline would mean both a loss of prestige in the society, and a loss of commu-
nity autonomy."
Goode's analysis of professions as self-regulating communities thus
largely recapitulates Durkheim's ideal of a corps intermediaires. Yet in
neither Goode's nor Parsons' version of functionalist theory need there
be a naive belief that professions invariably live up to their own pro-
fessed high moral standards. Thus, neither Goode nor Parsons argues
that as an empirical matter professional self-regulation is effective, which
would clearly be a problematic assumption.ro What these theories high-
light is both the significant problem of controlling professions and the
consequences for the failure of self-regulation. What functionalist theory
does tell us is that self-regulation is significant as a mechanism for main-
taining socially beneficial professional autonomy and for ensuring quality
control. This theory takes seriously-at least in its most abstract
forms-professional ideals of community service that underlay self-regu-
lation and, at the very least, properly remain aspirational goals.61
b. Monopoly theories: professions and market control
A second, more critical and empirical tradition, takes the role and
47. [d.
48. [d. at 195-96.
49. [d. at 198.
,50. As Heinz and Laumann tell us, the notion of professional ·community" itself is
misleading because the bar is highly stratified, indeed, segmented into two fairly ex-
clusive spheres. See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE
SoCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 319-85 (1982). Additionally, as their work suggests and
Carlin's work shows, professional self-regulation is not generally effective. See gener-
auy JEROME E. CARUN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN (1962). '
51. Importantly, such ideals can also form the basis for an internal critique of pro-
fessional behavior itself. See generaUy AUERBACH, supra note 21.
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significance of professions in the market for their services more seriously
than does functionalist theory. Drawing on Weber's insight into the mo-
nopolistic tendencies of medieval guilds, Johnson's theoretical analysis of
professions shifted the focus of professions studies away from a unilineal
model of professionalization, towards a richer, more historically in-
formed and contextual framework,52 Johnson's mEijor contribution lay in
explicating a model of professions as occupations that successfully orga-
nize their resources, knowledge, and skills to define and defend the mar-
ket for their services.ro
Focusing on the medical profession, Berlant argued that professional
associations have as their central goal the attainment of monopoly and
that the function of ethics and self-regulation is largely to facilitate this
goal.t14 Larson's approach builds on this analysis and moves beyond it by
adding that the "professional project" entails not only the attainment of a
monopoly market but also the maintenance of upward social mobility.55
In this analysis, self-regulation serves three main functions. First, as the
functionalists recognized, it forestalls state intervention into the regulato-
ry process.156 Second, it serves to legitimate professional market control
and to enhance professions' claims to altruism or special ethicality.67
Finally, the system of self-regulation legitimates monopoly capitalism.58
Abel's work applies Larson's arguments specifically to the legal profes-
sion. Abel stresses that self-regulation both allows the profession to
"stave off state regulation" and to "support the status hierarchy in the
profession" by derming as unethical that conduct in which mostly non-
elite lawyers engage. He argues further that because the profession's
record on self-regulation is so abysmal by any measure, it is likely that
the organized bar "may be losing a hallmark of professional status-the
right to engage in self-regulation."W
Market theory thus emphasizes the role of self-regulation in securing
professional autonomy and social status. It views the attenuation of this
prerogative as an indicator of professional decline. Other contemporary
(and non-market oriented) theorists agree. Halliday's neo-functionalist
account concedes the utility of self-regulation to the early period of
professionalization but argues that to an "established" profession self-
52. See generally TERENCE J. JOHNSON, PROFESSIONS AND POWER (1972).
53. [d.
54. See JEFFREY L. BERLANT, PROFESSION AND MONOPOLY: A STUDY OF MEDICINE IN
THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN (1975).
55. See generally MAGAW S. LARsoN, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1977).
56. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 23.
57. [d.
58. [d.
59. [d. at 157.
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regulation is no longer important.60 Yet what remains to be explained
adequately in both these accounts is the symbolic or ideological signifi-
cance of self-regulation. This is a function that does not diminish over
time even once the professional markets have become well-established.
The system of self-regUlation is one of the chief mechanisms by which
the organized bar can articulate its collective voice and its ideology of
professionalism, its vision of the role of lawyers in society.
c. Professions and cultural control61
There is a third tradition in the sociology pf professions that, while not
incompatible with either functionalism or market theory62 moves past
these theories' one-dimensional vision of professions and develops a
more sophisticated vision of the cultural dimensions of professional pow-
er. An emerging cultural perspective promises to provide a more com-
plex and nuanced understanding of professions and their significance.
Such an approach is not entirely new, although it is underdeveloped in
much professions' scholarship.
Although he is generally considered solely an early market theorist,
Hughes is among the earliest writers to show awareness of and sensitivi-
ty towards the cultural rather than merely structural components of pro-
fessionalism.63 Because of this, Hughes' work is a corrective to overly
benign functionalist accounts of professions that largely take for granted
the emergence of professio~ in modem society. As outlined above, func-
tionalist perspectives frequently omit questions concerning precisely how
certain occupational groups achieve professional status.54 The logic of
functionalism presumes that complex societies have fundamental needs
for expertise that are then met by professional groups. Hughes' work,
and certainly the work of his students/16 is much more oriented toward
60. See HAwDAY, supra note 20, at 345-56; see also Michael J. Powell, Professional
Divestiture: The Cession of Responsibility for Lawyer Discipline, 1986 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 31 (discussing why the Dlinois Bar Association voluntarily transferred control
over lawyer discipline).
61. I borrow the tenn ·cultural control" from Laura Nader. See generaUy LAURA
NADER,' HARMONY IDEOLOGY: JUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A ZAPoTEc MOUNTAIN VILLAGE
(1990); The ADR Explosion: The Implication of Rheloric in Legal Reform, 8 WINDSOR
Y.B. OF ACCESS TO JUST. 269 (1988).
62. In fact, this third tradition repeats some of the key insights of the two previ-
ously mentioned.
63. See generally EVERETT C. HUGHES, MEN AND THEIR WORK (1958).
64. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., EUOTT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL POWERS: A STUDY OF THE INSTITUTION-
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understanding the processes by which particular occupational groups in
specific social and historical contexts secure claims to professional sta-
tus. From this perspective, there is no a priori abstract social need for
particular professions. Rather, the label "profession" denotes success in
defining and protecting unique occupational turf and, importantly, in
having this achievement accepted as legitimate by society.66 Hughes'
terms "license" and "mandate" capture this dynamic.67
For Hughes, professions are those groups that have achieved both
license and mandate.68 License is a form of social control; it is an offi-
cial sanction the state may grant of unique occupational boundaries.1I9
Rule~ defining the practice of law or medicine and limiting such practice
to officially recognized group members are obvious examples of this
form of control. Many, if not most distinct occupations acquire some
form of license, gain some means of identifying unique work, and devel-
op some method of securing it from outsiders. In its strongest form,
license is a form of state sanctioned monopoly. 70
Mandate, 'on the other hand, is a form of cultural control, markedly
more ephemeral in nature.71 It denotes the capacity to have an occupa-
tional monopoly and the attendant ~laims for heightened moral and intel-
lectual status that justify viewing the monopoly as legitimate, natural,
and necessary. Thus, in its strongest version, mandate is a form of hege-
monic control.72
ALlZATiON OF FORMAL KNOWLEDGE (1986).
66. See HUGHES, supra note 63.
67. Id.
68. Id. As he writes: "Many new and some old occupations have sought for them-
selves the envied status of professions; some of them succeed In gaining that esteem,
that broad license to control their work and that social mandate over affaIrs pertain-
Ing to it that the term professions connotes." [do. at 7.
69. [d.
70. [d.
71. [d.
72. Hughes' language aptly illustrates the point:
All occupations-most of all those considered professions . . . -Include as
part of their very being a license to deviate In some measure from common
modes of behavior. Professions also, perhaPs more than other kinds of occu-
pations, claim a legal, moral, and Intellectual mandate. Not merely do the
practitioners, by virtue of gaining admission to the charmed circle of col-
leagues, Individually exercise the license to do things others do not do, but
collectively they presume to tell society what Is good and right for the indi-
vidual and for society at large In some aspect of life. Indeed, they set the
very terms In which people may think about this aspect of life . . . .When
the presumption of a group to a broad mandate of this kind Is explicitly or
Implicitly granted as legitimate, a profession has come Into being.
[d. at 79. For an excellent discussion of the term "hegemonic control" as used In the
present analysis, see T.J. Jackson Lears, The Concept of Cultuml Hegemony: Problems
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In Hughes' scheme, true professions are those groups whose claims to
both license and mandate are most secure. However, this security need
not be permanent. Indeed, professions, other occupations, and the public
at large may develop "jurisdictional disputes"73 regarding the proper pa-
rameters of professional license and mandate.74
Starr's approach to professions' theory has a great affmity with
Hughes.76 In explaining the rise and decline of a "sovereign" medical
profession, Starr distinguishes between social and cultural authority.
"Social authority ... involves the control of action through the giving of
commands, while cultural authority entails the construction of reality
through defmitions of fact and value."76 Starr views professions as occu-
pations that have achieved "cultural authority," or the capacity to have
"particular defmitions of reality and judgments of meaning and val-
ue ... prevail as valid and true."77 Thus, professionalism is a form of
"occupational control rather than a quality that inheres in some kinds of
work."78 The attainment of professional status results in large part from
a successful struggle for cultural authority.1ll In this view, a crisis of the
cultural dimension of professional power is thus a challenge to the very
core of status as a "profession."
In another essay, Abbott develops an approach to professions' theory
that is similar to both Hughes' and Starr's models in many ways.so His
theory of professions is broadly ecological and focuses on the centrality
to professions of what he terms "jurisdiction," or tl,le capacity to claim
and Possibilities, 90 AM. HisT. REV. 567 (1985).
73. See HUGHES, supra note 63.
74. As Hughes remarks:
The typical reform movement is a restless attempt of laymen to redefine val-
ues, or at least to change the nature and tempo of action about some matter
over which an occupational group, or several occupations, holds a mandate.
The movement may simply push for faster or more drastic action where the
profession is moving slowly or not at all; it may be direct attack upon the
dominant philosophy of the profession, as in some attempts to change the
manner of distributing medical care. The power of an occupation to protect
its license and to maintain its mandate, the circumstances in which they are
attacked, loSt or changed; all these are matters for investigation.
[d. at 85.
75. See generally STARR, supra note 19.
76. [d. at 13.
77. [d.
78. [d. at 16.
79. [d. at 17.
SO. See generally ABBO'IT, supra note 26.
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exclusive control over particular work.81 In making such a claim, a pro-
fession "asks society to recognize its cognitive structure through exclu-
sive rights," which may include the right to a monopoly market for ser-
vices, the right to control training, recruiting and licensing of practitio-
ners, and the right to self-regulate.82 Echoing Hughes' notions of license
and mandate, Abbott argues that jurisdiction "embodies both social and
cultural control. "83
A profession may make jurisdictional claims in various arenas, includ-
ing the public, legal, and workplace arenas. Moreover, Abbott argues that
in the United States, the arena of public opinion is most significant. It is
in the public arena that professions "establish power that enables them
to achieve legal protection,"84 which is often difficult to establish. In-
deed, "[b]y the time a profession actually achieves legal establishment, it
has usually long since won its public position."85 The establishment of
legal jurisdiction, however, while difficult and slow to attain, is generally
enduring. In contrast, public jurisdictional claims are much more precari-
ous, even while they may be more quickly attainable.85
Importantly, the process of securing professional jurisdiction is an
ongoing task in Abbott's theory. Professions must reassert, rejustify, and
reestablish their claims to professional jurisdiction as challenges to pro-
fessional jurisdiction arise.81 As does the cultural view on professions,
this view stresses the role of self-regulation in the ongoing process of
maintaining professional cultural authority.
The aim of this study, then, is to develop this cultural perspective on
professions, focusing on the California State Bar disciplinary system in
crisis. In California, the Bar's self-regulatory powers were threatened,
forcing the Bar to reassert its justifications for the privilege of self-regu-
lation. The California example is thus a study of a crisis of cultural au-
81. [do
820 [do at 59.
83. [do at 86.
84. [do at 60.
85. [d. at 64.
86. As Abbott explains:
A jurisdictional claim made before the public Is generally a claim for the le-
gitimate control of a particular kind of work. This control means first and
foremost a right to perform the work as professionals see fit. Along with the
right to perform the work as It wishes, a profession normally also claims
rights to exclude other workers as deemed necessary, to dominate public def-
initions of the tasks concerned, and Indeed to impose professional definitions
of the tasks on competing professions. Public jurisdiction, In short, Is a claim
of both social and cultural authority.
Jd. at 60.
87. Jdo
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thority for the legal profession. At stake is not only control over lawyer
discipline but also control over the capacity to articulate professional
ideology.
A central theme of this study is the key theoretical link between self-
regulation, professional ideology, and professional cultural (or hegemon-
ic) control. Before turning to the contemporary crisis, however, it is first
necessary to understand the historical dimensions of this linkage, devel-
oped as lawyers in America were transformed in a traditional to a mod-
ern legal profession.
C. Self-Regulation in Historical Perspective
Self-regulation, along with a general system of legal ethics is one of the
cornerstones of the modern legal profession's ideology and world view.
The pre-modern legal profession often er\ioyed considerable autonomy
from the state and from external regulation. The ancient English Inns of
Court, for instance, were private guild-like bodies that possessed exten-
sive power to regulate admissions, etiquette, and conduct of barristers.
But it is only with the rise of a modern legal profession beginning in the
nineteenth century that self-regulation became such an integral part of
professional ideology and power. This section examines the development
of this linkage.
1. The Roots of Collegial Control
a. Continuities and discontinuities
One characteristic of professions is the need.to construct their cultural
authority. Self-regulation, as part of a broader system of professional
ethics and ideology, plays a crucial role in this process. The claim for
self-regulation is symbolically important because it is one resource a
profession can marshall to articulate its view of the world and the proper
role it plays in society. The successful attainment of self-regulatory pow-
ers, which is frequently grounded in a claim for superior ethicality and
specialized knowledge, both conveys and legitimizes professional prerog-
atives and status.sa Of course, a profession can also establish profession-
al authority on other grounds and by other means. 811 A central theme of
88. See Andrew Abbott, Professional Ethics, 88 AM. J. SOc. 855 (1983).
89. See, e.g., STARR, supra note 19; Stephen Botein, "What We Shall Meet A,fter.
wards in Heaven": Judgeship as a Symbol for Modern American Lawyers, in PRO-
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this chapter, however, is that this symbolic function of self-regulation
was particularly salient for the modem legal profession as it struggled to
create a new ideology of professionalism-and also to establish new
social institutions to articulate that ideology-in response to the decline
of the traditional social and legal order that had previously sustained the
profession and guaranteed its social status.
This argument highlights the discontinuities between the modern legal
profession and its antecedents. Thus, it is useful to fIrst delineate pre-
cisely why such a distinction is signifIcant. For example, many early
histories have failed to make such a rigid distinction. Indeed, they often
stress or even celebrate the ancient historical roots of law as one of the
"learned" or "gentlemanly" professions, and typically presume continui-
ties between the ancient and contemporary legal professions/Ill Such a
view, however, misses much. It suffers from a naive teleological bias that
emphasizes both the naturalness of the progression from a "gentlemanly"
to a modern elite profession, and the development of contemporary insti-
tutions (such as bar associations) appropriate to such development. As
such, it ignores key questions pertaining to when, why, and how the
modern legal profession developed its own unique bases of cultural au-
thority.
Other legal historians have generally been more sensitive to the com-
plexities and contingencies of professionalization.91 Yet it is theorists
such as Johnson and Larson who highlight the uniqueness of modern
professions.92 As Larson states: "The continuity of older professions with
their 'pre-industrial' past is ... more apparent than real."93 For Larson,
the modern professions are relatively recent social products whose emer-
gence coincides with industrialization. Modern professions, Larson ex-
plains, are quite different from their historical predecessors. The source
of professional power in pre-industrial society derives not from training
or credentialling but from social position and association with elite pa-
trons.94 Yet, as social conditions changed with the onset of industrial
FESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA (Gerald L. Geison, ed., 1983);
GERARD W. GAWALT, THE PROMISE OF POWER: THE EMERGENCE OF THE LEGAL PROFES-
SION IN MAsSACHUSETTS 1760-1840 (1979); THOMAS L. HAsKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF
PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE AssOCIATION AND THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS OF AUTHORITY (1977); MARy O. FuRNER, ADVOCACY AND
OBJECTIVITY: A CRISIS IN THE PROFESSIONALlZATlON OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 1865-
1905 (1975).
90. See, e.g., POUND, supra note 3; WARREN, supra note 3.
91. See generaUy JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAw: THE LAw '
MAKERS (1950); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw (2d ed. 1985).
92. See generaUy TERENCE J. JOHNSON, PROFESSIONAL POWER (1972); LARSON, supra
note 55.
93. See LARSoN, supra note 55, at xvi.
94. Id. at 4-5.
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society, so too did the bases for professional power: "From dependence
upon the power and prestige of elite patrons or upon the judgment of a
tightly knit community, the modem professions came to depend upon
specific formal training and anonymous certificates."96 Moreover, while
the modem legal profession undoubtedly incorporated some pre-industri-
al status criteria and ideological orientations, it also faced the need to
develop new sources of professional authority.96
This is a view that Duman successfully elaborates in his study of the
nineteenth century English legal profession.97 Duman demonstrates the
significance of what Johnson and Larson98 fmd so crucial: that the mod-
em legal profession arose in a social, economic, and cultural setting
vastly different from the one that sustained the traditional legal profes-
sionand its ideology of a "learned" and "gentlemanly" profession.99 As
Duman shows, the pre-modem legal profession derived its authority from
its close relationship with the landed aristocracy it served. lOll Additional-
ly, the aristocracy defmed the ideals.of the professional culture. IDI Chief
among these ideals was the concern for social status rather than the
intellectual or economic value of professional work lD2
The onset of industrialization, however, attenuated the close bonds
between the legal profession and the aristocracy.lll3 Increasingly, the le-
gal profession came to serve not the landed aristocracy, but the business
95. Id. at 4.
96. Id.
97. See Daniel Duman, The Creation and DiJfusion of a Professional Ideology in
Nineteenth Century England, 27 Soc. REV. 113 (1979).
98. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
99. See generaUy Duman, supra note 97.
100. Id. at 114-15.
101. Id. at 115.
102. Id. Discussing the professional ideals current in the 18th century, Duman
writes:
Professional men at that time emphasized the status and not the functions
connected with their occupations. Their social superiority was not dependent
upon the intellectual intensity, or on the social or economic worth of their
work. On the contrary, the professions were valued as occupations which
provided their practitioners with an appropriate environment and sufficient
resources-leisure and sometimes finances-to live a life which was indica-
tive of their superior station. The professions served as a means to an
end-to the gentlemanly life, to the right social milieu and to acceptance as
a member of the nation's social elite.
Id.
103. Id.
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and industrial class.104 The result was a shift from the dominant patron-
professional relationship, characterized by the dependency of profession-
als on aristocratic custom and largesse, to a new professional-client rela-
tionship, characterized by the dependency of the client on the expertise,
skill, and promise of the professional to provide quality service.106 Be-
cause of this shift, the social and occupational ideals of the legal profes-
sion became more independent of the client. lOtI However, this produced
an identity crisis for lawyers. 107 The legal profession could no longer
claim superior social status based on its connection with the aristocra-
cy.11J8 As Duman argues, the profession's increasingly close relationship
to business and industry threatened to undermine its professional status:
"Professional men were left to defend the social position which they had
inherited from their pre-industrial predecessors, but Without the support
of a high status clientele."109
Partly in response to this crisis, the legal profession began to develop
a unique, self-conscious, and group-oriented ideology in the early nine-
teenth century that stressed:
[T]he importance of specialized training, the need to test practitioners' compe-
tence, and the exacting demands of professional work, [professionals] began to
view their occupations as desirable and' useful ends in themselves. Based upon a
common understanding of their social functions and ethical obligations, this ideol-
ogy was fundamental to the development of the professions as a distinct social
entity. Even more importantly, however, it provided professional men with a mor-
al justification for their claim to high social status-namely the service ideal. liD
The emerging professional ideology was eclectic. It incorporated ele-
ments of both aristocratic and entrepreneurial ideals. It stressed, among
other things, a view of professional duty to client and society, Important-
ly, the pre-industrial gentlemanly heritage of professions was never fully
eradicated, but instead was subsumed into the new professional ideolo-
gy.lII In place of the aristocratic notion of a gentleman came one more
104. [d.
105. [d.
106. [d. at 115-16.
107. [d. at 117.
108. [d. at 116,
109. [d. at 117.
110. [d.
111. In an interesting recent historical study, Haber argues that the American pro-
fessions retain a distinctive sense of gentlemanly honor and authority that derives
from the model of an 18th century English gentleman. See generally SAMUEL HABER,
THE QUEST FOR AUTHORITY AND HONOR IN THE AMERICAN PROFESSIONS, 1750-1900
(1991). Haber's argument is important, primarily because it avoids the Instrumentalism
implicit in both Larson's and Johnson's accounts of professional ideology. See supra
notes 52-59 and accompanying text (discussing the theories of Larson and Johnson).
On the other hand, Haber's analysis falters because he too readily dismisses any
understanding of professional Ideology as a form of hegemonic control. See id.
506
[Vol. 22: 485, 1995] Ideologies ofProfessionalism
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
suited to the changed social conditions of the nineteenth century.llZ In
this new professional world view, professional superiority was founded
on moral superiority, and grounded in a commitment to public ser-
vice. 1I3
Duman's concern is with the emergence and diffusion of this new
professional ideology and not with the institutional arrangement by
which it is articulated. However, in a recent study also focusing on the
English bar during the early-modem period, Pue makes this link explic-
it. 114 He shows how the Bar's system of disciplinary enforcement of pro-
fessional etiquette and ethical ideals (or self-regulation) helped to project
an image of professional dedication to public service, to shape modem
professional ideology, and to bolster professional authority during a peri-
od when this authority was severely challenged. liS
The process of self-regulation has thus been an integral resource with
which the modem legal profession has shaped its professional ideology
and authority. What needs to be examined, then, is precisely how this re-
source developed in the American context.
b. The pre-modern era
The early colonial period in America was not a hospitable setting for
the development of a legal profession.1I6 Few of the early colonists
were lawyers. 1I7 This was partly due to the fact that the largely agrarian
colonial economy had little need for full-time legal practitioners. Equally
important was the pervasive anti-lawyer sentiment that stemmed from,
among other sources, religious antipathy for lawyers and litigation, Uto-
pian yearnings for government without law and lawyers, animosity to-
wards the English legal system and its servants, and the desire of self-
sufficient planters and merchants to control their own affairs. liS
What legal work that arose was handled by litigants themselves. liD
Where this was not feasible or advisable, there was a variety of part-time
112. Duman, supra note 97, at 119.
113. Id. at 119-20.
114. See W. Wesley Pue, Moml Panic at the English Bar: Paternal vs. Commercial
Ideologies of Practice in the 1860s, 15 L. & SOc. INQUIRY 49 (1990).
115. Id. at 81.
116. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 81-84.
117:. Id. at 81.
118. Id. at 82.
119. Id. at 83.
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legal and occasional practitioners who handled cases for others while
also pursuing other occupations. One scholar has shown, for instance,
how attorneys in the county and provincial courts in early colonial Mary-
land can be divided into "four major categories of part-time practitio-
ners: l20 (1) planter-attorneys, who might have had some acquaintance
with the law during the course of their education and who worked on
occasion in their own counties; (2) clerk-attorneys, some of whom had
lost their governmental positions due to the "vicissitudes of politics and
patronage"121 and some of whom were newly arrived to the colony· and,
unable to secure positions suitable to their training, turned to the prac-
tice of law for support; (3) merchant planter-attorneys, who were typical-
ly immigrants with previous commercial connections with the colony and
who upon arrival worked in law to protect their business interests; and
(4) entrepreneur-attorneys, who were both "occupationally and geograph-
ically mobile"l22 and who practiced law as only one of several occupa-
tional pursuits. One such entrepreneur, for example, held jobs as a ship-
wright, carpenter, innholder, planter, and lawyer before leaving Mary-
land.123
Several early colonies actually prohibited professional lawyers, prefer-
ring instead that individuals act as their own advocates in legal mat-
ters: 124 For example, the Body of Liberties, which was Massachusetts
colony's fIrst written law code, disallowed the payment of fees to legal
practitioners. l25 Other colonies, such as Virginia, went so far as to make
the professional practice of law itself illegal. l26
Despite these formidable obstacles, the need for a full-time legal pro-
fession developed along with the growth of commerce and the rise of
land speculation.127 Colonial offIcials began to view lawyers as a "neces-
120. See Alan F. Day, Lawyers in Colonial Maryland, 1660-1715, 17 AM. J. LEGAL
RiST. 145, 147-49 (1973).
121. ld. at 148.
122. ld. at 149.
123. ld. (referring to Michael Judd).
124. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 81. Or, more likely, they preferred that people
avoid courts altogether. A prominent theme in colonial legal culture, and indeed
throughout American history, is an emphasis on harmony and conciliation, and an
intolerance for litigation and litigants. See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE
WITIlOUT LAw? RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT LAWYERS 3-30 (1983).
125. See 1 ANToN-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA
75 (1965) (section 26 provides "[e)very man that flndeth himselfe unfit to plead his
owne cause in any Court shall have Libertle to imploy any man against whom the
Court doth not except, to help him, Provided, he give him noe fee or reward for his
palnes"). .
126. See Alan M. Smith, Virginia Lawyers, 1680-1776: The Birth of an American Pro-
fession 280 (1967) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Johns Hopkins University).
127. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 84.
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sary evil rather than an outright abomination."I28 Consequently, there
was a shift from prohibitory legislation to regulation of the legal profes-
sion. Regulations, of course, varied both over time and between jurisdic-
tions. They were often quite extensive and generally entailed some com-
bination of control of the legal profession by the executive, the legisla-
ture, and the courts. Thus, it was the state rather than the profession
that typically regulated lawyers. 128
Regulations dealt with both standards for admission and control of
post-admission conduct. ISO In a 1732 Virginia act, for example, the
Governor's CoUncil was empowered to suspend or disbar an attorney for
violating the required attorney's oath.131 Similarly, the Act granted
courts considerable control over attorneys who practiced before them,
including the power to order an attorney to pay all costs resulting from
wilful neglect of a case before the COurt. l32 Also, early lawyer regulation
128. See Smith, supra note 126, at 280.
129. See, e.g., id. at 269.
130. Sometimes the focus of regulation was the competence of the lawyer and not
merely his ethics. In a 1720 Massachusetts court regulation, a lawyer whose client
had been nonsuited due to an error in the lawyer's writ was required to redraft a
new writ without charging an additional fee. See GAWALT, supra note 89, at 10.
131. See Smith, supra note 126, at 312.
132. [d. at 313. Occasionally, such powers were exercised in quite colorful contexts.
One scholar of this period writes of a "rather spectacular example of the misbehavior
of an attorney" and the response of a Virginia county court in 1730;
Prosser was the attorney for the plaintiff in the case of Wiles v. Hughes.
When the case was called, Prosser began without the permission of the court
to question Hughes before he was sworn as a witness. The court admonished
him for this breach of proper procedure. Prosser answered that if he was
not allowed to speak for his client he would consider the court to have
perpetrated an iI\iustice and that he would ask any questions he pleased. The
court then demanded that Prosser enter into bond giving security for his
good behavior. Prosser refused and was taken by the sheriff to the jail to be
kept until he paid fIfty pounds security conditioned on his good behavior for
a year and a day. The court attempted to proceed with the case of Wiles v.
Hughes but discovered that Prosser had possession of the declaration in the
case. First the sheriff and then the clerk were sent to demand the declara-
tion from Prosser, but he refused to give it to them. Prosser was then sum-
moned before the court but said he would not produce the declaration so
long as he was held a prisoner. The court then held him guilty of a breach
of behavior, fIned him fIve pounds and ordered the sheriff to keep him in
jail until he paid. The court was still unable to proceed without the declara-
tion, however, and again sent the sheriff to bring Prosser and his papers
before the court so that they might be searched for the declaration. The
sheriff returned alone, reporting that Prosser was defending himself in the jail
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often set maximum fees that could be assessed for professional servic-
es. l33 The rates were typically low, and this type of external control
over the legal profession was accordingly a constant source of irritation
for lawyers. 134
Increasingly, however, there were a number of self-conscious collective
attempts by lawyers to assert professional power and authority.136 These
attempts met with varying success. In 1774, for example, Virginia
lawyers' efforts at protesting against low statutory legal fees were a ma-
jor factor in closing the colony's COurts. 136 Such protests had to do with
more than money. They were also an expression of the increased cohe-
sion and power of lawyers. Haber, in fact, argues that lawyers' activity in
pushing for controls over admission to the profession and influencing fee
legislation indicates the rise of the legal profession's cultural authority
during this period.137 Haber views the profession's ready ability to
equate professional betterment (in the form of entry restrictions and
higher fees) with the public good (which was the justification for such
improvements) as proof that lawyers were "acting in an atmosphere of
moral legitimacy that supported their increasing assertiveness and al-
lowed them to apply their full strength in order to get what they want-
ed."I38
Lawyers attempted to construct their authority along two dimensions.
The fIrst was ideological. Drawing on the model of an idealized English
gentlemanly class, the legal profession attempted to create a public im-
age of lawyers as a class of gentlemen. The second dimension was insti-
tutional. Chief among the institutional bases for establishing professional
power was the bar association.
Initially, the legal profession turned to the formation of bar associa-
tions as a means to assert their collective interests and to bolster profes-
sional authority and gentlemanly statUS. 1OO Bar associations existed as
with a sword. The court then ordered the sheriff to summon a guard and
keep' Prosser In jail without food and drink until he delivered up his weap-
ons and papers. Two months later, Prosser was finally released after giving
bond for good behavior and was refused an appeal.
[d. at 322-23.
133. [d. at 327.
134. [d. at 327-43.
135. [d.
136. [d. at 339.
137. See HABER, supra note 111, at 74-75.
138. [d.
139. One likely model for colonial bar associations was the Society of Gentleman
Practisers In the Courts of Law and Equity, founded by London attorneys In 1739.
The goals of this English society were to promote the gentlemanly status of the pro-
fession (or perhaps more accurately, to extend such status to the attorney branch of
the profession, since the elite barristers were already secure In their status as gen-
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early as colonial times. 140 Although many organizations functioned pri-
marily as social or dining clubs for lawyers, some also played an active
role. in promulgating rules pertaining to entry and educational require-
ments, fee schedules, and post-admission lawyer conduct. 141 Educational
requirements frequently stressed the need for lawyers to have had a "lib-
eral" (i.e., classical) education, which, following the English tradition, it-
self conferred much status as a gentleman. 142
The success of these organizations prior to the Revolution varied.
Gawalt has shown, for example, that the pre-Revolution bar associations
in Massachusetts were successful in generating regulations for governing
the legal profession, but were only moderately successful in enforcing
them. lola Despite bar association efforts to promote stiff entrance re-
quirements to the profession, many untrained and unsanctioned practi-
tioners continued to work in the courts, particularly in rural counties. l44
Moreover, the associations were hampered by their very nature as volun-
tary organizations, which precluded disciplining or otherwise enforcing
regulations on anyone but member attorneys. Even when dealing with
members, the associations were not fully effective in having their regula-
tory authority recognized by the COurts. 145 Judges, who were infrequent-
ly attorneys, were simply not receptive to the notion that the only
guarantee of lawyer competence lay in professional control over the
lawyers who appeared before them in COurt. l48
The pre-Revolution bar associations were able, however, to voice the
collective interests and views of the growing American legal profession.
Importantly, they were able 'to draw on and rearticulate an ideology of
the gentlemanly status of law as a profession. These organizations of-
fered an institutional means to give some cohesion and solidarity to a
varied and geographically dispersed profession. 147 Moreover, they were
instrumental in identifying professional goals and values. On the eve of
tlemen professionals), to stiffen entrance requirements and exclude "irregular practitio-
ners" (i.e., those not trained or certified by the Society), and to secure powers of
self-regulation over practitioner conduct. See GAWALT, supm note 89, at 11-12.
140. For general histories of bar associations In America, see generally POUND, su-
pm note 3; WARREN, supm note 3.
141. [d.
142. See GAWALT, supra note 89, at 18-19.
143. [d. at 22-30.
144. [d. at 22.
145. [d.
146. [d. at 24-26.
147. [d.
511
the Revolution, however, many of these goals remained inchoate since
there was insufficient public and judicial support for the profession's
claims for authority to regulate itself.
The post-Revolution legal profession faced renewed efforts at external
regulation, and even elimination, by the state. l48 Public hostility towards
the profession stemmed in part from the lawyers' role in the booming
debt collection practice that followed the Revolution. 149 Public suspicion
of the self-serving and monopolistic nature of bar association regulations
and "reforms" similarly fueled antipathy towards lawyers. l50 Neverthe-
less, lawyers continued to use the bar associations as a means to assert
their collective will and authority. By 1810, Gawalt tells us, Massachu-
setts lawyers had achieved considerable autonomy and power through
bar association efforts; that year, the supreme judicial court adopted as
its own various rules and standards promulgated by local bar associa-
tions pertaining to admission and educational requirements. 1M Addition-
ally, the supreme court mandated that henceforth locai bar associations
were to have the formai legal power to control admission to the profes-
sion by requiring candidates to secure the recommendation of the local
association where he had studied, as a prerequisite to admission to prac-
tice before any COurt. l62 "With these rules," Gawalt writes, "the bar asso-
ciations achieved their peak of institutional autonomy, and the profession
had its most complex formal standards before the twentieth century. "1M
But bar associations were not the only institutional source of profes-
sional power. In fact, by the mid-nineteenth century bar associations
were eclipsed in many respects by the development of the modem law
school. As part of their efforts to elevate professional status and authori-
ty, bar associations had quite consciously drawn on an ideological model
of gentlemanly status and authority. Through bar associations, the legal
profession modeled legal education in a manner befitting such gentle-
manly status. This often consisted of a requirement for a liberal educa-
tion followed by training in a system of apprenticeship monitored by the
associations themselves. Yet some segments of the profession realized
that there was considerable power to be derived from viewing law as a
scientific system rather than a di!ijointed set of rules, and they attempted
to construct the institutional base appropriate for reshaping legal educa-
tion along these lines: the university affiliated law school. 1M
148. Id. at 81-118.
149. See POUND, supra note 3, at 179-80.
150. Id.
151. GAWALT, supra note 89, at 116-17.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 117.
154. See, e.g., id. at 129-158. For a detailed discussion of the development of the
law school in American history, see generally ROBERT B. STEVENS, LAw SCHOOL: LEGAL
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Thus, the role of early bar associations in constructing professional au-
thority is mixed. Clearly the Bar benefited from having an organization
such as the bar association to articulate a collective voice and view of
the profession in the public arena and to foster a sense of group cohe-
sion and identity. It is also certainly true that a professional ideology of
superior ethics and public service, which were modern adaptations of the
gentlemanly model of professions, enhance professional stature. More-
over, there were notable successes by bar associations, particularly in
the areas of control over entry requirements and some post-admissions
regulations. l56 However, the legal profession did not achieve extensive
self-regulatory powers of the type it won in the later nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. At that time, bar associations no longer had a prima-
ry role in shaping legal education but did reassume a prominent role as
generators of professional ideology that once again revolved around the
gentlemanly and public-spirited image of the legal profession. The re-
emergence of this ideology helped shape the modern legal profession, its
institutional arrangements, and its professional authority and power.
c. Modern bar associations and the reassertion of
professional mandate
As Halliday reminds us in his study of the Chicago Bar Association:
"The politics of expertise are contingent on an authority that can be
constructed only through assiduous and persistent effort. "156 Beginning
in the 1870s, the American legal profession once again turned to bar
associations as the central mechanism to assert its professional mandate
and construct that authority.
This development followed over three decades in which lawyers as a
group did not pursue professional goals collectively since bar aSsocia-
tions generally fell into desuetude between the 1830s and 1870s.157
Pound and others characterize this period as "The Era of Decadence. "11;8
But, as Bloomfield has argued, such a characterization "overemphasizes
the role of formal organization as the appropriate yardstick by which to
measure the strength of professionalism within the bar."11;9 During this
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 18508 TO THE 19808 (1983).
155. See generally GAWALT, supra note 89.
156. See HAwDAY, supra note 20, at 59.
157. POUND, supra note 3, at 223.
158. [d.
159. See Maxwell Bloomfield, Lawyers and Public Criticism: Challenge and Re-
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period ,of Jacksonian democracy, the American legal profession
prospered in many respects, even though bar associations did not. lOO
What, then, were the reasons behind the re-emergence and rapid devel-
opment of modern bar associations in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries?161 There were clearly a number of factors. Linking these
factors together, however, were elite lawyers' perceptions of the tenuous-
ness of their status and authority in the face of substantial social and
professional changes, and elite lawyers' concerns over the need to con-
struct and justify a coherent professional self-image.
One explanation for the rise of the modern bar associations during this
period is that it was simply part of a broader trend towards the forma-
tion of an organizational society:62 But other factors influenced this de-
velopment as well. This period witnessed an enormous growth in the
number of lawyers, an increase in the heterogeneity of the profession,
the concentration of many lawyers in large urban areas, and a shift in the
dominant type of practice from courtroom to office work. This combina-
tion made informal control of the profession less effective and created a
need for more, formal regulation, a notion which the profession itself ad-
vanced. l63 While this explanation is partially true, it risks downplaying
some of the baser motivations undoubtedly associated with the rise of
bar associations. 164
sponse in Nineteenth-Century America, 15 AM. J. LEGAL RIST. 269, 269 (1971).
160. FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 278; see also DAVID H. CALHOUN, PROFESSIONAL
LIvEs IN AMERICA: STRUCTURE AND AsPIRATION, 1750-1850, at 59 (1965). Further, the
fact that admission to the profession was relatively open did not mean that there
were no controls over lawyers. lnformal controls were undoubtedly Important, par-
ticularly in the early circuit-riding system where lawyers and judges traveled and
lived together to visit the local county courts. Id. at 60-61. Additionally, "the market
for legal services remained a harsh and efficient control" that would, weed out many
of the inept and untrustworthy. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 278.
161. By 1899 only four states had not yet made efforts to establish state or local
bar associations. See generally Terence C. Halliday, et al., Minimalist Organizations:
Vital Events in State Bar Associations, 1970-1930, 52 AM. Soc. REV. 456 (1987).
162. See, e.g., CORINNE L. GILB, HIDDEN HIERARCHIES: THE PROFESSIONS AND GoVERN-
MENT 17 (1966) ("To articulate and sustain the new and needed levels of professional-
Ism, and to hold their own In a society whose various other members were in-
creasingly organized, the professions, too, formed organizations."). See generally ROB-
ERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877-1920 (1967). For a contrary view, see
generally WAYNE K. HOBSON, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE ORGANIZATION-
AL SOCIETY, 1890-1930 (1986).
163. See Theodore J. Schneyer, The Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept: Gener-
alizing from the Wisconsin Case, 1983 AM. B. 'FOUND. RES. J. I, 16 (1983).
'164. Auerbach, for example, argues quite forcefully that bar associations' develop-
ment of, and emphasis on, professional self-regulation during their early years was an
attempt by elites within the profession, motivated by anti-ethnic bias, to control the
burgeoning immigrant bar. See AUERBACH, supra note 21, at 95-129; see also HOBSON,
supra note 162, at 301-<l4. Hobson shows how the elite bar's anti-ethnlc campalgn
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In addition, the very real concerns about corruption within the judicia-
ry and legal profession, threatening to delegitimize the entire legal sys-
tem and, hence, undermine the role and authority of lawyers also
spurred the development of bar associations. 1M In 1870, a small group
of elite corporate lawyers established the Association of the Bar .of the
City of New York (ABCNY) in response to widespread judicial and politi-
cal corruption in New York City.lOO This corruption stemmed both from
Tammany Hall control over city politics and the judiciary to the much
publicized scandals involving leading lawyers, judges, and legislators,
which' "made a mockery of the law" and threatened to undermine the
legitimacy of the legal system and of lawyers. 167 Similarly, in 1874, an
elite core of lawyers formed the Chicago Bar Association (CBA), whose
stated goal was to "maintain the honor and dignity of the profession" and
who turned their organization's reformist attention to the city's corrupt
legal system and judiciary.l68 This same concern animated the formation
of the first successful national bar association, the American Bar Associ-
ation (ABA), in 1878.169 The formation of the ABA was an elite effort
that included as its chief aim, the restoration of the "honor, integrity, and
fame of the profession in its two manifestations of the Bench and Bar."170
was symbolically important. It identified a convenient low-status scapegoat for the
profession and it allowed elite lawyers to assert their superior status and ethicality.
This campaign also allowed the elite bar to defme the "dirty work" of the profession
as that work typically done by low status solo and small firm practitioners who
worked for individual rather than corporate clients. Id.; see also Andrew Abbott, Sta-
tus and Status Stmin in the Profession, 86 AM. J. Soc. 819 (1981).
165. See HOBSON, supra note 162, at 217-19.
166. See PoWELL, supra note 20, at 6-28.
167. Id.; see also John A. Matzko, The Best Men of the Bar: The Founding of the
American Bar Association, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CML WAR
AMERICA 79 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984).
In 1868, the leaders of the New York City bar had begun a shifting fratricidal
struggle on behalf of Cornelius Vanderbilt, Daniel Drew, Jay Gould, and Jim
Fisk, who were attempting to gain control of the Erie Railroad. When judges
as well as legislators and lawyers proved for sale to the highest bidder, the
legal system nearly collapsed Into anarchy. Soon after an armed conflict be-
tween two hired gangs on the Erie tracks outside Binghamton was halted by
the state militia, a call for an organization of the New York City bar began
to circulate.
Id.
168. See HALuDAY, supra note 20, at 64-67.
169. See Matzko, supra note 167, at 80.
170. Id. (citations omitted) (discussing the formation of the ABA).
During much of this period, the organized bar focused on the encroachment of
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Given the organizers' acute awareness of the need to enhance the law's
image as a profession, it is perhaps no surprise that among the fIrst func-
tions initiated by bar associations were those primarily devoted to pro-
fessional image and refonn. For example, the fIrst committees estab-
lished by the ABCNY were those dealing with grievances against lawyers
and refonning the judiciary.171 These committees investigated com-
plaints against lawyers and judges and initiated disciplinary or impeach-
ment actions in meritorious cases. l72 Similarly, of the fIve committees
fIrst founded by the CBA, three were concerned with professional image
and standing, including the Grievance Committee, that disciplined unpro-
fessional lawyers. l73 By establishing such committees, the elite bar asso-
ciations attempted to assert their superior ethicality as professionals and·
hence, their authority to derme the parameters of professional conduct
for lawyers and judges.174 In short, the modem bar associations were
asserting their mandate to self-regulate. 175
The foundations of this mandate developed rather quickly. In the late
1870s, the ABCNY Grievance Committee established an important prece-
dent by agreeing to investigate and bring charges against an attorney for
bribing a witness. 176 Previously, only the courts had initiated miscon-
duct proceedings against lawyers. 177 There was little activity from the
ABCNY Grievance Committee immediately after this, but in 1884 the
committee voted to extend its disciplinary power over lawyers to non-
members within its jurisdiction as well as members. l78 With this move
the bar also increased the scope of its purview over lawyer misconduct.
Whereas previously the courts had confIned their policing of the profes-
sion to actual courtroom behavior, the bar's assertion of disciplinary
its professional turf and the concomitant threat of the demise of a lawyer-centric
view of the law due to the rise of administrative law and increased rationalization of
the law by legislation. For an account of this shift, see HURST, supra note 91, at 187-
88. See also HOBSON, supra note 162, at 62-65 (noting that a prominent complaint of
lawyers at the time was "overlegislation").
171. See POWELL, supra note 20, at 18.
172. [d. As Powell writes:
In establishing these committees the ABCNY was taking the moral high
ground and asserting that, although representing a minority of the members
of the New York Bar, it could and would define acceptable standards of
professional apd judicial conduct and act to discipline those lawyers or judg-
es who brought the bar and bench into disrepute.
[d. at 18-19.
173. See HALUDAY, supra note 20, at 68.
174. [d. at 68-69.
175. [d. at 68-75.
176. See POWELL, supra note 20, at 19.
177. [d.
178. [d.
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authority over all lawyers-a move that was given de facto recognition by
the courtsl79-meant that an organization existed that could act on com-
plaints regarding lawyers' behavior outside of court as well. l80 By 1892,
the ABCNY Grievance Committee even acquired the authority to initiate
investigations of its own accord, a power that, while infrequently used,
indicated the growing strength of the bar's disciplinary mandate. 181
The ABCNY was a "pioneer" in forming a successful model of self-
regulation during the earliest years of its development. lll2 Although the
ABCNY Grievance Committee was not necessarily successful in terms of
the number of lawyers it disciplined, its importance lay in the "symbolic
significance of its control over lawyer discipline."183
Voluntary bar associations such as the ABCNY and CBA constructed a
model and ideology of self-regulation that was both symbolically impor-
tant and highly influential. This became a model that the legal profession
tried to institutionalize nationwide in the move to establish mandatory
bar associations.
2. The Institutionalization of Collegial Control
By the early years of the twentieth century, private bar associations
had established a model of professional collegial control that stressed a
public service ideal, a view that lawyers were properly key players in
significant social reform efforts, and an image of professional moral su-
periority. This model influenced and strengthened the bar's status as
arbiter of professional standards and as creator of professional ideology.
179. [d. In New York, only the supreme court had the power to disbar or suspend
errant attorneys, but it generally deferred to the Grievance Committee's recommenda-
tions. [d. at 19-20.
180. [d. Misuse of client funds or improper solicitation were common subjects of
complaints acted upon by the ABCNY. [d.
181. [d. at 20.
182. [d.
183. [d. at 27. As Powell writes:
The development of disciplinary machinery and the Institutionalization of
a voluntary association's right to investigate complaints and bring charges
against all lawyers was fundamentally important to the professionalization
process. The pioneer work of the ABCNY Grievance Committee contributed
significantly to the development of professional self-regulation, in particular
encouraging the impression that the bar was, and should be, responsible for
its own discipline.
[d.
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The Progressive era movement toward mandatory bar membership in all
states was an effort to establish this newly found authority nationwide.
a. The unified bar movement and the consolidation of
professional power
The unified bar movemene84 was part of broader Progressive era re-
form efforts, but was the brainchild of one influential reformer: Herbert
Harley, a former small-town lawyer and newspaper editor.1M As an edi-
tor, Harley advocated various progressive reform efforts, including the
development of small claims courts, improving judicial selection, and
reforming court procedures!86 During a 1912 visit to Ontario, where he
examir,ed judicial reforms in Toronto, Harley became acquainted with
the Law Society of Upper Canada. This was a guild-like professional
association for lawyers that was as autonomous and powerful as the
English Inns of COurt. l87 The Law Society was an organization to which
all practicing lawyers in its jurisdiction had to belong and pay dues. The
Society not only controlled admission to the bar, but also entry to the
Osgoode Hall Law School, and post-admission discipline of lawyers. ISS
This example of professional control inspired Harley to envision what
the legal profession might be able to achieve in the United States, should
the often weak and underpopulated voluntary bar associations be trans-
formed into compulsory organizations with expanded powers befitting
lawyers' professional status.
Upon his return to the United States, Harley advocated for the estab-
lishment of nationwide collegial control of the legal profession along the
model of the Law Society!SS Harley was not alone in his vision, and he
gathered support for his proposal to create mandatory-membership asso-
ciations from Roscoe Pound and other luminaries. 11lO With the help of a
generous local benefactor, Harley established the American Judicature
Society in 1913 to study and fight for bar unification and other legal re-
forms. 191
The central goal of the bar unification movement was to create an
autonomous, self-regulating, prosperous, and influential legal profession.
184. A "unified" bar, also variously referred to as an "Integrated" or "mandatory"
bar, Is one In which dues-paying membership Is a prerequisite to the privilege of
licensure In a particular state. See Schneyer, supra note 163, at 1 n.l.
185. See DAYTON D. McKEAN, THE INTEGRATED BAR 30-51 (1963).
186, [d. at 32.
187. [d. at 33.
188. [d.
189. [d.
190. [d.
191. [d.
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To further that goal Harley considered it necessary to create mandatory
bar associations with, the power to establish their own admissions crite-
ria, promulgate ethical rules to guide the profession, issue subpoenas to
aid in ,lawyer discipline investigations, and sanction errant lawyers. l92
These were broad and unprecedented powers for any occupational
group, and were to lead the bar into "a golden age 'in the future far out-
shining that other supposedly golden age of the pre-civil war years. '''193
From the beginning of the bar unification movement, Harley was sensi-
tive to the' claim that the movement's aims were purely monopolistic.
Harley responded to a letter written by a judge that criticized the "closed
shop" mentality of bar unification by publishing both the letter and his
editorial response in the American Judicature Society Journal. "The
judge," Harley wrote, "should take more exercise in the open air, and eat
frugally of laxative foods. "194
Harley understood that bar unification was a restrictive' device that
limited competition; but this was precisely the point. Harley held that
only with an adequate income could a lawyer have the proper ethical
orientation and grounding. Bar unification, then, would help upgrade the
profession both by limiting access to the profession to a better class of
lawyers and by removing fmancial constraints that might lead to unscru-
pulous practice, thus allowing lawyers the necessary leisure to realize
their proper public role and responsibilities. In commenting on the effect
of the bar-controlled admissions he witnessed in Canada, Harley re-
, marked:
[W)hen admission is won finally there is compensation. The candidate finds him-
self in a profession which is looked up to. He is free from the demoralizing com-
petition which dulls the conscience of· the young practitioner in the States. He is
not impelled by starvation to cruise along the ragged coast of impropriety....
Improving professional ethics and regulation was the principle argu-
ment behind bar unification in every state. l96 The claim was that in-
creased membership dues generated by a mandatory bar would provide
192. See Herbert Harley, Redeeming of the Profession, 2 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y
105, 118-21 (1918).
193. HALLIDAY, supra. note 20, at 80 (quoting Herbert Harley, An American Bar in
the Making, 10 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 103 (1926)).
194. McKEAN, supra note 185, at 25.
195. [d. at 33-34.
196. See William A Glaser, Three Papers on the Integrated Bar, Part I: Organization,
and Part II: The Debate' (1960) (unpublished papers prepared for the New York State
Bar Association and the Columbia University School of Law, Columbia University,
Bureau of Applied Social Research).
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funding for a comprehensive disciplinary apparatus for policing the bar
in each state. Further, mandatory membership would facilitate beneficial
collegial relations, instill a sense of collective duties and ethics, and thus
prevent discipline problems from arising in the first place. l97 Finally,
proponents argued that bar control over the admissions process would
improve the character and honor of lawyers. Only independent bar asso-
ciations could be properly selective since they would not be subject to
the same political constraints felt by courts and legislatures to keep ad-
missions standards lax and entry to the profession relatively easy. 198
Other arguments advanced in support of bar unification included the
claim that only a unified bar could speak with a united and authoritative
voice on important public policy issues. Legislatures are unlikely to give
credence to positions taken by voluntary bar associations, which are
exclusive and thus never representative of the bar as a whole. Supporters
envisioned that a unified bar, as a democratic and self-governing body,
would have the resources to make its positions on policy issues known
to the legislature and could claim to speak with authority for the entire
bar and not simply a small professional elite. 199
Naturally, there were counter argwnents to each of these assertions.
For example, successful and influential elite private bar associations
such as the ABCNY had been established on precisely the opposite un-
derstanding of their professional and moral authority.200 William
Guthrie, then the president of the ABCNY, vehemently opposed the bar
unification movement.201
The argwnents supporting bar unification portray an ideology of law-
yers as properly ethical, self-regulating, and prominently involved in pub-
lic policy issues of the day. The development of the unified bars success-
fully constructed this vision. The first states to unify were smaller states
197. [d. at 2-3. Harley thus envisioned professional associations functioning very
much like Durkheim's corps intermediaires. For an interesting discussion of this
notion of the professional "community" and Its historical roots, see Thomas 1..
Haskell, Professionalism versus Capitalism: R.B. Taumey, Emile Durkheim, and C.S.
Peirce on the Disinleresledness of Professional Communities, in THE AUTHORITY OF
EXPERTS: STUDIES IN HIsToRY AND THEORY (Thomas H. Haskell ed., 1984).
198. See Glaser, supra note 196, Part II at 9.
199. [d. at 9-14.
200. See Powell, supra note 20.
201. As Powell explains:
Asserting that the source of the authority of voluntary bar associations such
as the ABCNY lay In the fact that they were "representative not so much of
the whole bar as representative of the elite of the bar, of the best part of
the bar," Guthrie warned that "democratizing the Bar" would have disastrous
consequences for ethical standards.
POWELL, supra note 20, at 28.
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with fairly homogeneous bars. Larger states, which ha4 more heteroge-
neous bars and already functioning volWltary bar associations, success-
fully resisted bar unification.202 Specifically, North Dakota was the fIrst
state to create a unified bar in 1921, followed by Alabama in 1923, and
New Mexico in 1925.203 In 1927, California became the fIrst large indus-
trial state to unify its bar.2!ll
i. The birth of the California State Bar
The creation of the State Bar of California by legislation in 1927 was
not only an early and influential victory for the proponents of bar unifi-
cation, it was also the culmination of decades of work by the organized
legal profession in the state. VolWltary bar associations had been estab-
lished in major California cities since the resurgence of the modem bar
association. The San Francisco Bar Association was established in 1872
and its COWlterpart in Los Angeles was fOWlded in 1888.2011 A nominally
statewide bar association was formed in San Francisco as early as 1889,
but it was short-lived, as were two other such associations established in
the city prior to the 1906 earthquake.206
There were formidable barriers to statewide organization of the profes-
sion in California The great size of the state made the logistics of colle-
giality problematic, particularly since transportation between various re-
gions was inadequate.207 Rural distrust for urban lawyers was another
factor inhibiting statewide organization as was North-South intrastate
animosity, indicated best perhaps by an 1888 attempt by Southern Cali-
fornia residents to divide the State in two.208
There was also a natural impediment to professional cohesion deriving
from the large numbers of newly-arrived attorneys from out of state. The
period between the latter part of the nineteenth and the early twentieth
.century was one of extraordinary population growth in California, espe-
cially in the southern part of the state. The population of Los Angeles,
for instance, increased nearly six-fold from 102,479 to over 577,000 be-
202. See generally McKEAN, supra note 185.
203. [d.
204. [d. at 41-46. Idaho had passed legislation unifying Its bar In 1923, but the Ida-
ho Supreme Court held this statute to be unconstitutional the following year. [d.
205. See Glib, supra note 20, at 32. This account of the birth of the State Bar In
Callfornla derives largely from Glib's study. [d. at 28-78, 101-29.
206. [d. at 35.
207. [d.
208. [d.
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tween 1900-1920.209 Moreover, many of these immigrants were attorneys
who competed fiercely with each other as well as with lay competitors
and bank and trust company practitioners for business.21o So many were
lawyers, in fact, that the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce produced a
brochure in 1912 that, Gilb writes, bluntly warned would-be migrant law-
yers that "[T]his is probably the least promising city of the size in the
United States for lawyers and other professional men. If you seek em-
ployment of this kind, do not come here.1t211
Despite these obstacles, the California Bar Association (CBA) became
the first statewide bar organization when it was founded in 1909.212 Yet
the Association struggled to wield any real collective power. Prior to
'1917, few of its measures proposed to the state legislature were enacted
into law.213 Further, when the Association did succeed in this tas~14 it
found that even in victory "we are laughed at in the interior .... We
have men who refuse to join our Association .... They not only do not
join, but they ridicule US.1t215
Local bar associations also had limited influence on public policy is-
sues and on professional regulation. In 1917, the San Francisco Bar Asso-
ciation attempted to have two police court judges disciplined who had
been charged with accepting bribes to dismiss criminal cases pending
before their COurts.216 While successful in having the judges recalled, the
Association could not persuade the supreme court to disbar them.217 In
this same year, and partly in response to its lack of success in pUrsuing
the police court judges, the San Francisco Bar Association attempted to
upgrade its professional status. This attempt echoed similar attempts by
the CBA to acquire the power to issue subpoenas to aid in disciplinary
investigations and to exercise greater regulatory control over the profes-
sion.218
These two associations jointly formed a committee to study a Quebec
model of bar organization, which, like the model that influenced Herbert
Harley, included strict lawyer control over admissions and discipline.219
In 1919, the committee drafted a bill proposal that would have given the
209. [d. at 35-36.
210. [do at 35-37.
211. [do at 36 (quoting the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce).
212. [do at 35.
213. [d. at 36.
214. One success was Its 1917 campaign to create an additional division of the Dis-
trict Courts In order to alleviate court congestion and delay. [d.
215. [d. (quoting the California State Bar Proceedings of 1917).
216. [d. at 37.
217. [d.
218. [do at 37-39.
219. [d. at 40.
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CBA authority to recognize official bar associations for each county and
to delegate to these county bar associations the power to investigate
disciplinary matters.220 This proposed legislation was not the strong
model of autonomous bar association control over admissions and disci-
pline enjoyed by the English Inns of Court and the Quebec or Toronto
organized bars.221 But even this weaker version of bar supervision over
lawyer regulation did not become law. The initial bill was reported out of
committee just prior to the close of the year's legislative session.222 A
subsequent attempt to introduce the bill the following year was similarly
unsuccessful.223
The San Francisco Bar Association tried on its own in 1920 to draft a
bill to. increase the bar's self-regulatory powers.224 This bill was mod-
elled on the American Judicature Society's model Bar Unification Act,
published in 1918.225 The central features of the model act were that it
created a Board of Governors to administer the bar association, gave the
bar control over the appropriation of funds from mandatory lawyer reg-
istration dues, established in the bar the power to determine standards
for admission to the profession, and gave the bar the power to promul-
gate its own ethics code, to discipline, and even disbar attorneys for
violating that code.226
The San Francisco Bar Association's version of this bill failed to get
out of committee in 1921.227 But this same year a propitious event oc-
curred. The CBA had directed great effort to pass a bill defIning and pro-
hibiting the unauthorized practice of law.228 The main targets of this
proposed legislation were lay practitioners, disbarred attorneys, and bank
and trust companies who competed with lawyers.229 This bill passed the
legislature and was signed by the governor, but the public subsequently
placed the bill on referendum and voted it down in the following Novem-
ber election.230 This defeat mobilized bar leaders. As Gilb remarks,
"[t]he bar association members who fought hardest for the [defeated bill]
220. [d.
221. [d.
222. [d.
223. [d. at 39-40.
224. [d. at 42.
225. [d. at 41-42; see also Harley, supra note 192, at 111.
226. See Gilb, supra note 20, at 42.
227. [d. at 44.
228. [d. at 43-44.
229. [d.
230. [d. at 44.
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were, by and large, the leaders in the subsequent campaign to create a
State Bar in California. "231
These leaders learned well from their failure with the unauthorized
practice bill and paid great attention to mobilizing the support of law-
yers, other occupations and professions, and the general public for bar
unification. The central theme of the bar's campaign in 1925 was to re-
form the profession-"kick the rascals out"-by means of creating a
unified and self-regulating bar.232 The campaign also attempted to obtain
the support of local bar associations, district attorneys, real estate
boards, chambers of commerce, and even the bar's traditional ene-
mies.233 Members of the banking community were also persuaded not to
oppose the State Bar bill, in return for which the bar promised similar
lack of opposition to the banks' attempts to raise executors' fees. 234
This broad-based support facilitated passage of the State Bar bill. The
Senate approved the bill unanimously and the Assembly passed it by a
vote of sixty-five to eleven.2M Despite this, the Governor, Friend W.
Richardson, vetoed the bill.2M Richardson's main objection was that the
proposed self-regulating bar would not be subject to state control.237
Richardson wanted, for instance, to add a provision to this legislation
that would grant the Governor power to appoint the bar's Board of Gov-
ernors, a move that would transform a self-regulating bar into one reg-
ulated "through an administrative commission."238
In response, the bar once again mobilized support.239 The Bar bill was
reintroduced into the 1927 legislative session, where it passed the Senate
on a vote twenty-five to fourteen and the Assembly by a margin of fifty-
one to fifteen. 240 This tim,e the newly-elected Governor C.C.
Young-who had been elected in large part due to the support and influ-
ence of a leading unified bar advocate-signed the bill into law.241 The
legislation created the State Bar as a public corporation subject to super-
vision by the Supreme Court of California.242
This statute, as ultimately passed, was largely drawn from the Ameri-
231. [d.
232. [d. at 63.
233. [d. at 64. These enemies Included its competitors targeted by the previous
unauthorized practice of law bill, the title Insurance and trust companies. [d.
234. [d. at 64-55.
235. [d. at 55.
236. [d. at 55-56.
237. [d. at 57.
238. [d. at 57.
239. [d. at 58.
240. [d. at 68-71.
241. [d. at 74.
242. [d. at 71-74.
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can Judicature Society's model bar unification bill.243 However, it also
contained an important change derived from the American Bar
Association's model Bar Unification Act, subsequently approved by the
ABA in 1920.244 The change was not only a strategic move but was also
symbolically important. Whereas the earlier version of the legislation
proposed to create a statewide bar organization by incorporating then-
existing bar associations, the new version was based on the premise that
the "bar was already a body-politic." Lawyers were officers of the court.
Creating the State Bar on this premise meant that the supreme court
retained ultimate control over the profession and had delegated its pow-
er to regulate lawyers to the bar itself. While this delegated power deviat-
ed from the autonomous form of self-regulation that Herbert Harley and
other reformers initially envisioned, it was nonetheless considerable.245
Under the statute creating the State Bar, lawyers had substantial con-
trol over professional discipline. The Board of Governors, elected by
lawyers themselves, appointed the Administrative Committees charged
with investigating cases of professional misconduct. Additionally, al-
though the supreme court retained the power to conduct its own disci-
plinary proceedings, had full powers of judicial review, and was not
bound by the decisions of the Board of Governors regarding action in
particular cases (the Board merely "recommends" disciplinary action),
the court has generally been highly deferential to the bar's opinions and
authority in disciplinary matters.245
There can be little doubt that this special relationship with the Court
enhanced the bar's professional authority. The role of lawyers as officers
of the court entitled them to privileges greater than other occupational
groups, making their acquisition of self-regulatory power as an agent of
the state less of a precedent for other groups than it might otherwise
have been.
Initially, the preferred method for creating a unified bar was by means
of legislation. But this meant that the Legislature could alter or amend
the proposed bill, and the governor could veto it, as in the California
experience. The more expedient process of obtaining unification through
243. Id. at 44-45.
244. [d. at 46.
245. Id. at 45-47.
246. [d. at 103. But see Lowell Turrentine, May the Bar Set its Oum House in
Order?, 34 MICH. L. REV. 200, 202 (1935) (arguing that the California Supreme Court
had "emasculated" Bar authority by its active exercise of oversight into Bar disci-
pline, frequently lessening recommended disciplinary sanctions).
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court order-typically following the passage of a brief enabling stat-
ute-became the nonn after 1934.247 This change in tactics was an im-
portant shift. Previously, bar associations had tended to view courts as
adversaries for control of the profession. Such an adversarial relationship
no doubt stemmed in part from courts' historical animosity towards the
profession's attempts to upgrade requirements for practice and for judge-
ships.248 But before a modern judiciary the bar found a more amenable
audience for many of its claims. Thus, while Harley's vision of a fully
autonomous and self-regulating profession never materialized, the bar
unification movement nevertheless elevated the status and power of the
organized bar. Unified bars never acquired complete disciplinary control
over lawyers (as in Harley's Ontario-irlspired proposal), but rather re-
ceived delegated powers from the courts to control and discipline the
profession.249 This partnership with the courts elevated the bar and
made its claims for professional status and self-regulation more secure.
ii. The rise of the "inherent-powers" doctrine
With the establishment of the unified bar movement, the legal profes-
sion substantially institutionalized its mandate to self-regulate. Bar asso-
ciations maneuvered a shift from de facto to de jure recognition of their
self-regulatory claims. This mandate was further strengthened by a con-
current development fostered by the judiciary: the rise of the "inherent-
powers" doctrine. This doctrine was (and is) a historically confused but
sociologically interesting creation of state courts and was first asserted
nearly contemporaneously with the resurgence of the modern bar associ-
ations in the late nineteenth century.Z60
The doctrine itself is a "judge made and lawyer supported" legal doc-
247. See MCKEAN, supra note 185, at 49.
248. See, e.g., DORIS M. PROVINE, JUDGING CREDENTlALS: NONLAWYER JUDGES AND THE
POLITICS OF PROFESSIONAlJSM 1-60 (1986) (discussing the history of the judiciary, in-
cluding the movement from nonlawyer judges to lawyer judges).
249. See Glaser, Part I, supra note 196, at 16.
250. See generally Alpert, supra note 3 (analyzing the historical development of the
Inherent powers doctrine). Wolfram cites an 18th century decision, In 1'6 Mosness, 39
Wis. 509 (1876), as the earliest case asserting the Judiciary's exclusive authority to
regulate the legal profession. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 27 n.45
(1986). Wolfram notes that in the Mosness decision, the court expressed concern over
the legislature's attempts to "corrupt" the bar by easing entry standards to the profes-
sion. In this case, Wolfram tells us, the Mosness court "strongly Intimated that It
would refuse to follow a statute that required the court to admit a person whom it
considered unqualified." Id. The court was certainly responding to the times, since
there were great concerns among the bench and bar about the hoi polloi of immi-
grant and ethnic lawyers entering the profession. Wolfram also speculates, however,
that an earlier decision (appearing In the same reporter) Involving a woman's applica-
tion before the court for admission to the bar, lnt1uenced the Mosness court. See w.
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trine which essentially holds that the courts alone have the ultimate
authority to regulate the practice of law.261 A weak form of the doctrine
derives from the judicial claim of power to regulate lawyers even in the
absence of specific statutory authority to do so. This version of inherent
powers is based on the logic of necessity and arises from the very exis-
tence of the judiciary and the need to protect its proper functioning.262
A stronger and more expansive version of the inherent-powers doc-
trine holds, not merely that courts must have the power to regulate law-
yers, but also that this power is exclusive to the judiciary.263 This inter-
pretation rests on the logic of the related separation-of-powers doctrine,
which is a core tenet of the American system of government.264 Separa-
tion-of-powers has as its central premise the idea that governmental
power is properly divided among the three branches of government: the
251. WOLFRAM, supra note 250, at 22-33; see also Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Tuif
and Lawyer Regulation-The Role of the Inherent-Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LrM'LE
ROCK L.J. 1, 3 (1989).
252. Note, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary to Regulate the Practice of Law-A
Proposed Delineation, 60 MINN. L. REV. 783, 784-86 (1976) [hereinafter Inherent Pow-
er].
Courts have premised their power to regulate on the concept of "inherent"
judicial power. Inherent judicial powers are those not expressly granted by
constitution but said to arise from the very existence of the judiciary as an
independent branch of government. The constitutional creation of a "court"
implies that it must have the incidental powers necessary to its dignity,
functioning, and survival ....The theory with regard to regulation of attor-
neys is that, because they are officers of the court whose activities are cru-
cial to the court's operation, their qualifications and conduct must be subject
to the control of the court. . . . If the power to regulate attorneys is neces-
sary to the functioning of the courts, it is an "inherent" judicial power.
Ido
253. See, e.g., In re Day, 64 N.E. 646 (Ill. 1899). In this case the l1linois Supreme
Court struck down a law that exempted already-enrolled students of the state's two-
year law schools from newly-promulgated supreme court regulations requiring three
years of law school study and a bar examination for admission to the profession. Id..
at 653. The court had recently raised these admissions requirements (previously, grad-
uates from the state's law schools eI\ioyed a "diploma privilege" that exempted them
from taking the bar exam) and it denied an exemption from the new rules to stu-
dents who had already been enrolled in law school prior to the promulgation of
these rules. Id. at 646-47, 653. In response to the court's actions, the legislature en-
acted a statute exempting these students from the newly heightened requirements. See
Alpert, supra note 250, at 537-38. The court struck down the law, reasoning that It
improperly constituted an encroachment on judicial power to regulate the profession.
See In re Day, 64 N.E. at 653 (cited by Alpert, supra note 250, at 537-38).
264. Inherent Power, supra note 252, at 785.
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executive, the legislative, and the judicial.266 Further, it states that the
functions of these three branches are distinct, subject only to limited
oversight and control by the other branches.266 The stronger, more ex-
pansive version of the inherent-powers doctrine threatens to deny the
executive and legislative branches of government any role in regulating
lawyers, no matter hgw perfunctory or minimal that role might be.267 As
Wolfram writes, "[t]his means that an attempt by a legislature or an ad-
ministrative agency of a state to pass a law or to write a regulation that
affects lawyers or lawyering risks a judgment by the state's courts that
the law is unconstitutional.11266
Since the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, courts have
sometimes claimed inherent regulatory power over lawyers as an ancient
prerogative of the judiciary, but this power is a thoroughly modern devel-
opment.269 While courts have certainly played a substantial role in law-
yer regulation in the Anglo-American tradition,260 this has historically
been a shared rather than an exclusive function. 281 In colonial America,
lawyers were regulated by courts, legislatures, and the executive
branch.262 Similarly, even relatively modern case law indicates that
American courts recognize that they have concurrent and not the sole
power to police the legal profession.263
Despite the somewhat weak historical claim for the strong version of
inherent-powers, the American judiciary, between the 1870s and mid-
twentieth century, fashioned such a claim into an expansive doctrine.
Under this doctrine, state supreme courts have declared the courts' pow-
er to admit and disbar attorneys, promulgate ethics codes, designate
what constitutes unauthorized practice of law, and form a unified bar.2M
255. [d. at 786.
256. See id.
257. See, e.g., Sharood v. Hatfield, 210 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 1973). In Sharood,the
Minnesota Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a statute providing that
money collected from lawyers' annual bar registration dues be deposited in the state
treasury. [d. at 282. In declaring the law unconstitutional, the court based its decision
on the theory that the legislature lacked any power to regulate the legal profession.
[d.; see also Note, supra note 252, at 783 (discussing the case).
258. Wolfram, supra note 251, at 7.
259. See generally Alpert, supra note 250.
260. See, e.g., WOLFRAM, supra note 250, at 25-26.
261. [d.
262. See Alpert, supra note 250, at 532.
263. [d. Alpert shows, for example, that as late as 1876, it was unexceptional for a
state court to resolve the question of who has the ultimate authority to regulate the
profession in favor of the legislature. [d. at 533-34. By the tum of the century, how-
ever, such a JudicIal view "had become a minority position" among state courts. [d.
at 540.
264. See WOLFRAM, supra note 250, at 24-25.
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Courts have also declared numerous laws invalid as an encroachment on
their judicial power over lawyers.2M
The inherent-powers doctrine has not only empowered the judiciary
but provided a privilege to the legal profession. Under this doctrine,
lawyers receive quasi-public status as officers of the court and as ad-
juncts of the judiciary in carrying out the lawyer discipline function. The
model of regulation that results from the inherent-powers doctrine, while
not a pure guild model of autonomous professional self-regulation, is
nevertheless formidable. It privileges lawyers over other .occupations
(which are routinely regulated by the legislature), makes bar associations
partners with the judiciary for purposes of policing the profession, and
threatens to preclude external intervention into control of the legal pro-
fession. Whereas other occupations have sought and achieved various
degrees of self-regulation and restrictions on unauthorized practice, only
lawyers acquired the additional advantage of having-during a critical
period of their professionalization-a legal doctrine whose effect was to
preclude nonlawyers from second-guessing such controls.266
b. Bar unification and professional authority
The bar unification movement fell short of its goal of unifying all state
bars, even though it achieved considerable success. By the time of
Harley's death in 1951, twenty-four of the then forty-eight states had uni-
tied bars.267 By the mid-1970s, a total of thirty-three state bars had been
unified.266 Yet the fact that bar unification did not fully succeed on its
own ambitious terms is, perhaps, not surprising. More noteworthy is the
rapid extent to which the broader symbolic goals of the movement were
realized. Through bar unification, the legal profession was ideologically
re-cast as a group distinct from other occupations and thus worthy of
professional prerogatives and its privileged relationship with the state.
This is an important point, and it is one that Schneyer does not fully
appreciate in his study of the unified bar movement.269 As is apparent
266. See id. (analyzing applicable case law).
266. WOLFRAM, supra note 250, at 14-18. The doctrine Is still very much in force, al-
though it has come under steady attack since the 19608. See Alpert, supra note 250,
at 548-56.
267. McKEAN, supra note 185, at 51.
268. JEFFREY A. PARNESS, CITATIONS AND BIBlJOORAPHY ON THE UNIFIED BAR IN THE
UNITED STATES 3-4 (1973).
269. See generally Schneyer, supra note 163.
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from the title of his study, Schneyer's central argument is that the con-
cept of a unified bar is fundamentally "incoherent" because it remains
unclear what is the chief status of a unified bar: a public agency, a com-
pulsory membership organization, or merely a private voluntary organiza-
tion.270
One goal of bar unification, and of professionalization generally, is to
construct just such a "special identity" or cultural authority to demarcate
the profession from other occupational groups. Schneyer remarks in his
study that he is mystified why his critique of unified bars is not more
widespread.271 The problem is that Schneyer's analysis aims to answer
the question of whether unified bars function as well as their originators
claimed. This level of analysis ignores the ideological significance of the
movement. Bar unification was part of a larger professional and public
debate over a privileged vision of law and lawyers in society, and at that
level the legal profession fared well. Bar unification strengthened profes-
sional control over lawyer discipline, and in doing so aided the bar's
assertion of its professional authority.272
Self-regulatory powers are not an inherent or natural attribute of the
legal profession, but rather have been collectively claimed and construct-
270. As Schneyer writes:
The protracted nature of the debate [about the proper status of a unified
bar] is all the more remarkable when one stops to think that in modern
times no other American profession has seriously considered the same organi-
zational form. It is almost as if the debate itseif were an expression of the
lawyer's special identity.
[d. at 2.
271. [d. at 108.
272.. It is certainly not a goal of this research to delineate the historical develop-
ment of the legal profession's cultural authority. Such a task requires a book of its
own, such as Paul Starr's work on the medical profession in THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMA-
TION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE. See generally STARR, supra note 19. There is no compa-
rable social and cultural history of the legal profession.
Nevertheless, it is somewhat unremarkable to claim that the modern American
legal profession achieved broad cultural authority by the early to middle 20th century.
One focus of the present study is the role that self-regulation played in this process.
See generaUy HALLIDAY, supra note 20 (discussing whether the legal profession has
achieved such authority). Halllday's study successfully examines whether and to what
extent American lawyers have authority with regard to issues of both legal policy and
broad public policy. See also PROVINE, supra note 248 (studying lay lower-court judg-
es in New York State). Provine's study tests whether or not lay judges perform their
tasks as competently or as ethically as their counterparts who are lawyers. She finds
few relevant differences, but her analysis suggests that the assumption, that judges
who are lawyers are more ethical and technically proficient, has extraordinary sway
in American culture. The very taken-for-grantedness of this view is certainly one
strong indicator of professional hegemony or cultural authority. It is more than a
coincidence that this authority is, in part, grounded in an ideology which proclaims
the superior ethicallty of lawyers. See id.
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ed. The bar unification movement played a significant role in this pro-
cess. Early on, leaders of the bar unification movement attempted to
establish a model for lawyer self-regulation that emulated the strongly
autonomous professional control eI\ioyed by the English Inns of Court
and some of their Canadian counterparts.273 But in the United States,
such a guild model of control never existed as anything more than a
professional ideal. Advocates for bar unification quickly turned to a sec-
ond model of self-regulation that emphasized lawyers' public service role
and orientation, and that was premised on the status of lawyers as "of-
ficers of the court."274 It is this status, along with the cultural and moral
authority that it implies, that the bar unification movement helped to
secure for the legal profession. Construction of this authority was in
large part the result of the organized bar's efforts, but was also support-
ed by a concomitant assertion of legal authority by the judiciary that
established a doctrinal basis for lawyers' claims to professional sta-
tus.276 This was a powerful combination. The institutionalization of a
self-regulatory organization and ideology had a significant role in deter-
ring the threat of external intervention into professional regulation in
California for almost forty years.
II. CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE
A. Challenges to the Professional Prerogative
,Once established in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
self-regulation by the legal profession proved to be remarkably durable.
It was not seriously called into question for decades. By the late 1960s
and early 1970s, however, professional authority began to erode.276 This
was, of course, a period of tremendous social unrest and transformation
in the United States. Major social institutions were under attack as unre-
sponsive to popular needs, and the legal profession was not spared from
these attacks. By the 1970s, there was great nationwide dissatisfaction
with the perceived inadequacies of lawyer regulation.277 It was viewed
as ineffective in protecting the public and oriented towards protecting
professional power.278 In California, the profession also had problems
273. See supra notes 184-95 and accompanying text.
274. See Alpert, supra note 250, at 532-34.
275. See Gilb, supra note 20.
276. See irifra notes 283-97 and accompanying text.
277. See irifra notes 283-97 and accompanying text.
278. See irifra notes 289-95 and accompanying text.
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with its image and its record on self-regulation. But in many respects,
California's system for lawyer regulation was better than most and, as a
result, was not unduly threatened.279
By the 1980s, this status changed. Both internal and external sources
of dissatisfaction focused attention' on the deficiencies of' lawyer self-
regulation. Unlike the 1970s, the California Bar was not able to fend off
attacks on lawyer discipline with facile promises to "clean house."2BO
The challenge to the Bar went deeper than a critique of the efficacy of
self-regulation. Rather, critics challenged the Bar's very authority to self-
regulate.281 Further, opponents fundamentally questioned the Bar's role
as the voice of the collective profession.282 In short, the Bar's cultural
authority was threatened. The Bar was thus forced to justify not only the
traditional prerogative of lawyers to self-regulate, but also its role in
speaking for the legal profession as a whole. At stake was not merely the
role of the State Bar in disciplining lawyers, but the very status of the
profession as a privileged occupational group. This chapter explores the
nature and extent of this challenge to the Bar in California.
1. The Crisis of the 1970s: Lawyer Discipline in Disarray
In her study of the California State Bar, Corinne Gilb was able to por-
tray a remarkably benign image of lawyer self-regulation.2&'! As of the
mid-1950s, the system was, she argued, an effective system of regulation
motivated by professional concern for the public welfare.284 As she
writes:
[S)teadily over the years, the percentage of [the State Bar's) time devoted to disci-
pline has become less and less, complaints against attorneys have become fewer
and fewer .... Dissatisfaction with ,the level of attorneys' ethics comes now not
so much from the public as from the bar itself.2ll6
Within the two decades after Gilb wrote these remarks, however, there
was a much different tone nationwide.2116 Auerbach shows, for instance,
how a number of social factors undermined the authority of the legal
profession in the late 1960s and 1970s.287 The civil rights struggle, he
279. See i1lfra notes 304-12 and accompanying text
280. See i1lfra notes 325-28 and accompanying text
281. See i1lfra notes 337-39 and accompanying text
282. [d.
283. See Gilb, supra note 20.
284. [d. at 255-72.
285. [d. at 101.
286. Gilb, too, reflected this more critical stance towards professions in her later
work. See generally CORINNE LATHROP GILB, HIDDEN HIERARCHIES: THE PROFESSIONS
AND GOVERNMENT 1966).
287. See AUERBACH, supra note 21, at 263-308.
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argues, focused attention on the role of law and lawyers in upholding an
increasingly intolerable racist legal order in the South. Disenchantment
with the American policy in Vietnam also contributed to general disre-
spect for numerous social institutions, including the legal profession.
There were increasing pressures on the bar to conform its actual behav-
ior to its professed high ideals of public service and equal justice. Water-
gate especially, Auerbach tells us, provided a glaring example of the
failure of professional values, since most of those involved in the Nixon
administration scandal, including the president himself, were lawyers.288
Powell discusses other social factors that account for the diminution
of professional authority during this period.289 The rapid growth of the
Bar in both numbers and heterogeneity increased the pressure to lessen
barriers of access to the profession and of public access to law. Younger
and more diverse segments of the profession, Powell tells us, brought
with them concerns for access to justice and the provision of legal ser-
vices to groups traditionally denied legal representation.2llO
This consumerist attitude is also evident in numerous legal challenges
to the bar's traditional authority during this period.291 A series of United
States Supreme Court decisions highlighted the fact that the bar's system
of ethics and regulation often supported its own interests rather than the
public's.292 Thus, in Gold/arb v. Virginia State Bar,293 the Court held
the restrictive ethical practice of promulgating and enforcing minimum
fee schedules was illegal price-fIXing in violation of the Sherman Act.2IM
Similarly, in 1977, the Court struck down ethics rules restricting the ad-
vertising of legal services as an unconstitutional infringement on the First
Amendment right of free expression.296
Each of these factors increased the scrutiny and criticism of the legal
profession as a whole and of its system of ethics and regulation in partic-
288. [d.
289. See generally POWELL, supra note 20.
290. [d. at 97-113.
291. For other examples of the emerging consumer-oriented focus on lawyer disci-
pline, see Martin Garbus & Joel Seligman, Sanctions and Disbarment: They Sit in
Judgment, in VERDICTS ON LAWYERS (Ralph Nader & Mark Green eds., 1976); TIsHER,
supra note 3, at 86-118. See generri1ly PHILIP M. STERN, LAWYERS ON TRIAL (1980);
JETHRO K LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR: LAWYERS' UNETIllCAL' Enncs AND WHAT TO
Do ABOUT IT (1978).
292. See infra notes 293-95 and accompanying text
293. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
294. [d. at 791.
295. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 382 (1977).
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ular. One response of the bar was to publicly re-examine its collective
commitment to self-regulation. In the late 1960s, for example, the Ameri-
can Bar Association promulgated a new ethics code, the fIrst 'revision of
its ethical rules since initially adopting such rules in 1908.296 The ABA
also established a panel of prominent attorneys under the chairmanship
of retired Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark, with the mandate to "as-
semble and study infonnation relevant to all aspects of professional dis-
cipline, including the effectiveness of present enforcement procedures"
nationwide.297
This committee surveyed lawyer disciplinary agencies nationwide.298
It also held hearings in various United States cities where it listened to
comments and criticisms of judges and lawyers involved in lawyer disci-
pline.299 Importantly, the committee did not question the status of law-
yer self-regulation itself, but interpreted its mandate as "limited to con-
sideration of methods for improving the present system of self-disci-
pline."3OO Despite this narrow focus, the Clark Report was scathing:
296. The ABA adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908 and the Code of
Professional Responsibility in 1969. See generaUy CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics
(1969); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIUTY (1979).
297. See Clark Report, supra note 12, at xiii.
298. [d.
299. [d.
300. [d. at xvii; This is in sharp contrast to the position taken by the ABA 20 years
later. In 1989, the ABA created the Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary En-
forcement to, among other things, re-evaluate the functioning of lawyer discipline
systems after the reforms generated by the Clark Report See ABA Corom. on Evalua-
tion of Disciplinary Enforcement; Lawyer Regulation for a New Century: Report of
the Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Eriforcement 23 (1992) [hereinafter
Lawyer RegulationJ. The report stated:
Despite the many reforms made in the disciplinary process in the last twenty
years, the~ is significant distrust of the fairness and impartiality of self-regu-
lation. The Commission finds an important distinction between judicial regula-
tion and self-regulation in the area of lawyer discipline. Neither inherent pow-
ers doctrine nor the need for professional independence provides a rationale
for disciplinary functions to be conducted by elected officers of bar associ-
ations.
The Disciplinary system should be controlled and managed exclusively by the
state's highest court and not by state or local bar associations. This is nec-
essary for two primary reasons. First, the disciplinary process should be di-
rected solely by the disciplinary policy of the Court and its appointees and
not influenced by the internal politics of bar associations. Second, the disci-
plinary system should be free from even the appearance of conflicts of inter-
est or impropriety. When elected bar officlais control ali or parts of the dis-
ciplinary process, these appearances are created, regardiess of the actual
fairness and impartiality of the system.
[d.
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After three years of studying lawyer discipline throughout the country, this Com-
mittee must report the existence of a scandalous situation that requires the imme-
diate attention of the profession. With few exceptions, the prevailing attitude of
lawyers towards disciplinary enforcement ranges from apathy to outright hostility.
Disciplinary action is practically nonexistent in many jurisdictions; practices and
procedures are antiquated; many disciplinary agencies have little power to take
effective steps against malefactors.
The Committee has found that in some instances disbarred attorneys are able
to continue to practice in another locale; that lawyers convicted of federal income
tax violations are not disciplined; that lawyers convicted of serious crimes are not
disciplined until after appeals from their convictions have been concluded, often a
matter of three or four years, so that even lawyers convicted of serious crimes,
such as bribery of a governmental agency employee, are able to continue to prac-
tice before the very agency whose representative they have corrupted; that even
after disbarment lawyers are reinstated as a matter of course; that lawyers fail to
report violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility committed by their
brethren, much less conduct that violates the criminal law; that lawyers will not
appear or cooperate in proceedings against other lawyers but instead will exert
their infl.uence to stymie the proceedings; that in communities with a limited attor-
ney population disciplinary agencies will not proceed against prominent lawyers
or law firms and that, even when they do, no disciplinary action is taken, because
the members of the disciplinary agency simply will not make findings against
those with whom they are professionally and socially well acquainted; and that,
finally, state disciplinary agencies are undermanned and underfinanced, many
having no staff whatever for the investigation or prosecution of complaints.'Ill
In light of this "scandalous" situation, the Committee warned that,
unless refonn of lawyer discipline was effected from within the profes-
sion, external regulation would likely result.302 The remainder of the re-
port focused on developing thirty-six specific refonn proposals to fend
off such a fate.
The much publicized Clark Committee report did have some impact, as
numerous states moved to implement some or all of its recommended
refonns.303 California, however, was fairly well situated to withstand
301. See Clark Report, supra note 12, at 1-2. This Article quotes extensively from
the first two paragraphs of the Clark Report because many of these themes arise
repeatedly in analyses of lawyer self-regulation. Prior to this report, several empirical
studies of lawyers had shown many of these same deficiencies, such as routine non-
compliance with ethical rules by attorneys and the failure of lawyers to turn in col-
leagues who violate ethical rules to the authorities. See, e.g., CARIJN, supra note 9;
JOEL F. HANDLER, THE LAWYER AND HIs COMMUNITY: THE PRACTICING BAR IN A MIDDLE-
SIZED CITY (1967). The Clark Report, however, was a much more public condemna-
tion of the legal profession's system of ethics than these academic studies.
302. See Clark Report, supra note 12, at 8.
303. For a discussion of each reform proposal and its subsequent implementation in
various jurisdictions, see Lawyer Regulation, supra note 300, at 89-129. For a pos-
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many of the criticisms generated by the report. In fact, the Clark Com-
mittee modeled its "ideal" disciplinary agency on the California
system.304 The main features of this model included: (1) a full-time in-
vestigative staff, (2) an initial hearing stage to determine whether formal
charges should be fIled, (3) a formal hearing to determine fmdings of fact
and law, (4) internal administrative review, and (5) ultimate review by
the state supreme court.306
This does not mean, however, that calls for reform during this period
did not affect California's lawyer discipline system. There were public
warnings for the Bar to "clean house."306 The Bar responded, both by
rhetoric and by deed. It reiterated publicly that the Bar's proper role was
to self-regulate and that it had every intention to fulfill this role.307 It
doubled bar dues during this time to fmance disciplinary reforms.80S Ad-
ditionally, the Bar established a fund to help reimburse clients whose
attorneys had misappropriated funds from client trust accounts.309 The
Bar promulgated a revised ethics code in 1975, which generally met with
public approval.310 The Bar also made efforts to increase the number of
itive assessment of post-Clark Report refonns, see Timothy K McPike & Mark I.
Harrison, The True Story on Lawyer Discipline, 70 AB.A. J. 92, 93-99 (1984). An in-
sightful critique of the Clark Report is contaiI:ted in Douglas R. Haddock, The Legal
Profession's Attempt to Discipline its Members: A Critique of the Clark Report, 1970
UTAH L. REV. 611. Haddock argues that the Clark Report refonn recommendations
"will probably not be a cure but a placebo.· Id. at 623.
304. See generally Clark Report, supra note 12.
305. See id. at xiv. In fact, following the Clark Report, a standard refrain from Cali-
fornia Bar leaders to any attack on their system of lawyer regulation was that
California's system was a model for the nation.
306. See, e.g., Bar Association Should Ourb Excesses of its Members, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Feb. 7, 1972, at A16i Reagan Tells Lawyers to Clean House, Public Fed Up, SAN
DIEGO UNION, Dec. 21, 1970, at C1i State Bar Should Support Reform, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Sept. 20, 1970, at E2.
307. See, e.g., California Bar Reo,[firms Role as Disciplinarian, Los Angeles Times,
Sept. 28, 1971, at B7i State Bar President on Discipline, L.A TIMES, July 25, 1970, at
4i see also Forrest A Plant, President's Message: The Disciplinary Problem, A Call
for Individual Dedication, 46 CAL. ST. B.J. 130, 132 (1971).
308. See State Senate OKs BiU to Double Bar Dues, Protect Clients, SACRAMENTO
BEE, June 16, 1971, at A4.
309. See Annual Report of the Board of Governors, 47 CAL. ST. B.J. 501, 508 (1972)
[hereinafter 1972 Annual Report). Such a fund had been fonnally considered as early
as 1960. See, e.g., Burnhan Enersen, Report of Board of Governors, 35 CAL. ST. B.J.
558, 565 (1960). But the fund was not first established until 1972.
310. See Annual Report of the Board of Governors, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 422, 422-23
(1975) [hereinafter 1975 Annual Report]i The Practice of Citizenship, LA TIMES,
March 14, 1975, sec.2, p.4, col.!.
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lawyer disciplinary cases processed.3ll Lastly, in 1976 the Bar began to
appoint public members to act as referees in the discipline system.312
There were thus continual changes in the discipline system throughout
the 1970s. But the Bar never .received a serious challenge to its mandate
to self-regulate during this period. By the 1980s, however, this had begun
to change.
2. 1980s Deja Vu: The "Crisis" in California
Although the California, State Bar remained relatively unscathed by the
nationwide public dissatisfaction with lawyer discipline throughout the
1970s, the 1980s would prove to be quite a different story. In the early
1980s, the Bar faced a fonnidable legal threat to its status and role as a
mandatory association. This legal challenge centered on the Bar's capaci-
ty to utilize mandatory membership fees to support "political" purposes.
However, the attack also focused on the viability of the unified Bar itself.
Additionally, a 1985 expose of the Bar's disciplinary system dramatically
highlighted the ineffectiveness of self-regulation and, more damagingly,
the possible unwillingness of the Bar to police its own members. In com-
bination, these two attacks on the Bar helped to generate a crisis in
lawyer self-regulation in California, and one that threatened both the
authority of the State Bar as the voice of California lawyers as well as
the legitimacy of professional self-regulation.
a. The roots of crisis
The rapid growth of the legal profession during the 1960s and 1970s
was not met with a corresponding increase in Bar resources devoted to
lawyer discipline. Typically, between one-quarter and one-third of the
Bar's total annual dues collected were expended on self-regulation, and
this figure remained fairly stable until the mid-1980s.313 But as the legal
311. See, e.g., Gene Blake, Disciplining of Lawyers by Bar Rises 5fJ16, L.A. TiMES,
Aug. 11, 1972, at A31; Gene Blake, Errant Lawyers: More Critical View Emerging,
L.A. TiMES, Aug. 31, 1974, at AI.
312. See Annual Report of the Board. Of Governors, 51 CAL. ST. B.J. 549, 556 (1976)
[hereinafter 1976 Annual Report). .
313. In 1974, for example, the Bar allocated $1,092,780 to discipline, which consti-
tuted 26% of its total annual general budget. See 1975 Annual Report, supra note
308, at 422-23. By 1985, the Bar spent $7.8 million on discipline, representing 44% of
its annual budget. These figures rose dramatically thereafter. In 1987, the Bar's expen-
ditures on discipline were $25.2 million, constituting 64% of the budget; and in 1992
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profession grew in the state, it became increasingly evident that, as in
most states, lawyer discipline in California lacked adequate funding and
thus was unable to keep up with the demands made of it by an increas-
ingly large lawyer population-one that almost tripled in the state be-
tween the mid-1970s and early 1980s (and continued to climb thereaf-
ter).314
Among the first public signs of the problems in California's lawyer
discipline system in the 1980s appeared in a four-part investigative report
published in the Los Angeles Daily Journal.3lB This report was the re-
sult of a six-month investigation and found that: "A . .. review of dozens
of ... examples of (lawyer) misconduct, ranging from outright theft of
client funds to simple neglect, leaves the unavoidable conclusion that
California lawyers seldom are held accountable for their misdeeds."316
The fmdings of this inve~tigative report were that lawyers in California
rarely report the misconduct of their colleagues;317 that over eighty per-
cent of complaints received by the Bar remain uninvestigated;318 that
few investigations lead to disciplinary action against an attomey;319 that
the Bar spent $37.2 million, which was 74.3% of its total budget. California Bar Asso-
ciation, State Bar of California Statistics (unpublished report, on file with author
and the CBA) [hereinafter Statistics).
314. The following table illustrates the trend:
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
Annual Membership Figures
Activel(Total)
1970: 31,523 (33,788) 1985: 87,491 ( 98,956)
1975: 45,674 (49,601) 1990: 108,531 (125,863)
1980: 68,538 (75,247) 1992: 113,716 (134,983)
Statistics, supra note 313; Annual Report of the Board of Governors, 45 CAL. ST. B.J.
601, 602 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Annual Report); 1975 Annual Report, supra note
310, at 446.
The number of lawyers in the entire United States also grew considerably during
this period. See generally BARBARA A CURRAN ET AL., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL RE-
PORT: A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN TIlE 1980s (1985).
For a very interesting profile of the legal profession in California in the early
19905, see SRI International, Demographic Survey of the State Bar of California,
Final Report (August 1991) (prepared for the State Bar of California).
315. See Jon Standefer, Is the Legal Profession Guilty of Failing to Police Itseif?,
L.A DAILY J., May 15, 1981, at 5 [hereinafter Standfifer 1]; Jon Standefer, State Bar
Meting Out Fewer-and Lighter-Penalties, LA DAILY J., May 18, 1981, at 6 [herein-
after Standfifer 11]; Jon Standefer, Attorney Incompetence Presents DiJlicult Problem,
L.A DAILY J., May 19, 1981, at 7 [hereinafter Standfifer II1]; Jon Standefer, State Bar
Resisting Discipline Changes, L.A DAILY J., May 20, 1981, at 8 [hereinafter Standfifer
IV).
316. Standfifer I, supra note 315, at 5.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
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most such discipline consists of a light punishment such as a reprimand
letter;320 and that the disciplinary system simply does not address issues
of basic attorney incompetence.321 In sum, this report concluded that
the State Bar disciplinary system was an elaborate bureaucracy that sim-
ply did not work,322
The Bar's response to this series was initially defensive, perhaps pre-
dictably so. State Bar President Robert Raven wrote in an opinion piece,
also for the Los Angeles Daily Journal, that the Bar's discipline system
was recognized nationally as "outstanding" and as a model for self-regula-
tion that other states sought to emulate.323 Raven deemed it a good sys-
tem, even if it could, of course, always be made better.324
Others, however, were not quite so sanguine. Philip Schafer, a Cres-
cent City attorney elected as a Bar Governor, ran his campaign promising
to devote his time to improving lawyer discipline. His candidacy arose
from his indignation over the length of time it took the Bar to discipline
a local attorney whose client accused him of misappropriating over
$30,000 of his client's money-an accusation the lawyer never bothered
to deny. After his election, Schafer became head of the Bar's Committee
on Adjudication and Discipline.
Schafer's tenure proved eventful. Within a year after his election,
Schafer uncovered a potential scandal in the Bar's disciplinary sys-
tem.325 In June 1983, while implementing its flrst-ever computerized in-
ventory of unresolved complaints against California lawyers, the Bar
found that it had over 5,000 of them buried in its fIles. Most of these
complaints were about a year old. Yet a number were considerably older,
and at least one dated back to 1976. Clearly something was wrong with
the disciplinary system, and Schafer appointed a special panel to fmd out
precisely what this was. The panel had a broad mandate to determine the
source of the ineffectiveness in the discipline system at every stage in
the process.
The panel, headed by U.S. District Judge Robert Coyle (who was a
former member of the Bar's governing board) found that the disciplinary
backlog and delay were the result of "systemic" defects, which, it argued,
320. [do
321. [d.
322. Standiifer IV, supra note 315, at 80
323. See Robert Raven, California a Model JOT Lawyer Discipline, LoA. DAILY Jo,
June 11, 1981, at 4.
324. [do
325. [d.
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could no longer be tolerated.326 The report stated that even in cases
where the attorneys and Bar prosecutors stipulated as to the relevant
facts and appropriate discipline, it took "virtually two years for discipline
to be effectuated."327 The time required for full processing of a contest-
ed case that passed through the entire system averaged over forty
months.328
Among the reforms proposed by the Coyle Committee were measures
to increase the resources spent on lawyer discipline (particularly at the
investigative stage where the case backlog was then most urgent), and to
permit the Office of Trial Counsel (the prosecutorial arm of the disciplin-
ary system) to issue formal disciplinary charges (rather than continuing
to require prosecutors to present evidence to a State Bar Court referee
who alone was empowered to issue formal charges).329
Ultimately, however, the report was not a scathing condemnation of
the Bar. Rather, it was a critical but respectful critique, and' one that did
nothing to challenge the Bar's self-regulatory mandate. Indeed, the Coyle
Committee report expressly stated that various proposals in California
. and at the national level, which threatened to impinge upon this tradi-
tional prerogative of the bar, were "well-meaning but ill-founded."33O In
short, the Coyle Committee firmly upheld the principle of self-regulation
by the Bar.
A second report, based on a commissioned study completed by exter-
nal analysts, reiterated many of these same findings.331 This report fo-
cused exclusively on the investigative function of the discipline system.
The report based its fmdings on a study headed by Mark Kroeker, a vet-
326. See State Bar of California, Committee Report of the Subcommittee on Expedit-
ing the Disciplinary Process to the State Bar of California Committee on AcUudica-
tion and Discipline, March 27, 1984 [hereinafter Coyle Report).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. Among the proposals singled out by the report Included one by United
States Senator Robert Packwood of Oregon (S.B. 1714) that would remove authority
for lawyer discipline from the states entirely and vest it In the Federal Trade Com-
mission. Id. A somewhat more limited encroachment of the Bar's self-regulatory pow-
er cited with similar disapproval by the Coyle Committee report was a proposed bill
by CalifornIa Assembly member Lawrence Stirling (A.B. 3233) that granted powers to
municipal and superior courts to suspend attorneys lmmediately who, in the opinions
of the judges, were gullty of crimes involving moral turpitude. Id. Lastly, the Com-
mittee also disapproved of the proposed development In the Ninth Circuit to establish
a system for disciplining directly lawyers appearing before the Ninth Circuit courts.
Id.
331. See State Bar of California, Report to the Committee on Admissions and Dis-
cipline: Investigative Process of the State. Bar Disciplinary System, Presented by the
Subcommittee on Expediting the Disciplinary Process, July 19, 1985 [hereinafter
Kroeker Report).
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eran Los Angeles Police Department commander. The central finding of
the report was that the complaint backlog in the investigative stage was
"substantial and unacceptable," and it resulted from lack of sufficient
investigative resources as well as "serious organizational, structural and
procedural deficiEmcies."332 In order to address these deficiencies, the
Kroeker Report recommended that the Bar immediately provide addi-
tional resources for investigations and, more dramatically, that it ·orga-
nize the investigative function as a separate and autonomous division of
the discipline system.333
Many of the reforms recommended by the Coyle and Kroeker Commit-
tees were, in fact, implemented by the Bar.334 Yet the Bar faced other
challenges as well, which only tangentially dealt with the lawyer disci-
pline system, but which ultimately affected the development of the "cri-
sis" in attorney self-regulation profoundly.
In the early 1980s, politically conservative Bar members, angered by
the Bar's public stances on controversial political issues, sued the Bar to
prohibit the use of mandatory membership fees to support law reform
and political activities. The suit argued that by doing so, the Bar violated
the dissident members' First Amendment rights.336
332. Id.
333. Id. At that time, investigations were perfonned under the direct supervision of
the Office of Trial Counsel. The Report suggested that an independent Office of In-
vestigations (which would more closely resemble the functional role of a police de-
partment working with a separate district attorney's office in the criminal justice sys-
tem), headed by a Chief Investigator with a professional background in investigations,
rather than an attorney,' would professionalize the much-maligned bar investigative
staff and provide for greater accountability at this stage of the disciplinary process.
See id.
334. See Cameron Andersen, The New, Improved System, 5 CAL. LAw., Dec. 1985 at
12; James Evans, Opening Up Discipline, 5 CAL. LAw., Oct. 1985, at 22; Kim I. Eisler,
Lawyer Discipline Revamp Approved by Bar Committee, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 19, 1985,
at 1. Among other things, the Bar established a new Office of Investigations separate
from the prosecutorlal arm of the discipline system (the Office of Trials), provided
greater funding and staff to the investigative arm of the system, and created a "ca-
reer ladder" for Bar investigators in an attempt to encourage experienced investiga-
tors to remain with the Bar. See id.; BuUetin Board: Board Moves on Discipline, 5
CAL. LAw., Dec. 1985 at 67.
335. See Keller v. State Bar, 47 Cal. 3d 1152 (1989), rev'd, 496 U.S. 1 (1990). The
KeUer case was initially rued in superior court in October of 1982. See James Evans,
Behind the KeUer Case, 10 CAL. LAw., May 1990, at 35, 38. Eddie Keller and the oth-
er dissident Bar member plaintiffs objected to the Bar's use of their fees to support
causes that they found objectionable, including such diverse activities as:
(1) Lobbying for or against state legislation prohibiting state and local agency
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Beyond the narrow legal issues involved in the case, the Keller assault
was part of a broader attack on the Bar's status as a mandatory member-
ship organization.33Il Thus, fundamentally the Bar had to justify its con-
tinued existence as a unified bar with affIrmative support from all mem-
bers cif the profession. This claim historically had been one powerful and
pragmatic basis for organizing unified bars, especially in the early part of
the century. By the early 1980s, however, the claim had lost much of its
appeal, at least for those Bar members who considered the Bar's political
positions to be too liberal.
During this same period, while the Bar's asserted role as the legal
profession's voice on broad policy issues became problematic, its author-
ity to self-regulate also became precarious.337 In a 1981 investigative se-
ries on Bar discipline appearing in a legal newspaper, one San Diego
lawyer quipped that before a lawyer would lose his license in California,
"you've damn near got to prove he's an ax: murderer."338 Although this
remark was no doubt intended as a bit of hyperbole, a subsequent and
employers from requiring employees to take polygraph tests; prohibiting pos-
session of annor piercing handgun ammunition; creating an unlimited right of
action to sue anybody causing air pollution: creating criminal sanctions for
violation of laws pertaining to the display for sale of drug paraphernalia to
minors; limiting the right to individualized education programs for students in
need of special education; creating an unlimited exclusion from gift tax for
gifts to pay for education tuition and medical care: providing that laws pro-
viding for the punishment of life Imprisonment without parole shall apply to
minors tried as adults and convicted of murder with special circumstances;
deleting the requirement that local government secure approval of the voters
prior to constructing low-rent housing projects; requesting Congress to refrain
from enacting a guest worker program or from permitting the importation of
workers from other countries.
(2) FIling amicus curiae briefs in cases Involving the constitutionality of a
victim's blll of rights: the power of a workers' compensation board to disci-
pline attorneys; a requirement that attorney-public officials disclose names of
clients: the disqualification of a law firm.
(3) The adoption of resolutions by the Conference of Delegates endorsing a
gun control initiative; disapproving the statements of a U.S. senatorial candi-
date regarding court review of a victims' bill of rights; endorsing a nuclear
freeze initiative; opposing federal legislation limiting federal court jurisdiction
over abortions, public school prayer, and bussing.
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 6 n.2 (1990).
336.. For a discussion of the political context of Keller, see Evans, supra note 335,
at 35, 38. Compare Edward Lascher, DismanUB the Unified Bar, 3 CAL. LAw., May
1983, at 12 (opining that the Bar is in need of reform) with Anthony Murray, The
Unified Bar Serves the Public Interest, 3 CAL. LAw., May 1983, at 13 (arguing against
changing the Bar).
337. Indeed, these two issues were intertwined. See irifra notes 363-439 and accom-
panying text (discussing SB 405 and SB 1543).
338. See Stand/ifer II, supra note 315, at 6.
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highly influential investigative newspaper series proved that the San
Diego lawyer's claims might not be too far off the mark.339
b. The ''Brotherhood'' revealed
In many respects, the "Brotherhood" series of articles in the San Fran-
cisco Examiner merely reiterated claims and criticisms about the Bar
that were already known, at least among lawyers.340 The critique fur-
thered by these articles-that Bar discipline was slow, secretive, and le-
nient in its procedw-es34l-was not new, and in fact, the Bar itself had
already recognized some of these problems and begun to address
them.342 But there are several reasons, far beyond bringing these claims
to light, why the "Brotherhood" series was effective. First, it personalized
and dramatized the defects of an ineffective lawyer regulation system by
focusing poignantly on the victims, of attorney misconduct and on horror
stories of ethical violations. Second, these stories appeared in a general
circulation newspaper rather than a legal periodical, which greatly in-
creased their visibility and impact. Few who read this series could fail to
be outraged at a system that allowed such abuses to occur with seeming
impunity. Finally, the series focused not merely on the efficacy of the
Bar's disciplinary system but on the issue of whether lawyer self-regula-
tion itself was legitimate. Whether lawyers were capable of self-regulat-
ing-or should be allowed to-was, after this series, thrust prominently
into public debate.343
339. See Kang, supra note 10, at 1-3, 14.
340. See generaUy id.
341. Id.
342. See generaUy Burke M. Critchfield, The Bar is Improving a Good System's
Shortcomings, L.A. DAILY J., Apr. 10, 1985, at 4.
343. The opening lines of the "Brotherhood" articles were powerful:
There are convicted criminals practicing law In Califomla. They Include
lawyers who have lied, cheated and stolen. A bagman in a bribery scheme is
allowed to practice law.
So is an attorney who burglarized a client's market.
So a drug smuggler, an embezzler and a stock swindler.
So is a lawyer who impersonated a cop.
So is a child molester.
So is an attorney who did dirty tricks for the White House, and another
who tried to raise campaign cash for President Nixon by selling an ambassa-
dorship.
After punishments ranging from a wrist slap to a few years on the side-
lines, all were judged to be fit to be attorneys.
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California's system for disciplining lawyers is "deeply troubled," the
article stated, even though it was once "the model for the entire na-
tion."344 "That system is supposed to protect the public by weeding out
unscrupulous lawyers. Instead, it protects lawyers."345
These dramatic statements and others were supported by telling
statisticS.346 In 1984, almost 9000 complaints against attorneys made
their way to the State Bar.347 Yet in that same year, only eleven attor-
neys were disbarred.348 More troubling than this, the Bar seemed more
aggressive against lawyers who failed to pay their Bar dues than against
those who violated ethical standards.349 Five times as many lawyers
were suspended for failing to pay dues than those suspended for ethical
misconduct.360 The articles further revealed that sixty percent of com-
plaints received by the Bar were closed without any formal investigation,
and ninety-four percent of cases were dropped prior to a formal hearing.
Bar discipline, the authors concluded, was slow (cases frequently took
years to resolve, while an attorney remained practicing), unduly secre-
tive, protective of attorneys, len~ent, and ineffective in protecting the
public.351 The chief reason for these problems, according to the "Broth-
erhood" series, was the "built-in" conflict of interest in having lawyers,
alone among professions and occupations, self-reguiate.352 The numer-
ous and compelling stories culled from Bar discipline case fIles and ex-
tensive interviews bolstered the authors' conclusions.363
Kang, supra note 10, at 1-2.
344. [d. at 2.
345. [d.
346. [d. at 2-9.
347. [d. at 2.
348. [d.
349. [d.
350. [d.
351. [d. at 2-3.
352. [d. at 3, 14.
353. See generally id.
For example, one particular attorney !!tole from many of his clients. [d. at 6. He
stole almost $60,000 from a family he successfully represented in a wrongful death
action by forging their settlement checks and keeping the funds for himself. [d. The
family fmally brought a complaint against the attorney before the Bar, but in the
course of two years while the complaint was pending, the attorney embezzled over
$300,000 from a dozen more clients. [d. Ironically, during that time the lawyer served
as a discipline judge for the State Bar. [d. Additionally, because the Bar's disciplinary
investigation remained a secret, the attorney was able to win election during the
same period as a vice-president of the Califomla Trial Lawyers Association. [d. It was
oniy after the attorney was actually convicted of grand theft in the criminal justice
system that the Bar suspended him. [d. Even two years later at the time of the arti-
cle, the supreme court had not yet acted to disbar him. [d.
Another victim of attorney misconduct had to sue his lawyer to receive anything
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The Bar's response to these charges of ineffectiveness in disciplining
the state's unethical lawyers was familiar. One top Bar administrator, J.
David Ellwanger, repeated the oft-used rebuttal that the California sys-
tem was the best in the country.3M A former Bar president repeated this
refrain, claiming that California's lawyer discipline system was the "envy
of other stateS."3M Similarly, the then-current State Bar president, Burke
M. Critchfield, responded to the allegations of the "Brotherhood" series
by claiming that California's disciplinary system, while imperfect, was the
"most effective ... system of regulation of any bar or other professional
group in the country. "3M
Critchfield excoriated the "Brotherhood" authors for focusing on atypi-
cal horror stories representing "an extremely small percentage of Califor-
nia lawyers."367 Moreover, Critchfield asserted that the Bar was already
aware of problems with lawyer discipline and had taken substantial steps
to address them. These steps included sponsoring legislation368 that
would: (1) give the Bar power to speed disciplinary proceedings against
attorneys deemed to pose an "imminent threat of harm" to their clients
or the public, (2) allow for reciprocal discipline where lawyers had al-
ready been disciplined in another jurisdiction, (3) strengthen the Bar's
investigative powers by requiring respondent attorneys to cooperate with
Bar investigations (backed by new contempt powers to enforce subpoe-
nas before the S~te Bar Court), and (4) clarify and expand the Bar's
authority to assume the practice of a lawyer who had abandoned a cli-
ent.368
These reforms were, indeed, already in progress, but given the publici-
from a tort claim settlement the lawyer had negotiated on his behalf. 111. at 14. The
client had been rendered a quadriplegic in an accident, and the lawyer was able to
settle the case for over $350,000. Id. The lawyer also kept all but $29,000. 111. This
same lawyer embezzled over $600,000 from other clients and was ultimately convicted
of these thefts and dlsbarred. Id. Yet during the course of the Bar's confidential in-
vestigation into numerous complaints against the miscreant lawyer, he continued to
practice and steal from his clients. 111. During this time, he was even named to the
State Appellate Court, though the nomination was later withdrawn. Id.
354. Id.
355. See Kenneth Jost, The Public's. Stake in Lawyer Discipline, L.A DAILY J., Apr.
8, 1985, at 2.
356. Id.; see Burke M. Critchfield, The Bar is Improving a Good System's Short-
comings, L.A DAILY J., Apr. 10, 1985, at 4 (asserting that the "Brotherhood" report
was exaggerated).
357. Id.
358. AB. 1275, CalifornIa Legislature, 1985-86 Regular Sess.
359. See Karen Ringuette, Cleaning up the Act, 5 CAL. LAw., July 1985, at 12.
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ty generated by the "Brotherhood" series, they were too little, too
late.S60 As various newspaper articles and editorials indicate, there was
little sympathy for lawyer self-regulation after the revelations of the
"Brotherhood" series.361
The "Brotherhood" series had been a catalyst in another sense as well.
It not only created considerable public response, it generated political re-
sponses. Within one month of the series' publication, Democratic State
Senator Robert Presley created a special Task Force on the State Bar
Discipline System to examine lawyer regulation and to recommend possi-
ble reforms, including, presumably, establishing a disciplinary agency
independent of the Bar as the "Brotherhood" article had suggested. Many
of the Task Force members were individuals who had been cited or in-
terviewed for the "Brotherhood" articles, including academics, public
interest lawyers, former Bar prosecutors, and members of the public.
A second political response revolved around what had been a fairly
mundane Bar dues bill, which had been introduced into the legislature in
February of 1985.362 This bill was transformed in the wake of the
"Brotherhood" articles into a vehicle to increase legislative oversight of
Bar discipline and almost destroyed the unified Bar.
c. ''Bar wars"
Under the state constitution, the California Legislature must authorize
the Bar to set and collect its annual membership fees.363 In February of
1985, State Senator Dan Boatwright introduced Senate Bill (SB 405) as
legislation designed to extend the Bar's dues collecting authority and al-
low for slight dues increases.364 This bill was far from routine, however.
Following the Examiner's expose on Bar discipline, several members of
the legislature were unwilling to authorize the Bar's dues collecting pow-
er without addressing the glaring deficiencies in lawyer regulation in the
state. At a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on Senate Bill 405, Sen-
ator Robert Presley, who had recently appointed a special task force to
examine the problems in lawyer regulation, insisted that the proposed
360. See Kang, supra note 10, at 14.
361. See, e.g., Dan Walters, Self-Regulation Doesn't Work, L.A. DAILY J., Apr. 10,
1985, at 4; Jost, supra note 355, at 2; Jon Standefer, How Serious is the Bar About
Lawyer Discipline?, L.A. DAILY J., May 13, 1985, at 4 (analyzing the changes in the
Bar's disciplinary system).
362. S.B. 405, California Legislature, 1985-86 Regular Sess. Under the State Constitu-
tion, the Bar requires legislative authorization to collect its mandatory membership
dues.
363. CAL. CONST. art. VI § 9; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6140 (West 1990 & Supp.
994).
364. See S.B. 405, supra note 362.
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dues bill contain some "controls" to ensure that the Bar clean up its
scandalous disciplinary case backlog.366 Several other members advocat-
ed similar changes, and the legislature subsequently amended Senate Bill
405 to: (l) raise Bar fees to be used exclusively for disciplinary reforms
where needed, and (2) provide for unprecedented legislative control over
the disciplinary process.366 As amended, the legislation required the Bar
to report to the legislature on changes and improvements it was to im-
plement in the disciplinary system. Additionally, the Bill required the Bar
to reduce its disciplinary case backlog within the following two years367
and to establish goals regarding the amount of time within which disci-
plinary cases were to be resolved.368
Yet these changes were not sufficient to ensure the bill's passage, for
the "Brotherhood" series not only generated reformist sentiments in the
legislature to require the Bar to clean up its act, but also provided an
opportunity for conservative legislators to attempt to use the fee bill as a
vehicle to accomplish legislatively what KeUer v. State Bar of Calijor-
nia369 threatened to do judicially: restrict the Bar's role and authority in
the political arena.370 On the fmal day of the 1985 legislative ses-
sion-effectively the last day for the Bar to obtain authority to collect
membership dues for 1986-these two issues came to a head.
The last day of the 1985 legislative session fell, orriinously enough for
the Bar, on Friday the 13th of September. Although the dues bill re-
mained unpassed, many hoped and expected that it would become law
because it provided for substantial legislative oversight into the Bar's
disciplinary matters and required the Bar to seriously address its scandal-
ous complaint backlog.371 •
Assembly Judiciary Committee Chair Elihu Harris first raised the dues
bill for a floor vote at 5:30 P.M., but Assembly Speaker Willie Brown
prevented the bill from proceeding to a vote at that time.372 Shortly
after 9:00 P.M., Harris had a second opportunity to bring the dues bill for
365. See Charley Roberts, Senate Unit Approves Bar Dues BiU; Orders Disciplinary
Backlog Cleared, L.A. DAILY J., May 22, 1985, at 2.
366. See id.; S.B. 405, CONF. REP. No.1, Sept. 10, 1985, at 2, 5.
367. The amount of reduction required was later set at 80%.
368. Roberts, supra note 365, at 2; see SB 405, as amended In the Senate· May 30,
1985.
369. 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
370. See supra note 335 and accompanying text
371. See Charley Roberts & Philip Carrizosa, Bar Dues BiU Fails in Final Hours of
Legislative Session, L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 17, 1985, at 1.
372. ld.
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a vote in the Assembly. This time, however, the conservative legislators
made their move. Assembly Minority leader Pat Nolan, who was a leader
of the Assembly Republican caucus and also one of the KeUer plaintiffs,
attempted to block a vote on the bil1.373 Angered over the Bar's sup-
posed support for "liberal causes," Nolan's goal was to use the bill to
force the Bar to sharply limit its political activities and to focus exclu-
sively on admissions and disciplinary functions.374
Nolan cited a recently passed and, at that time, untested legislative
procedural rule requiring conference committee reports to be placed in
members' m.es for at least one legislative day prior to proceeding to a
vote.376 Although the conference committee had met several days earli-
er, its report on the bill had been delayed and only arrived in members'
m.es on the ThurSday afternoon preceding the proposed Friday vote.376
The Senate had already voted on the dues bill Friday afternoon after the
Senate Secretary interpreted the new rule to allow for such action. But in
the Assembly, the Chief Clerk had a different interpretation; he conclud-
ed that the rule required a full twenty-four hour day to elapse between
the time a bill arrived and the vote on it could occur.377
Assembly Speaker Brown presided over the floor when this controver-
sy arose and learned of the conflicting interpretations of the rule.378
Brown had already obtained an opinion from the legislative counsel that
supported allowing the vote to proceed. Much to everyone's astonish-
ment, however, the Speaker elected not to decide which interpretation to
accept, quipping that as an impecunious member of the Bar himself, he
had a conflict of interest over the dues bill and would wait for further
authority on the interpretation of the legislative rule, thus postponing any
decision until the legislature re-convened in January.379 No dues bill
would be had this term, Brown declared.380 Stunned, both Harris and
Senate Judiciary Committee chair William Lockyer continued to press the
Speaker during breaks in the session to allow the vote, arguing that, as
the late Friday session had edged over into the early hours of Saturday, a
new day had begun, thus properly allowing the dues bill to be the subject
of a vote.sal At 5:30 A.M. on Saturday, Brown relented and allowed Har-
ris to bring the bill to the floor. But, again, Nolan objected, arguing that
legislative rules required that the lawmakers adjourn by midnight of the
373. [d.
374. [d.
375. [d.
376. [d.
377. [d.
378. See Roberts & Carrlzosa, supra note 371, at 19.
379. [d.
380. [d.
381. [d.
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last day of the session. Any extension of time required a two-thirds vote
of both houses, something the united Assembly Republican caucus could
prevent.382 Defeated, Harris gave up, and the dues bill remained
unpassed.383
The Bar was in a panic over this situation.384 Traditionally, it mailed
membership dues bills· immediately after approval of legislative authori-
ty.385 Many lawyers paid their dues before the end of the year for tax
purposes, and the Bar relied on this money for its operating expens-
es.386 With no dues bill, the Bar faced a financial crisis.387 Since the bill
had not passed in 1985, the Bar faced having to try for "emergency" leg-
islation in January, which would authorize it to collect membership dues
immediately.388 The other alternative would force the Bar to wait until
January of 1987 for its dues collecting authority to go into effect, thus
requiring retroactive collection of 1986 dues.389 However, such an ex-
traordinary measure also required a two-thirds vote, which was unlikely
unless the Bar agreed to limit its role to admissions and discipline as the
Assembly Republicans wanted.390
Another option for the Bar was to petition the supreme court to over-
ride the legislature's ban on collecting its dues.391 The Bar chose to try
this move in October, but was opposed by the Governor and various
legislative leaders.392 Ultimately, the supreme court refused to accede to
the Bar's request. As a result, the Bar was forced to request that its
members submit their dues voluntarily.393
In January of 1986, a compromise on the dues bill became possible.
Senate Bill 405 was to be passed as a regular measure, requiring only a
382. [d.
383. [d.
384. See Dan Morain, State Bar Asks High Court for Dues Power, L.A TIMES, Oct.
30, 1985, at 13.
385. Roberts & Carrlzosa, supra note 371, at 19.
386. [d.
387. See Morain, supra note 384, at 13.
388. Monica Bay & Eric Jaye, WiUie Brown: Emergency Dues BiU Won't Pass, THE
RECORDER, Dec. 13, 1985, at 1.
389. [d.
390. [d.
391. See State Bar Asks Supreme Court to Override Republican Assembly Ban on
its CoUection of Member Dues, L.A TiMES, Oct. 30, 1985, at A3.
392. See Governor, Brown, and Legislative Leaders ask Supreme Court to Refuse to
Let Bar Couect Dues, L.A TIMES, Nov. 20, 1985, at A2.
393. See California Supreme Court Rejects State Bar Plea that State Rescue it from
Crisis, Postpones Decision until February 1986, L.A TiMES, Nov. 27, 1985, at A20.
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majority vote, and not as emergency legislation. This would mean that
the Bar technically had authority to collect its 1986 dues retroactively in
1987. But the bill retained the novel legislative oversight into Bar disci-
plinary reforms that had broad support in both parties and houses. Sen-
ate Bill 405 was thus not the vehicle for the Assembly Republican caucus
to force the Bar to limit its role to "non-political" matters. However, the
political strategy had shifted. In late 1985, Senator Presley's Task Force
on Bar Discipline endorsed a proposal to remove the Bar from self-regu-
lating entirely, and in January 1986 the senator introduced legislation to
effect this change.394 Senator Nolan and others now rallied behind this
proposal.
In an important sense, Presley's legislation was to prove more threat-
ening to the Bar than Nolan's attempt to limit its role. Both challenges
shared the political goal of reducing the Bar's power. However, Presley's
new legislation had broader political support and could not be character-
ized narrowly as a spiteful attempt by conservatives to destroy the Bar. It
also directly challenged the ideology of professionalism itself.
d. Ideologies ofprofessionalism
In response to the "bar wars" dues bill crisis, the Bar generated a mas-
sive "media and member blitz" designed to convince both the public and
the profession the bar was being victimized by "either conservative dem-
agogues or, a spiteful legislature intent on destroying or dismembering
the state bar, or both."396 But the real challenge to the Bar cut deeper
than this, and cut across both partisan and political lines. Moreover, the
attacks on the Bar's traditional prerogative of self-regulation were direct-
ed not only at the political level, but at the ideological level as well. The
Presley Task Force in particular, in its report and recommendations and
the legislation resulting from them, developed this ideological critique.
Although it ultimately failed, this attack on professional ideology shaped
the debate over Bar self-regulation, as it affected the direction of future
disciplinary refomls.
i. The task force on State Bar discipline
One month after the publication of the Examiner's "Brotherhood"
series, State Senator Robert Presley formed a blue ribbon Task Force on
the State Bar Discipline System to consider and adopt proposals to re-
form lawyer regulation in California.396 The sixteen-member Task Force
394. See S.B. 1542, California Legislature, 1985-86 Regular Sess.
395. See Richard A. Antonico, Bar Governor Richard Antonico: The Bar Slwuld Not, .
and Cannot, Police Its Oum, THE RECORDER, Jan. 6, 1986, at 1.
396. See Philip Carrlzosa, Task Force Urges Stripping State Bar of Discipline Cases,
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was a diverse mix of people,397 composed of law professors,398 attor-
neys (two of whom had previously been Bar discipline prosecutors and
two of whom were public interest lawyers),398 public officials, and pub-
lic nonlawyer members. Richard Antonico, a public member of the State
Bar Board of Governors was on the Task Force, as was another Bar
Governor, Philip Schafer, who had appointed the Coyle Committee.400
The Task Force examined not only the Bar's disciplinary system but
also other state regulatory bodies responsible for disciplining various
occupations and professions.40' In September of 1985, the Task Force
produced a joint resolution and several reform recommendations that
were supported by the majority of Task Force members.4lr.l Chief among
these proposals was the recommendation that the State Bar be divested
of its control over lawyer regulation, to be replaced by an independent
state agency under the authority of the supreme court.403
This was a dramatic proposal, repeated in a public hearing within the
following two weeks.404 This hearing was a joint session of the Senate
and Assembly Judiciary committees. The purpose of the hearing was to
examine the Task Force's proposals in order to determine whether legis-
L.A DAILY J., Sept. 19, 1985, at 1.
397. See Recommendation oj Senator Presley's Task Force on Bar Discipline, Sept.
18, 1985 (copy of document In author's files) (hereinafter Presley Recommendation).
398. Professors Deborah Rhode of Stanford Law School and Stephen Bundy of Boalt
Hall School of Law were the academics on the Task Force. Id. Both were well ac-
quainted with the history and sociology of lawyers and had quite a critical and pro-
gressive perspective on reform of the legal profession.
399. Interview with Phil Martin, (a former Bar prosecutor, then In private practice)
(1987). Phil Martin was particularly contemptuous of Bar discipline management, hav-
ing come to his role as a Bar prosecutor with previous experience as a practicing
defense lawyer, a rarity for the Bar. Bar discipline management In particular often
had little or no actual trial experience before coming to the Bar. In fact, some top
Bar Managers were not licensed attorneys In California. Martin had little doubt that
these "Inexperienced bureaucrats" were a maJor reason for the Ineffectiveness of the
Bar's disciplinary system.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Recommendation of Task Force on Bar Discipline: Before the Joint Meeting of
the Senate and Assembly Judiciary Committees, California Legislature, 1985-86 Regu-
lar Sess. (Sept. 30, 1985) (testimony of Stephen M. Bundy) (In author's files). Even
those members In the minority, while not formally supporting the specific proposals,
considered them to be worthy of further study. Id. at 2.
403. Id. See generally Presley Recommendation, supra note 397; see also Carrlzosa,
supra note 396, at 1.
404. See Joint Interim Hearing, supra note 11.
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lation enacting some or all of them would be introduced in the next
legislative session.406
The two academics on the Task Force, Deborah Rhode of Stanford
Law School and Steve Bundy of V.C. Berkeley's Boalt Hall School of
Law, presented the chief fmdings and recommendations of the Task
Force majority.406 There were two essential points. First, incremental re-
forms in lawyer discipline are unlikely to be satisfactory given the Bar's
long history of ineffective lawyer regulation and its equally long experi-
ence with piece-meal reforms accompanied by assurances to iIJlprove the
system.407 The second and related point was that the Bar, as both a
trade association and a disciplinary agency, had an inherent conflict of
interest and for that reason alone cannot be expected to regulate its own
members effectively.408 The message was clear: lawyers alone, unlike
any other occupation in the state, were allowed to regulate their own
despite their abysmal record of doing so and absent any expectation that
they would perform any better in the future. 409 For these reasons, both
Bundy and Rhode concluded that the only solution to the lawyer disci-
pline crisis in California was to divest the Bar of its self-regulatory au-
thority, and to establish an independent regulatory agency under the
supervision of the supreme court to regulate lawyers in the state.410
Phil Martin, another Task Force member and former Bar Prosecutor,
continued the critique.4lI Whereas Rhode and Bundy stressed the illegiti-
macy of lawyer self-regulation, Martin proffered another level of criticism
to this theme: the Bar is a mismanaged bureaucracy that is ineffective in
regulating lawyers.412 The organization of Bar discipline substantiates
this accusation.413 The disciplinary system is handled by the Board of
Governors who are not interested in or familiar with the field of legal
ethics and discipline. Similarly, neither the next level of management, the
senior discipline executive, nor the director of the Trial Counsel's office
has much experience with the actual practice of law or with prosecuting
discipline cases.414 Moreover, the line prosecutors are routinely lawyers
with virtually no experience practicing law prior to working for the
Bar.416 "This is an excellent structure for a trade association," Martin
405. [d. at 1-3.
406. [d.
407. [d. at 37-38.
408. [d. at 3840.
409. [d. at 4043.
410. [d. at 52-54.
411. [d. at 59-66.
412. [d. at 60.
413. [d. at 62-63.
414. [d.
415. [d. at 62.
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concluded, but no prosecutor's office would ever staff its organization
with so many levels of lawyers inexperienced in actual disciplinary pros-
ecution.416 Little wonder then, Martin remarked, that in his three years
as a defense attorney defending lawyers accused of wrongdoing, he nev-
er lost a case. Martin attributed this not so much to his own legal acu-
men as to the incompetence of Bar lawyers and management.417
The public, nonlawyer testimony at these hearings pushed the critique
of Bar self-regulation to its extreme. From this perspective, the system
needed real improving, not mere window dressing that would leave law-
yer regulation "in the hands of judges and attorneys."416 Several mem-
bers of the public forcefully asserted that only nonlawyers were com-
petent to serve as prosecutors and judges in any system of lawyer regula-
tion since the "old Boys" of the bar are inherently biased towards their
fellow members.419 "The only ... answer that makes sense," one wit-
ness remarked, "is to remove attorneys and judges from the jury and the
. bench when we're talking about attorney discipline."420
In advocating for such measures as removing attorneys from the sys-
tem of lawyer regulation and replacing them with, for instance, "citizen
justice panels," the lay testimony reflected the deep dissatisfaction and
alienation that consumers of legal services felt with law, lawyers, and an
unresponsive lawyer discipline system.4~1 It also carried the critique of
the Task Force to its logical conclusion: because lawyers have an inher-
ent conflict of interest in regulating themselves, discipline should be re-
moved from their responsibility and, indeed, from the purview of the
judiciary entirely.
It was clear that the legislators present were not entirely persuaded by
the Task Force critique. Repeatedly, they asked for some indication of
precisely what type of independent agency the Task Force had in mind
as a model.422 One legislator asked Rhode to identify a single state regu-
latory agency that was sufficiently effective so that it might be emulat-
ed.423 Rhode and the other Task Force members had no answer.424
416. [d. at 63.
417. [d.
418. [d. at 66-75, 84-99.
419. [d. at 71-73, 84-87.
420. [do at 73.
421. [d. at 66-75, 84-99.
422. See id. at 42-45.
423. [d. at 42.
424. [d. at 42-43.
553
Nevertheless, the Bar's promises to do more to reform lawyer discipline
were also not fully reassuring to those present. They had heard it all be-
fore. Because of this, the Task Force's recommendations could not be
lightly dismissed. As one newspaper editorial explained following the
hearing:
The Profession's longstanding failure to adequately discipline Its own members
gives weight to the task force's central argument: that no private trade association
can be relied on to hold the Interests of the public above those of its members.
Therefore, the task force argues, It Is time for the state to step in .... The task
force proposal deserves serious consideration.'"
Following this initial public hearing, Senator Presley began to flesh out
some specifics of what an independent lawyer discipline agency might
look like.426 By January of 1986, Presley was prepared to introduce leg-
islation implementing some of the proposals his Task Force had devel-
oped. The most important of which was the creation of a new lawyer
regulation agency separate from the Bar. He introduced two separate
bills proposing Bar disciplinary reforms, one that would establish an
independent administrative arm of the supreme court to regulate lawyers,
another that would impose a variety of new duties on lawyers ranging
from disclosing rates to issuing written contracts for legal services and
permitting audits of attorney-handled client trust funds. 427
425. Regutating Professionals, L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 7, 1985, at 1 (reprint of a SACRA-
MENTO BEE editorial).
426. Senator Presley wrote, for Instance, to the Legislative Analyst requesting an
examination and evaluation of various extant models of occupational regulation in the
state. See Letter from Senator Robert Presley to William Hamm, Legislative Analyst
(Oct. 10, 1985) (on me with author). The Legislative Analyst responded and recom-
mended that the system for regulating doctors In the state was the best model avail-
able. See Letter from William Hamm, Legislative Analyst, to Senator Robert Presley
(Dec. 16, 1985) (on file with author).
427. The most controversial bill, SB 1543 (Presley), would establish the "California
Attorney Discipline and Competency Commission" to serve as the administrative arm
of the Supreme Court for purposes of regulating lawyers, thus divesting the Bar of
this function. See SB 1543, California Legislature, 1985-86 Regular Session; see also
James Evans, Year of Discipline: WiU the 1986 Reform BiUs be the Closing or Open-
ing Shots in the Battle over Attorney Discipline? 6 CAL. LAw., Dec. 1986, at 37. The
proposed commission was to be composed of 15 members appointed by various gov-
ernmental officials: the Governor would appoint four members, the Legislature would
appoint six, the State Bar would have four appointees, and the Chief Justice one. [d.
Importantly, the Commission was to have a majority of public, nonlawyer members.
It would be composed of nine nonlawyers and six lawyers. Rather than relying on
volunteer attorney referees to serve as disciplinary "judges," Presley's bill proposed to
use administrative law judges to fill this task. [d.
Senate Bill 1569, the companion bill to SB 1543, CalifornIa Legislature, 1985-86
Regular Sess. (Presley), Introduced a variety of additional changes In lawyer regula-
tion, regardless of whether the new state agency gained approval. See SB 1569. See
generaUy Evans, supra note 335. ThIs bill, among other things, imposed duties on
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Understandably, the bar vigorously resisted both bills.428 The State
Bar Board of Governors voted 18-1 in its February meeting to oppose
transferring control over lawyer discipline to an outside state agency. To
the Bar, outside regulation of the profession was simply unthinkable.429
Any such proposal, Bar President Heilbron argued, was "radical" as self-
regulation was an ancient prerogative dating back for centuries.430 More-
.over, stated Heilborn, lawyers are different from other occupations since
they are both officers of the court-in effect, a branch of the judiciary,
which the other two branches of government should not be allowed to
"emasculate"431-and are frequently defenders of interests adverse to
the state and hence need the independence from the state that self-regu-
lation ensures.432 In short, as the president of the Los Angeles County
Bar association stated, self-regulation is "crucial to a democratic
society."433
Although the Legislature was receptive to the Presley legislation, it was
by no means guaranteed to enact these proposals into law. Some legisla-
tors simply were not convinced that an independent regulatory agency
would perform more effectively than the Bar.434 Presley tried to assure
lawyers to disclose to clients their hourly rates and standard fees for legal services;
to provide written fee agreements for most contracts for legal services over $1000; to
self-report information to the Bar such as the filing of three or more malpractice
claims against them in a single year and to report, in some instances, when they had
been the subject of judicial sanctions. Additionally, the bill increased the Bar's pow-
ers to audit client trust funds managed by attorneys and specified that the goal in
disciplinary proceedings was to process a complaint within six months of receiving it.
Lastly, the bill required the Bar to report annually to the Legislature regarding its
progress towards meeting these goals. See SB 1569.
428. See, e.g., David M. Heilbron, Solving the Discipline Problem, 6 CAL. LAw., June
1986, at 53 (comments of the State Bar President). For an overview of the Bar's
position and that of its critics, see Robert Egelko, State Bar Discipline Under Fire, 6
CAL. LAw., June 1986, at 54-55.
429. See Victoria Slind-Flor, Bar Opposes Outside Discipline Agency, L.A. DAILY J.,
Feb. 24, 1986, at 1. The sole Board member opting to support the Presley bills was
Richard Antonico, a public member of the Board who also served on the Task Force.
For a discussion of Antonico's views on this matter, see Antonico, supra note 395, at
1; Richard Antonico, Why Lawyers Should Support Senator Presley's BiU, THE RE-
CORDER, March 20, 1986, at 3.
430. See Heilbron, supra note 428 at 90; see also Letter from David Heilbron to Wil-
liam Lockyer (Mar. 18, 1986) (on file with author).
431. See Slind-Flor, supra note 429, at 2.
432. See Heilbron, supra note 428, at 90.
433. See Vogel, supra note 5, at 5.
434. See Charley Roberts, Heated Debate Opens on Riiform of State Bar's Discipline
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Lockyer (and others) that his bill was not designed to "create another
mediocre state regulatory agency." Rather, he argued, the new indepen-
dent discipline system would be better than the Bar's because it would
serve the interests of the public first instead of those of the
profession.436
The Los Angeles County Bar Association and the politically powerful
California Trial Lawyers Association joined the Bar in its opposition to
Senate Bill 1543. Both groups argued that it was premature to consider
placing control for lawyer discipline in an independent agency, particu-
larly since various reforms were already underway and should thus be
given time to take effect.438 Because of this opposition, Presley delayed
action on his bill.437 By March it became clear that Presley did not have
the votes to move his bill past the Senate Judiciary Committee without
amendments.438 At the end of March, Presley suggested a compromise.
Presley dropped his insistence that the Bar divest itself of its lawyer
discipline function and instead proposed that Senate Bill 1543 create an
independent director appointed by the Governor to run the Bar's disci-
pline system. The Bar, however, objected to this intrusion into its prerog-
ative as well. 439
Finally, in late April, Presley offered a fmal amendment that allowed
him to move the bill out of committee!·o Rather than creating an inde-
pendent director of Bar discipline, Senate Bill 1543 now proposed to cre-
ate an outside monitor of Bar discipline to be a "public watchdog" of the
lawyer discipline system.44 ! The monitor would oversee and report on
Bar regulation but would have no authority to direct its operations. Al-
though the Bar opposed even this level of oversight into its operations, it
was unable to defeat this measure and instead tried to put passage of the
bill in the best possible light: "All in all, I think it's a good bill," Bar Pres-
Role, L.A DAILY J., Feb. 26, 1986, at 2. As William Lockyer, chair of the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee succinctly put the Issue at this committee's initial hearing on the
matter: "The current system stinks. It will continue to stink. And the changes will
stink." [d.
435. See Letter from Senator Robert Presley to Senator William Lockyer, Chair,
Senate Judiciary Committee (Mar. 6, 1986) (on me with author).
436. See Resolution of the Board of Trustees of the Los Angeles County Bar Associ-
ation, adopted Apr. 9, 1986 (on file with author).
437. See Phillp Carrizosa, Vote on Lawyer Discipline Bill is Postponed, LA DAILY
J., Mar. 11, 1986, at 2.
438. See Phillp Carrizosa, Lawyer Discipline Compromise Mulledj Outsider Could
guide Process in Bar, L.A DAlLY J., Mar. 21, 1986, at 2.
439. [d. .
440. Phillp Carrizosa, Senate Panel Approves Accord on State Bar's Discipline Role,
L.A DAILY J., Apr. 30, 1986, at 2.
441. See Letter from Senator Robert Presley to Senator John Doolittle, Senate Judi-
ciary Committee (Apr. 28, 1986) (on me with author).
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ident Heilbron stated. "[S]elf-regulation has been retained and discipline
is still under the judiciary, administered by the bar."442
As passed, Senate Bill 1543 and its companion bill, Senate Bill 1569,
were substantial pieces of legislation that created unprecedented legisla-
tive oversight into lawyer regulation. Originally controversial for its at-
tempt to divest the Bar of its self-regulatory powers, Senate Bill 1543
ultimately allowed the Bar to retain responsibility for lawyer regulation.
An unsuccessful version of the bill would have placed an outside director
in charge of Bar discipline operations, but even this was finally defeated
in favor of having a more passive monitor examine and report on lawyer
regulation-but without having any direct power to change Bar opera-
tions or procedures. While the Bar resisted even this interference into its
traditional prerogative, the fmal version of the bill could be viewed as a
victory of sorts for the Bar. Yet, the creation of the Bar Discipline Moni-
tor position would prove to be a most eventful development. Any feeling
of victory by the Bar would be short-lived.
ii. The Bar discipline monitor
Phil Martin, a former Bar prosecutor, member of the Presley Task
Force, and the principal author of Senate Bill 1543, once remarked that
he assumed the position of Bar Discipline Monitor would be filled by
"some retired judge from Fresno." By this remark, Martin conveyed his
geographical elitism as well as his fear that the Monitor position would
turn out to be an ineffective means o,f reforming lawyer regulation. The
individual chosen to serve as Bar Monitor, however, was neither from
Fresno nor hesitant in advocating effective lawyer discipline.
Attorney General John Van de Kamp was ultimately responsible for
selecting the Monitor.443 His office solicited inquiries from those willing
to serve in this capacity and sought to have a number of candidates ap-
ply for the position.444 Van de Kamp's preference was to select a retired
judge, deeming it important to choose a Monitor who was neither identi-
fied closely with the Bar nor with its harshest critics.445 By early Janu-
ary of 1987, Van de Kamp had his choice: Robert Fellmeth, a professor of
442. See Carrlzosa, supra note 440, at 2.
443. See· Philip Carrlzosa, Search Starts for Bar Discipline Monitor, L.A. DAILY J.,
Nov. 18, 1986, at 2.
444. [d.
446. See Attorney General of California John K Van de Kamp, Remarks to the State
Bar Convention 1 (revised as delivered Oct. 20, 1986) (on me with author).
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law at the University of San Diego and director of the school's Center for
Public Interest LaW.448 Fellmeth's scholarly background was in the field
of administrative and regulatory law, and he had previously worked in a
district attorney's office specializing in the prosecution of white-collar
crime. Fellmeth (like Van de Kamp) also had a strong background in
consumer law, having been one of the first of "Nader's Raiders," working
with attorney-consumer advocate Ralph Nader in the 1960s.447 While he
was certainly above the "Bar wars" fray, Fellmeth's credentials promised
that his oversight of lawyer regulation would be anything but tolerant of
the status quo.
Indeed, in his. initial report in June of 1987, Fellmeth leveled a scathing
critique at Bar self-regulation.448 He described a lawyer discipline sys-
tem that was understaffed, underfunded, ill-trained, and poorly organized.
It was, in short, a system almost designed to fail. 449
Subsequent reports continued in this vein. In his first progress report,
Fellmeth stated that, despite "bona fu1e" efforts by the Bar to respond to
his initial criticisms, the "current failure" in Bar discipline could only be
characterized as "extreme."460 Investigators had triple the caseload they
could handle effectively, the prosecutorial arm of the disciplinary system
was entirely "incapable of handling a complex serious case against a
practicing attorney," and the State Bar Court adjudication system re-
mained inconsistent and minimally competent. 481 According to
Fellmeth's Second Report, these problems were "critical," and would
remain so until passage and complete implementation of the series of
reform measures he advocated and that were contained in proposed leg-
islation, Senate Bill 1498 (Presley).482
446. See Patricia Rogero, San Diego Law Professor Picked as Bar Discipline Mon-
itor, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 22, 1987, at 21.
447. Id.
448. See generally Robert C. Fellmeth, Initial Report to the Assembly and Senate
Judiciary Committees and Chitif Justice of the Supreme Court: A Report on the
Performance of the Disciplinary System of the California State Bar, June 1, 1987
(on file with Robert C. Fellmeth at the Center for Publlc Interest Law, University of
San Diego) [hereinafter FeUmeth Initial Report).
449. As Fellmeth concluded:
I would be shirking my duties as assigned by law to contend that the system
now In place, or as It Is evolving, approaches a minimum level of acceptabili-
ty. Under standards requiring expeditious, Independent, fair and thorough
disciplinary proceedings, It Is my duty to report that we are a long way from
meeting those standards.
Id. at 176.
450. Robert C. Felimeth, flirst Progress Report of the State Bar Discipline Monitor,
Nov., 1987, at 1 [hereinafter FeUmeth 1].
451. Id.
452. Robert C. Fellmeth, Second Progress Report of the State Bar Discipline Moni-
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By his third progress report, Fellmeth began to re-shape the discussion
over Bar discipline.463 He continued to advocate for implementation of
the almost forty reforms contained in Senate Bill 1498, yet also argued
for the fIrst time the lawyer discipline system's need to emphasize more
than reducing backlogs and enhancing the investigative, prosecutorial,
and adjudicative functions. The system also needed, he argued, to take a
broader focus and deal with a consumer emphasis.4M
Such a model system, Fellmeth explained, should implement preven-
tive measures to deal proactively with attorney misconduct; it should
address the widespread problem of attorney dishonesty; it should place
greater emphasis on issues such as fee disclosures and billing abuses;
and it should develop such needed measures as mandatory malpractice
insurance and required continuing education.456
In his fmal reports, Fellmeth continued to press for this broad range of
reforms as well as for implementation of those he made originally. By his
fourth report, he was able to announce "for the fIrst time" that "signifI-
cant progress had been made" in the lawyer regulation system, even
though considerable defIciencies remained.466 This remained the theme
of Fellmeth's remaining reports. By his sixth progress report, Fellmeth
contended that, while not "ideal," California's lawyer regulation system
was indeed making progress.467
In his last report, Fellmeth commended the "substantial progress"
made over the past four and one-half years, including the implementation
tor, Apr. 1, 1988 [hereinafter FeUmeth II]; SB 1498, Ch. 1159, 1987-88 Regular Sess.,
1988 Cal. Stat. at 3699.
453. Robert C. Fellmeth, Third Progress Report of the State Bar Discipline Monitor,
Sept. 1, 1988 [hereinafter FeUmeth III).
454. Fellmeth noted that:
(A) model system should clearly include a focus on gross or continuing in-
competence within its disciplinary function. The sine qua non of a profes-
sional licensing system Is the prevention of irreparable harm to consumers
and to the judicial system; that Is the rationale for the prior restraint of
licensure barrier into the profession.
Id. at 4.
455. Id. at 4-7.
• 456. Robert C. Fellmeth, Fourth Progress Report of the State Bar Discipline Moni-
tor, Mar. 1, 1989, at 2-3 [hereinafter FeUmeth IV].
457. Robert C. Fellmeth, Sixth Progress Report of the State Bar Discipline Monitor,
Mar. 1, 1990, at 7 [hereinafter FeUmeth VI]. In the Sixth Report, Fellmeth noted, "It
Is within the realm of possibility that the California system could become the model
system its defenders have always proclaimed it to be-proclamations solemnly Issued
in the face of 5,OOO-Case backlogs and little public discipline." Id. at 7.
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of many of his two hundred recommended changes in the discipline
system, but he also continued to stress the need for greater client-fo-
cused measures.46lI .
Presley's Senate Bill 1498 was the vehicle Fellrneth used to implement
his vision of an effective system of lawyer regulation-or, at least, as
effective a system as could be had while still under Bar control. This
legislation aimed to accomplish three objectives: to enhance the detec-
tion capacity of the discipline system, to increase the legal authonty of
the system, and, perhaps most importantly, to restructure the State Bar
COurt.469 Enhanced detection powers would be achieved by such mea-
sures as authorizing the Bar to retain members' fmgerprints to facilitate
criminal arrest notification, requiring the courts and malpractice insurers
to report judgments against attorneys to the Bar in certain circumstanc-
es, and authorizing the courts to report the issuance of contempt orders
against an attorney that could lead to disciplinary action by the Bar. The
legal authority of the Bar would expand under this bill to increase the
discipline system's ability to remove attorneys from practice when they
constitute a substantial threat of harm to clients or to the public. The
reformation of the Bar Court effected by Senate Bill 1498 included re-
placing volunteer practicing attorney Referees appointed by the Bar with
professional administrative law judges appointed by the supreme court.
Senate Bill 1498 became law in May of 1988, and with it continued the
transformation of the California State Bar Discipline System.460
iii. Summary: competing ideologies
The crisis in attorney discipline that arose in California during the
1980s was both political and ideological. At the political level, the Bar
faced a challenge from largely conservative members and legislators, de-
signed to limit the Bar's ability to act in the political arena. At the ideo-
logical level, however, the crisis was even more pronounced. The attack
was against the Bar itself, challenging its legitimacy as the voice of the
legal profession in the state, and against the legal profession, challenging
it to justify its privileged position in society in order to retain self-regula-
tory powers. .
The Presley Task Force and, later, Presley's legislation, Senate Bill
1543, developed one version of the attack on the Bar. The Task Force
critique was essentially grounded in an ideology of de-professionalism,
458. See Robert C. Fellmeth, FeUmeth Final Report of the State Bar Discipline
Monitor, Sept. 20, 1991, at 1 [hereinafter FeUmeth Final Report).
459. See generaUy S.B. 1498, Ch. 1159, 1987-88 Regular Sess., 1988 Stat. of Cal. 2 at
3699.
460. See itt.
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having as its main goal the de-mythologization of professional power and
authority. The central tenets of this view were that lawyers are no differ-
ent from other occupational groups that are routinely regulated by the
state and that the inherent conflict of interest involved in attorney self-
regulation renders it fundamentally illegitimate. Professional ideology,
from this view, is a mask for professional self-interest.
A related, but more extreme, anti-professional ideology was also part
of the debate in the lawyer regulation crisis, but its support was always
marginal. To be sure, members of the public and organized consumer
groups such as HAL~I made their voices heard. The core themes in
this ideology were that, not only waS lawyer regulation by the State Bar
illegitimate, but that any lawyer involvement in the attorney discipline
system, even the involvement of the judiciary, was simply another exam-
ple of the "Brotherhood" at work. This perspective developed an ideology
of the legal profession as not simply another occupational group, but as
an actual conspiracy against the public good.
The Bar responded in various ways to these different levels of critique.
Its main response was to reassert a traditional ideology of professional-
ism, which stressed the historical tradition and social value of profes-
sional self-regulation: Lawyers are a bulwark of democracy, the profes-
sion is an arm of the judiciary, and only a free and independent (i.e.,
self-regulating) profession can hope to achieve the ethical ideals to which
lawyers properly aspire. Moreover, from this view, lawyers are those best
situated to do the job of attorney discipline, since they alone. have the
expertise and motivation to see that the job gets done properly.
In the end, however, none of these perspectives was fully persuasive.
The Bar's traditional ideology of professionalism seemed to ignore the
very clients the profession professed to serve. Moreover, the Bar's ideo-
logical response to the attacks on its role in lawyer regulation seemed
largely irrelevant. In neither the Presley Task Force nor subsequent Sen-
ate Bill 1543 proposals was regulation of lawyers by lawyers seriously in
doubt. Under both, lawyers would continue to carry out lawyer regula-
tion under the aegis of the supreme court. Similarly, the anti-professional
ideology was also deficient. It relied on a view "of the legal profession
that caricatured the professional motivation of lawyers and judges. The
"Brotherhood" motif, while popular (and certainly containing a seed of
461. See, e.g., Hearing in Favor of SB 1543 Bfifore the California Senate Judiciary
Committee (Feb. 25, 1986) (testimony of HALT-An Organization of Americans for
Legal Refonn) (on file with author).
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truth), simply mischaracterized a more complex reality. The bar is highly
differentiated, segmented, and diverse. Many lawyers, including those on
the Task Force and in the Legislature-and, presumably some in the
Bar-wanted not to protect fellow lawyers but to police them effectively.
The anti-professional ideology, insofar as it treated the Bar as a mono-
lith, lacked credibility.
By contrast, the de-professionalism ideology formulated by the Task
Force was intellectually persuasive. Its main goal was to de-mythologize
the legal profession and to undermine the long unquestioned basis for
lawyer self-regulation. But this was ultimately not enough. Few in the
Legislature appeared to disagree with the view that lawyers should be
considered as just another occupational group and hence be forced to
justify or relinquish their self-regulatory powers. Yet the de-professional-
ism critique did little to explain how an independent disciplinary agency
would operate and why it would be more effective than Bar regulation,
legitimate or not. This de-mythologizing ideology ran into the formidable
barrier of a pragmatic Legislature that would be forced to fashion any
alternative to Bar regulation.
With the creation of the Bar Discipline Monitor, the debate over the
ideology of professionalism shifted. No longer was the central focus
whether lawyers should self-regulate, but how lawyer regulation under
the administration of the Bar should operate. The ideology of profession-
alism advanced by the Monitor drew on traditional ideology by exhorting·
the Bar to develop a system of lawyer regulation that lived up to profes-
sional ideals. It also drew on reformist ideologies by emphasizing the pri-
macy of the client's perspective in the regulatory process. Self-regulation
had thus been maintained by the Bar, but with a mixed victory. Self-regu-
lation remained not because of the persuasiveness of the Bar's ideologi-
cal claims but due to the more pragmatic concerns of a legislature un-
willing to create another ineffective or "captured" regulatory agency. As a
result, the Bar had become subject to continued pressures for reform
and continued efforts to re-shape professional ideology from a
consumer's view. The next sections explore the results of these
processes.
B. The Professionalization ofBar Discipline
The previous section examined the ideological dimensions of the de-
bate over lawyer self-regulation in California. As discussed, the
profession's ideological vision was not fully accepted, but neither was it
successfully defeated. Nevertheless, the challenge to the Bar's authority
was important because it marked a turning point in the Bar's role in the
regulation of lawyers. Although the Bar retained self-regulatory powers,
henceforth these powers would be subject to considerable scrutiny. But·
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to what effect? The debate over lawyer self-regulation occurred not only
at the ideological level but also at the empirical and nOrnUltive levels.
This chapter analyzes the contours of this debate and examines the com-
peting claims of critics and the Bar concerning the effectiveness and
desirability of lawyer self-regulation.
The most strident critics of lawyer self-regulation contend that the Bar
is simply incapable of effectively regulating its own members.462 There
are two dimensions to this critique. The fIrst is an empirical and psycho-
cultural claim which holds that lawyers, whose training and socialization
have inculcated in them a shared sense of professional community, will
either naturally tend to, or in more conspiratorial versions, purposely
seek to protect the interests of fellow members of this community rather
than those of the client or public at large.
A second aspect of this critique is normative. This version either ex-
pressly or implicitly holds that it is simply improper to allow lawyers (or
any occupation) to police themselves because it constitutes an inherent
conflict of interest. This is a variation on the notion that it is wrong to
be a judge in one's own case. It is not that one cannot ever act properly
in such a role but that the mere appearance of impropriety in such a
situation itself renders the role illegitimate.
The Bar, in turn, has had two main responses to these critiques. Again,
the fIrst response constitutes an empirical claim: No one can do a better
job regulating lawyers than lawyers.463 Nonlawyers, it is contended, will
simply not comprehend the complexities of the practice of law or the
need for lawyerly discretion suffIciently to be effective and fair regula-
tors of the profession. The second, and more normative claim is that it is
a good thing that lawyers self-regulate. Such a syst(!m of self-regulation
not only builds intraprofessional pride and public-mindedness, but more
importantly is socially benefIcial because lawyers' independence from
external regulation is a prerequisite for a vigorous democratic society.484
Yet, how are we to evaluate these competing claims? This section does
so by assessing how effectively they explain and predict how the lawyer
discipline system actually operates. Such a task is made considerably
more diffIcult because the California system itself underwent continuous
462. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 23, at 142-57; KAy A OSTBERG, HALT, ATIORNEY
DISCIPIJNE NATIONAL SURVEY AND REPORT 1 (1990) (on file with author); see generaUy
Ostberg, supra note 8.
463. Of course, this does not explain why the State Bar must be the agency to
regulate lawyers rather than an independent state agency staffed by lawyers.
464. See Hellbron, supra note 428, at 90; Vogel, supra note 5, at 5.
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change during the period of this study. This also presents, however, the
opportunity to understand the impact and consequences of these changes
on the disciplinary process. Thus, this section evaluates both qualitative
and quantitative data on the Bar disciplinary process. Rather than focus-
ing on the system at only one point in time, this study examines and
compares the evolving system over time, concentrating on the period
between 1985-1992.466 Such an inquiry involves two steps. The fIrst is an
analytic description and comparison of the Bar's disciplinary apparatus
and the processes of self-regulation. The second step involves a quantita-
tive analysis of the output of the disciplinary system. Taken together,
these two levels of analysis provide the means to assess the validity of
the competing claims over lawyer self-regulation in California.
1. The Organization of Self-Regulation
Although the California Supreme Court has ultimate authority over the
regulation of lawyers in the state, the court traditionally delegates much
of the responsibility for lawyer discipline to the State Bar. Additionally,
the State Bar Act,400 which created a unified bar in the state in 1927,
legislatively bestowed substantial self-regulatory authority on the Bar, in-
cluding the power to perfonn disciplinary investigations, to hold hearings
on discipline matters, to subpoena witnesses and evidence, to sanction
by means of public or private reprimands, and to recommend discipline
such as suspension or disbarment by the supreme COurt.467 Through its
governing body, the Board of Governors, the State Bar has also directly
shaped the contours of self-regulation by promulgating the ethical rules it
will enforce.468
465. This period roughly corresponds to the time-frame. of the Bar's most recent
"crisis" of self-regulation. See supra part II.A.2. In 1985 the ·soclal drama" began with
a highly influential public expos~ of the fallures of the Bar's lawyer discipline system
and the subsequent threat by the state legislature to force the Bar to relinquish Its
self-regulatory powers. The year 1992 marks the end of the Discipline Monitor's ten-
ure. See supra notes 443-60 and accompanying text. By this time the Bar's discipline
system was once again being publicly halled (at least by the Bar) as a model for the
nation. As the previous sections have shown, however, the roots of this particular
challenge to the Bar run deeper than the specific attacks in 1985. Indeed, they are
part of broader and recurrent crises of authority that all professions undergo, and in
an important sense, It ls oniy after much more time elapses that we will be able to
examine the full effect of the "reforms" enacted during 1985-92. This section repre-
sents a preliminary effort in this regard, and one that ls, ultimately, skeptical.
466. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6000-6228 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994)
467. ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & CHARLES O. PORTER, THE AMERICAN LAWYER: A SUMMARY
OF THE SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 254-55 (Greenwood Press ed., 1972); see
also ORIE 1.. PHIwPS & PHILBRICK McCoy, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS (1952).
For a conclse--:.although largely uncritical-history and overview of early lawyer disci-
pline in Callfornia, see Gilb, supra note 20, at 101-112.
468. While the Board of Governors passes these rules, they are formally adopted by
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a. Exercise of disciplinary powers
Historically, the Board of Governors exercised its disciplinary powers
with the aid of local grievance committees comprised of volunteer at-
torneys who are appointed by the Board. Under the discipline system
that remained in operation throughout much of the Bar's existence, vol-
unteer assistant secretaries were assigned the role of screening com-
plaints that were brought against Bar members. These complaints typi-
cally came directly through the mail or were referred to the Bar by local
voluntary bar associations, district attorneys, or other state agencies. At
least in the early years of the system's operation, such screening appears
to have been largely perfunctory, as an extraordinarily high percentage of
complaints proceeded to the subsequent preliminary investigation stage,
which was conducted by the local grievance committees.469 These com-
mittees, located throughout the state, generally investigated complaints,
held hearings, made fmdings of fact,and provided recommendations as
to whether a case should be dismissed, a reproval issued, or a disbar-
ment or suspension occur. The Board of Governors received this record
created by the local committees and itself acted collectively as judge in
all disciplinary matters.470 Before the Board, a respondent attorney (and
the attorney's counsel, if so desired) could present either oral or written
arguments and introduce any additional evidence pertinent to the
case.471 A resulting disciplinary decision was formally a "recommenda-
tion" by the Board of Governors that was sent to the supreme court for
its approval.472
the California Supreme Court. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6076-6077 (West 1990
& Supp. 1994). California adopted the original Rules of Professional Conduct of the
State Bar of California In 1928 and revised them in 1975. In 1988, California adopted
the California Rules of Professional Conduct, superseding the Revised Rules of 1975.
Lawyers in California are also subject to legislatively prescribed rules. See CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE §§ 6000-6228 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994).
469. See BLAUSTEIN & PORTER, supra note 467, at 254. These authors show that
between 1927 and 1939, the Bar received 8335 complaints against lawyers, conducted
preliminary investigations in 7965 of those cases, and brought formal charges in 1425
of them. From this, 278 cases were recommended to the Supreme Court for disci-
pline.
470. See Gilb, supra note 20, at 104-05.
471. [d. at 105.
472. See id.; The Board of Governors' Page, DisCiplinary Work, 3 ST. B.J. 209
(1929); Proceedings of the State Bar of California (Seventh Annual Meeting), at 34
(1934); Lowell Turrentine, May the Bar Set its Own House in Order? 34 MICH. L.
REV. 200, 201-02 (1935) (stating the Board had the power to investigate facts and
make recommendations to the Supreme Court).
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This disciplinary structure remained in effect well into the 1960s. By
1966, however, the Board of Governors felt it was unable to deal with all
discipline cases directly as well as carry out its other mandated func-
tions. Consequently, the Board delegated its disciplinary responsibilities
to two statewide discipline boards, and in 1968, consolidated this author-
ity into a single fifteen-member discipline board.473 Nonlawyer members
were added to the discipline board in 1976, which was part of a nation-
wide movement to increase public scrutiny into lawyer discipline in light
of the "scandalous" conditions in self-regulation revealed by the Clark
Report.474 The State Bar Court was created in 1979, to which the Board
of Governors delegated much of its authority in handling disciplinary
matters. The new Bar Court was established with three main depart-
ments charged with conducting disciplinary investigations, holding hear-
ings, and reviewing discipline decisions prior to submitting them to the
supreme court for approval. The Bar Court was staffed mostly by volun-
tary attorney "referees," although the hearing and review departments
both contained nonlawyer members as well. Thus, with few substantive
changes, the lawyer discipline system that existed in th~ 1970s bore great
resemblance to the original model of self-regulation envisioned at the
creation of the unilled State Bar in 1927. Spurred by both internal and
external criticisms of the system, however, in the early 1980s, lawyer
regulation in California was about to undergo signiflcant change.
b. Functional overview
Before examining California's contemporary Bar discipline system in
detail, it is useful to outline its broad functional contours, even though
the specifIc organizational arrangement of the system has changed over
time. There are five main functions performed by the Bar discipline sys-
tem: complaint intake, investigation, prosecution, adjudication and re-
view. Each function in turn is handled by a separate set of actors within
the system.
Complaint intake is the initial step in the disciplinary system. At this
step, complaints against attorneys are received, screened for relevance
and jurisdiction, and categorized in terms of the nature and seriousness
of the complaint. It is also at this stage that the Bar staff may informally
mediate "minor" complaints (i.e., those dealing with attorney behavior
unlikely to lead to disciplinary sanctions). Additionally, complaints falling
outside the Bar's jurisdiction, such as fee disputes, can be referred to
outside agencies or to alternative divisions within the Bar such as the
473. See President's Message: Disciplinary Procedure Updated and Streamlined, 43
J. ST. B. CAL. 9-12 (1968).
474. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
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Bar's mandatory fee arbitration program. Finally, case handlers at the
. intake stage can also initiate preliminary investigations and fact gathering
to facilitate a more formal investigation of complaints that occurs at the
next step in the process.
At the investigation stage, those complaints that have been screened
by the intake process and are deemed both jurisdictionally relevant and
likely to assert a disciplinable offense are investigated. This typically
. involves interviewing the complaining client (or "complaining witness" or
CW), the respondent attorney, and any other available witnesses. It may
also involve collecting and examining pertinent documentary evidence.
Where there is sufficient evidence to warrant further proceedings, an
investigator and attorney will prepare a summary of the case (termed a
"statement of the case" or SOC) that sets forth the basis for bringing
formal charges against a miscreant attorney.
The third stage in the lawyer discipline process involves determining
whether or not to prosecute a case by means of filing formal charges (a
"notice to show cause" or NTSC) in State Bar Court or to dismiss or
settle a case by means of informal disciplinary sanctions. Where Bar
prosecutors determine that formal charges should be flled, they contact
the respondent attorney and allow him or her to respond to the allega-
tions or to attempt to enter into a settlement with the Bar without pro-
ceeding to a formal disciplinary hearing.
At the a<ljudicative stage, those cases neither settled nor dropped in
the preceding stages are scheduled for a formal hearing before the State
Bar Court. Here cases are fully a<ljudicated in a non-jury proceeding
before a Bar referee or judge. The referee or judge then recommends
either to dismiss the case, to issue minor disciplinary sanctions, or to
suspend or disbar the attorney. This recommendation in turn is subject
to preliminary review at the State Bar Court level and ultimate review
before the California Supreme Court.
Such a brief overview of the discipline process can, of course, only
introduce and highlight the main stages in the Bar's system for regulating
lawyers. Moreover, while the general functions of the system have re-
mained constant, structural and organizational changes over time have
influenced each step in this process. It is thus necessary to explicate in
greater detail how the system outlined above actually operates as well as
to describe the recent evolution of Bar discipline process in California
and its consequences.
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2. The Transfonnation of Lawyer Discipline
Between 1985 and 1992, California's lawyer discipline system under-
went substantial structural and organizational changes. These develop-
ments occurred due to both internal and external dissatisfaction with a
system of self-regulation that seemed incapable ofdealing with the explo-
sion in California's lawyer population and the corresponding growth in
disciplinary complaints that resulted after 1970. During his tenure as
State Bar Discipline Monitor (1987-1992), Robert Fellmeth476 proposed
numerous changes in the operation of lawyer regulation. Many of these
proposed reforms were put into effect, and met with surprisingly little re-
sistance from the Bar. In the space of five short years, the Discipline
Monitor shifted from excoriating the Bar's self-regulatory apparatus to
viewing it in many respects as a model to be emulated by other states
and other professions.476
This section analyzes the process of lawyer regulation in California
during this remarkable period of change and reform. Quantitative indi-
cators of the output of the discipline system give us one way to evaluate
lawyer regulation in California and the effect, if any, of the reforms dur-
ing this period. Yet, it is also necessary to examine in detail precisely
what the changes in the system entailed. What, for instance, did the sys-
tem look like at the beginning and end of this period? How were com-
plaints against lawyers processed and how did this change over time?
Who were, and are, the key actors at each step in the disciplinary pro-
cess and how have their roles been affected by the reforms enacted ill
lawyer discipline? this section addresses these questions by analyzing
and comparing each stage of the lawyer discipline system as it evolved
during this period of reform.477
a. Intake
The California State Bar has two main offices, located in San Francis-
co and Los Angeles. While some disciplinary procedures occur in both
locales, the intake function for the system is performed in the Bar's
475. Robert Fellrneth was selected by legislative mandate to oversee the lawyer
discipline process and to recommend reforms In the system of self-regulation. See
supra notes 443-46 and accompanying text
476. See FeUmeth Final Report, supra note 458, at 2-6. It is important to stress that
Fellmeth's praise for the Bar 'discipline system reforms was qualified, a point the Bar
generally Ignores when It selectively uses quotations from the Monitor's final report,
such as in Its own annual reports on the discipline system. See' Progress Report, ST.
B. CAL. (1989-91) (quoting Robert C. Fellrneth, Seventh Report of the State Bar Disci-
pline Monitor, Sept. 1, 1990 [hereinafter FeUmeth VI/]).
477. ThIs description and analysis Is derived from published and unpublished re-
ports, archival sources, interviews, and limited observational data.
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downtown Los Angeles office. In the Inid-1980s, the intake unit originat-
ed as a separate division in the disciplinary system and part of the pro-
cedural reforms implemented by the Bar in response to an internally-gen-
erated study and critique of its lawyer discipline system.478 The central
rationale for developing the intake unit was that it would quickly identify
those relevant, potentially meritorious, and more serious complaints
entering the system for speedy processing.479 Those complaints identi-
fied as non-meritorious would be disposed of quickly and, therefore,
make the entire system more efficient as well as alleviate pressures
caused by heavy caseloads and tremendous complaint backlogs. The
underlying assumption supporting this development was that the vast
majority of complaints received by the Bar simply did not pertain to
problems within the Bar's jurisdiction nor rise to a level of sufficient
seriousness to justify disciplinary attention.48O By weeding out facially
non-meritorious complaints at an early stage, the intake unit would thus
help to focus Bar discipline resources on relevant matters tending to in-
volve the most serious forms of misconduct.481
The intake unit is generally the first step in processing complaints
through the contemporary lawyer discipline system. Although the Bar has
authority to initiate its own investigations, absent a formal complaint
made by a third party, such actions are relatively rare.482 Some cases
may also enter the system by bypassing the intake unit entirely. These
include special disciplinary proceedings, such as attorney requests for
reinstatement subsequent to disbarment, which enter the system directly
at the investigative stage. While not rare, such cases are far outnumbered
by cases originating as client complaints about an attorney.483 In 1986,
the Bar created a toll-free telephone complaint line to facilitate public
access to the disciplinary system. This is the means by which most com-
plaints enter the system. In 1987, a staff of six junior investigators per-
formed complaint intake under the guidance of a nonlawyer
supervisor.484 The primary tasks of these operators were to screen in-
coming calls, categorize them for further handling in the system, or dis-
478. See Kroeker Report, supra note 331 and accompanying text.
479..See Complaints' Grievance Panel Fifth Annual Report, STATE BAR CAL. 10
(1992) [hereinafter Grievance Panel Report].
480. See id.; FeUmeth Initial Report, supm note 448, at 8-15.
481. See id. at 8-11; see generally Grievance Panel Report, supra note 479.
482. See Ostberg, supra note 462, at 6 (citing Nat'l Org. of Bar Counsel).
483. Feumeth Initial Report, supra note 448, at 29.
484. Id. at 8, 29-30, 60-51 (criticizing the use of Inexperienced investigators in the
Intake process).
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miss or divert the complaints as appropriate.4& At the outset, many
calls received were simply not considered within the Bar's jurisdiction
and were thus terminated with an explanation that the complaint fell
outside the Bar's disciplinary purview.486 Fee disputes, for instance,
could be diverted to the State Bar's fee arbitration program.487 Other
complaints could be referred to local bar associations, which sometimes
attempted on their own to mediate or arbitrate disputes involving local
attorneys.486
Calls that in the estimation of the operator involved facts unlikely to
lead to further investigation were termed "inquiries" and were similarly
subject to dismissal.489 These calls might include allegations of relatively
minor misbehavior such as the failure to return a client's phone calls or
to return case files to a client.400 The designation of an incoming call as
an "inquiry" effectively removed the complaint from further consideration
by the disciplinary system, although the investigators handling complaint
intakes did have the authority to attempt to mediate such minor com-
plaints by phoning or writing a letter to a respondent attorney.491
It is only where an intake investigator initially determined that an alle-
gation, if true, described behavior that was manifestly unethical, unlaw-
ful, or likely to lead to disciplinary action that a call would be designated
as a "complaint."492 In such instances, the complaining client ("com-
plaining witness," or CW) would be sent a complaint form to initiate a
formal complaint.493 CWs were also routinely sent a letter requesting
that they provide additional documentation to substantiate their claims.
Typically, only a small percentage-around twenty percent-of complaint
forms were returned.494 This is, perhaps, not surprising since the system
placed a substantial onus on complaining witnesses at an early stage to
articulate properly a type of lawyer misconduct which would be deemed
485: [d. at 7-9.
486. [d. at 9.
487. [d.
488. Local bar associations themselves also frequently screened potential complaints
from entering the Bar's disciplinary system. [d. at 34. Consumers of legal services,
unless they are sophisticated or repeat clients, are unlikely to realize that local volun-
tary bar associations have absolutely no formal authority to deal with complaints
about lawyers. [d. at 35. Nevertheless, In 1987 many associations accepted such com-
plaints and attempted to resolve them Informally. [d. at 35. Complainants, however,
were frequently not Informed of the local associations' lack of jurisdiction nor were
their cases routinely referred to the Bar If the cases were not resolved. [d. at 34-36.
489. [d. at 8-9.
490. [d. at 8.
491. [d. at 8-9, ~O.
492. [d. at 8.
493. [d. at 9.
494. [d. at 9·10, 46-50.
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jurisdictionally relevant and to produce sufficient evidence or documen-
tation to support their allegations of misconduct,496
Those complaint forms that were completed and returned received de
novo review by an intake investigator who again sought to determine
upon quick consideration whether the complaint was properly in the Bar
discipline system.496 Upon reviewing the written formal complaint, and
perhaps contacting the respondent attorney by telephone for a response,
the investigator would again attempt to determine whether any further
action was warranted.497 If so, the investigator's final step was to
prioritize the complaint in terms of the seriousness of its allegations.4ll8
Complaints that survived this process of preliminary screening were then
forwarded to the Office of Investigations (01), of which the intake unit
was a separate part, for more thorough case analysis and investiga-
tion.499
Although the intake unit was designed as a reform measure to help
deal with case backlog problems within the discipline system, early on it
was vulnerable to harsh criticism, particularly by the Bar Discipline Mon-
itor.600 One difficulty was that the intake unit performed its screening
function perhaps too well, since few calls received on the phone ever
actually became active complaints that were passed on for more com-
plete investigation. Callers faced the initial obstacles of stating their
claims in a manner that the intake unit would recognize as both within
the Bar's jurisdiction and likely to lead to disciplinary sanctions even
before they were given a complaint form to complete. Additionally, the
relatively small percentage of complaint forms that were actually com-
pleted and returned faced a second screening process that included a
preliminary evaluation of the evidence produced by the complainant.
Thus, the very early stages of the discipline system were almost entirely
complainant-driven. As a result, only the most articulate or· persistent
complainants were likely to initiate a formal complaint,wl
.Perhaps most problematic however, was that this formidable screening
function remained largely hidden from view. Investigator discretion to
495. [d. at 41.
496. [d. at 47.
497. [d. at 10. .
498. [d. at 11.
499. [d.
500. See id. at 46-54.
501. [d. at 8-11, 46-50 (discussing the procedures and shortcomings of the intake
unit).
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refuse to send a complaint form or to designate both calls and completed
forms as "inquiries" was substantial and was not subject to meaningful or
systematic review. Moreover, the investigators performing this crucial
function were junior investigative staff members who typically lacked
any sophisticated knowledge about legal practice and procedures, or
even the nature of the Bar's disciplinary jurisdiction.l102 Consequently,
investigators at this stage tended to focus their attention on instances of
obvious criminality or misconduct, such as misappropriation of client
funds. More subtle misconduct was less frequently or reliably identified
for further investigation and processing. l102
Case screening determinations at the intake level also were performed
largely devoid of context.1lO4 The system intended to allow intake investi-
gators to determine whether a respondent attorney had been subject to
any prior discipline or complaints, yet this information was not available
to investigators in any reliable fashion. Although some information per-
taining to an attorney's "priors" was available on computer, records of
mere "inquiries" were kept only on index cards in fIles that were purged
periodically.1I06 Thus, investigators often had no way of knowing wheth-
er a seemingly "minor" incident reflected a broader, more persistent
pattern of routine misconduct or incompetence that should receive more
substantial scrutiny.1506
By 1991, however, many of the most serious organizational and pro-
cedural deficiencies in the Bar intake unit had begun to receive attention,
largely in response to the published criticisms of the Bar Discipline Mon-
itor.607 While still serving its screening function, intake had become ar-
guably more reliable. Part of this increased reliability stemmed from per-
sonnel changes. Previously, junior level investigators performed the in-
take function with little training in complaint handling procedures or
disciplinary law. Moreover, these investigators wanted to "investigate,"
and considered phone duty an undesirable assignment. lI08 Thus, a larger
502. See ill. at 62-64.
603. Id. at 62.
504. See generally id. at 46-54 (explaining the procedures and difficulties discovered
by the Bar Dlsclpllne Monitor regarding the Intake unit).
606. Id. at 10.
606. See generally id. at 64-66 (describing the Intake unit).
607. See generally FeUmeth I, supra note 460; FeUmeth II, supra note 462; FeUmeth
Ill, supra note 463; FeUmeth IV, supra note 466; Robert C. Fellmeth, Fifth Progress
Report of the State Bar Discipline Monitor, Sept. 1, 1989 [hereinafter FeUmeth V];
FeUmeth VI, supra note 467; FeUmeth VII, supra note 476; Robert C. Fellmeth,
Eighth Progress Report of the State Bar Discipline Monitor, Mar. 1, 1991 [hereinafter
FeUmeth VIII); FeUmeth Final Report, supra note 468.
508. See FeUmeth Final Report, supra note 468, at 60-63.
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staff of newly appointed "complaint analysts" who were specially trained
for their role replaced the intake staff.1I09
At the organizational level, investigator discretion to designate cases as
"inquiries" (and hence close them to further investigation) was constrict-
ed. Following a recommendation by the Discipline Monitor, the Bar add-
ed a new level of staff review at the intake unit.~lO This consisted of
centralizing the training and supervision of complaint analysts under the
authority of an experienced Bar attorney who was to henceforth review
all decisions before closing a case and who also read each incoming
completed complaint form. ~ll
A second source of review and oversight was established by statute
and put into 'effect subsequent to 1987.~12 This legislation created a
"Complainants' Grievance Panel," composed of seven members, three of
whom were nonlawyers.~13 This new panel was established with the
power to review dismissed cases and to order further investigations or
even to recommend that formal disciplinary charges be filed.~l.
The intake unit also benefitted from reforms that increased the amount
of information available to complaint analysts. Perhaps the most helpful
development was that the unit became fully computerized.~l~ From the
time an initial call was made, intake staff now had access to a variety of
data to aid their determination of whether to proceed further with a
case. Complaint analysts staffing the phones were able to view a detailed
record of a respondent attorney's prior and current involvement with the
discipline system. This record included such information as the nature of
any prior discipline imposed as well as the number and nature of any
previous "inquiries" received about a respondent attorney, or the status
of any current complaints against the same attorney. ~16 At least theoreti-
509. Id. at 24-25.
510. 'See id. at 61.
511. Id. at 61, 70.
512. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE § 6086.11 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993).
513. Id. § 6086.11(b). .
514. Id. § 6086. 11(a). For data on the operation of this panel for its first five years,
see generally Grievance Panel Report, supra note 479.
515. FeUmeth Final Report, supra note 458, at 72-73
516. Id. Other infonnatlon made increasingly available to Bar staff included data
regarding an attorney's criminal convictions and arrests, malpractice insurance claims
filed against the attorney, records of serious judicial sanctions imposed, and instances
where an attorney had written· a check for "insufficient funds" against a client's trust
fund account (often an Indicator not only of poor office management but of dishon-
esty that can lead to more serious unethical misconduct). Id. Many of these reforms
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cally, this enabled Bar intake staff to identify respondent attorneys who
had a pattern of misconduct or who had multiple current complaints
pending against them.517
Table 1 presents the quantitative data on the Bar's complaint intake
function. This data well-illustrates the primary screening function of the
intake unit. The number of total communications received, which is the
sum of all incoming calls plus the small amount of walk-in or initially
mailed complaints, rose dramatically between 1987 and 1992, from 26,216
to 89,467, an increase of over 340%. This is due both to the efforts of the
Bar to publicize its disciplinary work and reforms, and the publicity
about the disciplinary system generated by the Discipline Monitor's
evaluative reports. This figure also highlights a fundamental tension in
the discipline system, particularly at the intake stage. The more success-
ful the Bar is about publicizing its lawyer discipline system, the more
complaints are received by a system already struggling to reduce case
backlog and delays.
were mandated by 5B 1498, supra note 462, and only implemented after 1987.
617. This was not an insubstantial development. The Bar Discipline Monitor, for In-
. stance, reported that a large percentage of complalnts received Involved a small 'num-
ber of repeat offenders and that betWeen 66-8096 of cases forwarded for further inves-
tigation Involved attorneys with multiple complalnts pending against them. See
FeUmeth Final Report, supra note 468, at 72-81.
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Table 1
State Bar of California Lawyer Discipline System
Office of Investigations, IntakelLegal Advice
COMPLAINT INTAKES'"
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
TOTAL
COMMUNICATIONS 26,216 32,856 39,572 68,197 76,856 89,467
RECEIVED [lOO%) [100%) [100%] [lOO%] [lOO%] [100%]
OUTCOME (Categorization AssIgned)
Infonnatlon 15,135 15,394 19,805 48,054 56,104 67,726
Requests [58%] [47%] [50%] [70%] [73%] [76%]
inquiries 11,OSl 17,462 19,767 20,143 20,754 21,741
[42%] [53'l6] [50%] [30%] [27%] [24%]
inquiries
Advanced
to Complaint 7452 4376 5267 5980 6447 8181
Status [67%] [25%] [27%] [30%) [31%) [38%]
TOTAL # of
LAWYERS
INVOLVED
(complaints
may Involve
more than one
lawyer) 8096 4724 5686 6512 6925 8734
TOTAL # of
Lawyers In
State Bar'" 93,877 98,201 101,226 lOS,531 109,886 113,716
%of CA Lawyers
Involved In
complaints 8.6% 4.8% 5.6% 6.0% 6.3% 7.7%
ote: t'ercentages are rounaea ana U1ua may not ww lUU'lll.
618. State Bar of California, Lawyer Discipline in California: A Progress Report for
1988 and 1989, at 18-19 (on me with author); State Bar of California, Annual Re-
port, 1992, at 4 (on me with author), Annual Report, 1991, at 22 (on me with au-
thor).
619. State Bar of California, Membel'5hip Statistics (on me with author). This figure
represents annual active membel'5hip as of December In each year.
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Most incoming calls are designated as requests for infonnation, which
are diverted from the discipline system entirely, rather than as inquiries,
which may lead to an open complaint case. Infonnation requests repre-
sented 58% of the calls received in 1987 and 50% in 1989. However, in
1990, as the Bar experienced a surge of over 260% in the number of calls
received (compared with 1987), the amount termed information requests
rose to over 70% of incoming calls and remained at this high level for
both 1991 and 1992. Correspondingly, the number of inquiries fell. The
ratio of inquiries to information requests was fairly even between 1987-
1989, but by 1992 more than three times as many calls were categorized
as mere information requests rather than inquiries. The difficulty with
interpreting these statistics is that, while many calls are certainly mainly
infornlational (such as requests for bar brochures or advice on how to
select an attorney), many calls deemed infonnation requests undoubtedly
involve matters that are referred because they are considered to be out-
side the Bar's disciplinary jurisdiction.1I2O Thus, these fIgures may also
represent a shift by the Bar towards a more aggressive screening pos-
ture, which would mean that an increasing number of calls that might
otherwise properly be handled by the discipline system are being divert-
ed at this early stage.
Similarly, the fIgures on the number of inquiries that advance to be-
come open complaint cases also reflect the heavy screening that occurs
at this level. In 1987, over 67% of inquiries resulted in eventual complaint
status. The following year, despite a 25% increase in the number of in-
coming calls and a concomitant 58% increase in the number of inquiries,
the number of offIcial complaints declined by over 41%. This shift oc-
curred as the Bar replaced its junior investigators with specially trained
complaint analysts at the intake level. The resulting decline in both the
number and percentage of complaints may thus reflect more "efficient"
complaint screening or, again, may indicate a policy shift towards in-
creasing barriers to processing potentially meritorious complaints in the
discipline system.
b. Investigation
Cases that survive the initial screening performed at intake make their
way to the Office of Investigations, which operates out of both the Bar's
San Francisco and Los Angeles offices.1521 Like the intake stage, the in-
vestigation step focuses on identifying those cases most likely to lead to
a successful disciplinary sanction and channelling them for prosecu-
620. An example of such a matter is one involving an apparent fee dispute issue,
even where other potentially dlsc\pllnable issues may also be involved.
621. FeUmeth Initial Report, supra note 448, at 11.
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tion.622 The vast majority of complaints received at this stage are divert-
ed from the disciplinary system either by closure or the imposition of in-
formal sanctions.1523
In 1987, the investigation stage of the Bar discipline system was, in
many respects, the most problematic stage of the entire system.524 De-
spite earlier reform efforts, there was a tremendous backlog of complaint
cases awaiting investigation. Moreover, because there was considerable
political pressure to increase the output of processed cases (and hence
to lessen the case backlog), investigators often felt pressured to close a
case quickly or to pass on for further prosecution those cases that re-
quired minimal investigation, frequently leaving more complex cases and
those involving difficult or multiple allegations uninvestigated.1523
The first step of the investigation stage repeated part of the intake
screening function. Investigators receiving cases from the intake unit
reviewed complaints, reclassifying some cases as inquiries, dismissing
those unlikely to lead to disciplinary sanctions, or mediating cases that
seemed amenable to such informal resolution. During this second pre-
liminary screening, if it was determined that further investigation was ap-
propriate, the complaint was assigned to an investigation team. Both the
director of these investigative teams and the investigator ultimately as-
signed to the case had the authority to close a complaint for "insufficient
facts" ~ntirely without any additional review.526
Typically, the investigation of Bar complaints entailed little or no field
investigation. Because of heavy caseload pressures-investigators in 1987
were burdened with caseloads at least twice their optimal level-most
investigatory work was handled over the phone.m Bar policies discour-
aged off-site investigation, requiring investigators to obtain special per-
mission to conduct such fieldwork. 526 Instead, the typical investigation
involved contacting both the complainant and the respondent attorney to
522. See generally id. at 8-15.
523. See id. at 11-15.
524. Id. at 63-64.
525. Id. at 63-66. There were frequent charges by Bar staff and staff attorneys that
administrative pressures rather than sound prosecutorlal policy often dictated how cas-'
es were processed In order to make the system's statistics look good to outside critics. .
See, e.g., Monica Bay, Bar Attorneys Ch4rge 'Number Massaging',' Claim Bar is Ma-
nipulating Discipline Case Statistics, THE RECORDER, Mar. 21, 1986, at 1.
526. See FeUmeth Initial Report, supra note 448, at 12.
527. Id. at 64.
528. Id. at 64-65.
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clarify each party's version of the relevant facts and their responses to
the opposing party's position. Investigators could also request that both
parties submit pertinent documentary evidence in themail.1I29
In those instances where investigators determined that there was suffi-
cient compelling evidence to warrant fIling formal charges against an
.attorney, they compiled a report of their work and a recommendation
(called the "statement of the case" or SOC) that was submitted to the
director and then to the legal unit of the Office of Investigations (01) for
attorney review. This was the first time in the Bar's lawyer discipline
system that an attorney reviewed a client complaint. Once again, at this
stage the attorney reviewing the complaint was able to close a case for
insufficient facts or issue a letter of admonition to a respondent attor-
ney.630 Alternatively, the 01 attorney might agree to fIle formal charges
and forward the case to the prosecution stage where these charges were
drafted.631
Like their counterparts at the intake unit, 01 investigators enjoyed
considerable, and largely nonreviewable discretion to dismiss complaints,
often after only quite cursory investigation. Heavy caseloads and pres-
sures to resolve or dismiss complaints quickly created disincentives to in-
depth investigative work.632 Exacerbating this situation were formidable
barriers to extensive or thorough investigation of complaints. For exam-·
pIe', investigators and even attorneys working in the 01 were not permit-
ted to subpoena documents relevant to an investigation without filing a
supporting affidavit, which in turn, faced strict scrutiny before it was
accepted.1533 Nor were investigators allowed, in the course of their inves-
tigations, to mention the name of a respondent attorney to a witness or
even to write the attorney's name in correspondence with a complaining
client of that attorney.634
529. [d. See generally itt. at 63-69 (discussing the operations of and difficulties en-
countered by the investigators).
530. An "admonition" Is technically not a fonn of discipline. Rather, it Is a warning
against repeating the alleged misbehavior in the future. Admonitions are kept on file
for two years and can be reactivated if subsequent complaints are received against the
same attorney. See generally id. at 58-85 (assessing the investigations unit's procedures
and shortcomings).
531. [d. at 58-85.
532. For example, investigators had a practice of "abating" investigations where they
discovered that a civil or criminal case was pending against the respondent attorney
raising similar Issues. Such abatements were not re-opened uniess a client'refiled a
complaint. See id. at 77-78.
533. The Bar Discipline Monitor tenned the level of scrutiny it applied "search war-
rant affidavit criteria." See itt. at 71.
534. [d. at 70-71. As the bar Discipline Monitor remarked: "Where a complaining wit-
ness has problems with two or three attorneys, the investigator's attempt to write a re-
sponse letter acknowledging the complaints without mentioning the name of any of
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Attempts by an investigator to interview a respondent attorney's client
who had not flIed a formal complaint with the Bar required extraordinary
effort. First, the investigator had to make a formal request for permission
to conduct such an interview by means of completing a special request
form. 535 This request had to be approved not only by the investigator's
supervisor, but also by the Bar's Board of Governors. Similarly, Bar poli-
cy precluded investigators from speaking with Bar attorneys, including
those assigned to the 01, without receiving permission from two senior
supervisors.638 This strict policy was due, in part, to the desire to keep
investigations as independent of outside interference as possible, but it
also seriously undermined the ability of the OJ to coordinate its investi-
gations with the rest of the disciplinary system.637
Other divisions within the Bar also maintained policies that were undu-
ly solicitous to attorney privacy, even at the expense of Bar investigators'
effectiveness. For instance, if an investigator had probable cause that an
attorney had misappropriated funds from a client's trust account, the
investigator could not obtain basic information about the account (such
as the name of the bank holding the account or the account number)
from the Bar's Legal Services Trust Fund office, which kept records of
such information.638 Similarly, investigators seeking to check a
respondent's record for prior criminal arrests and convictions were not
allowed access to attorney rmgerprint flIes maintained by the Bar.638
Perhaps most ludicrous (and perhaps, revealing), after the passage of
discipline reform legislation requiring attorneys to self-report instances of
criminal convictions or multiple malpractice fllings against them to the
Bar, the Bar's Membership Records Office, which had responsibility for
receiving this information, would not release it to Bar investigators on
grounds that it was "confidential."540
These anecdotes reveal more than bureaucratic inefficiency or inertia,
they indicate how much the Bar's system for investigating disciplinary
complaints was imbued with extreme solicitousness for attorney confi-
dentiality and welfare, even at the expense of a miscreant attorney's
client or the public welfare. This is precisely the criticism that the
them makes for some interesting problems of draftsmanship." [d. at 71.
535. [d. at 72.
536. [d. at 77.
537. See ill. at 72-77.
538. [d. at 73.
539. [d. at 73-74.
540. [d. at 74.
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staunchest foes of the Bar had long levelled against lawyer self-regula-
tion. In 1987, much about the investigation stage of the lawyer discipline
system substantiated this critique.
By 1991, however, many of the most egregious examples of system
dysfunction at the investigative stage simply had not survived the Disci-
pline Monitor's exposure of them to the public. The 01 itself had been
reorganized so that it, along with the Office of Trails (aT), was under the
management of a newly created Chief Trial Counsel.M1 This arrange-
ment was intended to facilitate basic interaction between the investiga-
tive stage and the subsequent prosecution and hearing stages. As part of
earlier reform efforts, the 01 had been established as an independent unit
in the disciplinary system. Under this arrangement, the 01 was responsi-
ble for a case only until they recommended· to pursue the case further
and prepared an SOC. Because of the reorganization, an investigator was
able to remain involved in a case from the investigative stage to a hear-
ing. At least in theory, this allowed the investigator and the prosecuting
attorney to work together to conduct discovery or any subsequently
needed investigation.542
Other changes also generally strengthened the investigation stage. Not
insignificantly, investigator pay and staffing increased. Perhaps most·
importantly, the rather bizarre Bar rules and policies impeding aggressive
investigation of complaints were abolished. The former policy prohibiting
investigators from speaking with Bar attorneys, even those in their own
office at 01, was dropped. Nor were investigators any longer required to
obtain written authorization prior to interviewing non-complaining clients
of an attorney or precluded from mentioning the name of a respondent
in written communications. By this time, the 01 had also begun to imple-
ment additional options to divert cases from the discipline system at the
investigative stage. These "Agreements in' Lieu of Disciplinary Prosecu-
tion" (ALDs)1I43 allowed the Bar to place restrictions on an attorney's
right to practice, such as requiring participation in an alcohol or drug
treatment program, mandatory remedial training, or attendance at the
Bar's "ethics school" program.M4
Are these changes reflected in the quantitative data? Table 2 summa-
rizes the disposition of complaints at the investigation stage between
1987 and 1992. As these data indicate, the central function of the inves-
541. See CA. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6079.5 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994). The Board of
Governors, appoints the Chief Trial Counsel subject to Senate confinnation.
542. See FeUmeth Final Report, supra note 458, at 27-32, 81-83; FeUmeth V, supra
note 507, at 33-43 (explaining and evaluating the office of Investigations).
543. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6092.5(i) (West 1990 & Supp. 1994). California
first implemented this diversion program in 1989.
544. See FeUmeth Final Report, supra note 458, at 81-91.
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tigation stage, just as at the intake stage is to screen complaints. The
vast majority of cases entering the investigation stage are not passed on
for further proceedings. Instead, most cases are dismissed after a deter-
mination that there is insufficient evidence to proceed or that the case
lacks merit.1I45 The highest dismissal rate for this period was in 1987,
ninety-three percent, which undoubtedly reflects the heavy caseload
problems at that time and the concomitant pressure faced by 01 staff to
reduce the backlog. But the figures for the subsequent years remain high
as well-in fact, they are almost identical for most years-between sixty
and sixty-four percent.
The percentage of SOCs prepared, corresponding to the number of
cases submitted for filing of formal disciplinary charges, remains small
during the entire period. The rate was extremely small in 1987, where
only five percent of dispositions resulted in SOC recommendations, and
varied thereafter between sixteen and twenty-six percent.
545. The category "dismissals" In Table 2 also Includes cases where letters of warn-
Ing are sent as an Infonnal sanction.
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Table 2
State Bar of California Lawyer Discipline System
Office of Investigations
COMPLAINT DISPOSITIONS: INVESTIGATION STAGE""
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
TOTAL
(# of Attorneys 9484 5340 6832 6793 7423 8087
Involved) [100%] [100%] [100%] [100%] [100%] [100%]
OUTCOME:
Dismissal 8831 3356 4350 4318 4451 5165
[93%] [63%] [64%] [64%] [60%] [64%]
Statement of
Case (SOC) 465 1273 1747 1484 1420 1319
Prepared [5%] [24%] [26%] [22%] [19%] [16%]
Tennination 133 432 549 563 463 206
[1.4%] [8%] [8%] [8%] [6%] [2.5%]
Admonition 18 41 68 65
. . [.3%] [.6%] [.9%] [.8%]
Agreement in
Lieu of
Discipline 1 3 6 22
(ALD) . . [.01%] [.04%] [.08%] [.3%]
Forwarded 65 279 167 384 1016 1310
[0.6%] [5%] [2.4%] [6%] [14%] [16%]
\lote: Percentages are rounaea ana mus may not total lUU'1b.
546. State Bar of California, Lawyer Discipline in California: A Progress Report for
1988 and 1989, at 20-21 (on me with author); Annual Report, 1992, at 7 (on me with
author).
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Terminated cases are those that are closed for further disciplinary
action because they involve attorneys who have died, been disbarred in
another matter, or who have resigned with charges pending against them.
Again, these cases are relatively few in number, fluctuating between 1.4%
in 1987, and 2.5% in 1992, with a rise to between 6% to 8% for each of the
years in between.
Diversions from the system, in the form of admonitions or agreements
in lieu of discipline (ALDs), represent only a minute portion of cases.
This figure, however, is growing. From a low in 1989 of eighteen admoni-
tions (0.3% of dispositions at this stage), the figure grew to sixty-eight
admonitions in 1991 (0.9%), and sixty-five in 1992 (0.8%). Similarly, ALDs
increased from only one during the first year this diversion alternative
was implemented by the Bar, to twenty-two in 1992 (0.3%). Such an in-
crease in both types of diversions, while very small, may indicate a grow-
ing emphasis by the discipline system towards informal sanctioning.
The last column in Table 2 represents cases forwarded to the prose-
cution stage for further consideration or consolidation with other cases
against the same attorney. These figures show that the number of such
cases has been increasing. It is clear that in 1987 there was little capacity
in the system for processing such cases, or perhaps, little effort made to
do so, since fewer than 1% were so handled. Yet by 1991, 14% of cases at
the investigation stage were forwarded for consolidation. In 1992, an
almost equal number of cases were forwarded as were sent to the prose-
cution stage for filing of formal charges. This is an important statistic
because it indicates that the investigative process has become potentially
more effective in coordinating cases against repeat offenders, who often
are responsible for an astonishingly high number of disciplinary ac-
tions.M7
c. Prosecution
As with the investigation function, prosecution of Bar disciplinary
cases occurs both in the Los Angeles and San Francisco offices. In 1987,
the Office of Trial Counsel (OTC) handled the prosecution function.
547. For example, between 50-80% of cases forwarded from Intake to Investigation In-
volve respondents with other complaInts pendIng against them. Further, a very small
percentage (perhaps 1-296) of mlscreant lawyers account for what the DisciplIne Monl-
tor has termed an "extraordinary proportion" of consumer complaInts (having up to 23
complaints open against them at a sJngie time). See FeUmeth Final Report, supra note
458, at 68, 81.
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There were two main steps in this process. The first entailed receiving
the SOC from the investigation stage and evaluating whether the com-
plaint warranted filing formal disciplinary charges. OTC attorneys
evaluated cases almost exclusively on the basis of the papers prepared in
the preceding stages. They did little or no supplemental investigation and
had virtually no contact with investigative staff in the 01. In fact, until
1989 01 and OTC operated from entirely different office buildings in Los
Angeles, making interaction between investigators and prosecuting attor-
neys difficult even when not discouraged by Bar policy.648
At this stage in the discipline process, prosecuting attorneys had au-
thority to close a case for lack of sufficient facts to support a formal
prosecution, to issue an admonition,549 to enter into a stipulated agree-
ment with a respondent attorney for private reproval or other discipline
such as probation, or to bring formal charges by filing a notice to show
cause (NTSC) in State Bar Court.Wl Upon the filing of an NTSC, the
case was handed over to a separate prosecutor who was responsible for
conducting pre-trial negotiations and discovery and for presenting the
Bar's position at the hearing stage.M1
The decision to file an NTSC required the approval of the Assistant
Chief Trial Counsel.lI62 Once counsel prepared and approved a draft
NTSC, they sent a letter giving notice of the intent to file the NTSC to
the respondent attorney. A respondent attorney received the opportwUty
to reply within ten days and to meet with the prosecuting attorney in an
"intent to file" conference. This conference gave the respondent attorney
the opportunity to meet and respond to the impending charges and at-
tempt to have the charges dropped. Once the NTSC was filed, the com-
plaint was a matter of public record.1I62
At the post-conference stage, the OTC attorney could again decide
whether to drop a case, to enter into a stipulated agreement or to issue a
reproval or admonition.15M The attorney could also decide in favor of
additional investigation, but as a practical matter this was generally not
done. Not only were there formidable pressures to process cases quick-
ly,1IM but also a lack of investigative assistance or resources available to
648. See FeUmeth Initial Report, supra note 448, at 16-20.
549. See id. at 18-19.
550. Id.
551. Id. at 14-20.
552. Id. at 14.
553. Id.
554. Id. at 92.
555. Notwithstanding the pressure created by the tremendous case backlog at this
level In 1987, Senate Bill 1569 established a six month deadline at this stage for OTC
to determine case dispositions. See generaUy supra note 427 (discussing the standards
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an OTC attorney who decided to investigate any inconsistencies, gaps, or
other problems revealed in the "intent to fIle" conference. ll68
Once an NTSC was fIled, the case moved to new trial counsel for fur-
ther prosecution and possible a<ljudication.&67 A settlement conference
was scheduled for ninety days thereafter to allow time for discovery,
hearing preparation, and settlement negotiations. At this stage the prose-
cutor and respondent attorney could once again agree to impose almost
the full range of discipline without a formal hearing. On an organizational
flow chart such a settlement procedure appears to be an uneventful step.
Due to Bar policies of the time, however, the practice was nothing short
of Kat'ka-esque. The prosecuting attorneys at the settlement conference
had virtually no authority to settle cases on their own, even within es-
tablished guidelines. ll68 Instead, should the prosecuting attorney, respon-
dent, and respondent's attorney came to a meeting of the minds regard-
ing the proper disposition of a case (both as to the facts and discipline
to be stipulated), the prosecutor had to submit this proposed agreement
to an Assistant Chief Trial Counsel for review and instruction for sub-
stantive changes. These changes were then incorporated into a redrafted
agreement, which in turn was subject to two additional layers of review
.and approval. Only after these multiple instances of review and editing
was the redrafted agreement presented to the respondent attorney for
approval and signing. The respondent could, of course, accept the re-
drafted agreement. Not surprisingly, however, the respondent often ob-
jected to particular substantive alterations. But any further changes in
the agreement were again subject to de novo review through the entire
process.&69
In the few cases when the parties could negotiate a stipulated agree-
ment, they submitted the agreement to a hearing referee for formal ap-
proval. If the referee approved the agreement, it was then subject to
additional review before the review panel of the State Bar Court. If the
referee disapproved of any part of the agreement, the entire document
had to be re-submitted to the multilayered review and approval process,
even if the respondent attorney agreed with the referee's changes.MO
established by Senate Bill 1569).
556. FeUmeth Initial Report, supra note 448, at 93.
557. See id. at 23.
558. Id. at 97.
559. Id. at 95-102.
560. Id.
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In addition to this lack of discretionary authority in negotiating settle-
ments, Bar prosecuting attorneys faced other barriers to effective prose-
cution. For example, pre-trial discovery was difficult to conduct. Bar
attorneys were required to make written requests for permission to con-
duct depositions or to initiate any other action necessitating the expendi-
ture of funds. 1161 Even small expenditures, such as photocopies made
outside of Bar offices, required separate approval.1562 Because of this,
Bar prosecutors typically conducted very little pre-trial discovery, even
for complex disciplinary cases. Prosecutors suffered from a dearth of
other support services, even of the most basic kind. Because of histori-
cally below-market pay scales, few secretaries were hired with any legal
secretarial training and staff turnover was constant.1I63 In 1987, for in-
stance, only one legal secretary at the prosecution stage had served with
the Bar for longer than a single year.1I64 The secretaries themselves were
allowed access to modern word-processing equipment, on average, for
less than two hours a day.1566
Bar prosecutors fared little better. Their salaries were also below mar-
ket and accordingly, prosecutorial staff turnover was also high. The Bar
found itself unable to attract staff attorneys or to keep them employed
for longer than a year.lI66 This was, perhaps, not surprising, since Bar
prosecutors quickly learned that the dominant impression, even from
within the Bar hierarchy, was that trial counsel consisted of attorneys
who could not be successful in private practice.1I67
Thus, in 1987, the prosecution stage of the disciplinary system was
embarrassingly chaotic, dispirited, poorly staffed, and viewed even from
within as inept. Following the public disclosures of these inadequacies by
the Bar Monitor reports, conditions at the prosecution stage improved.
By 1992, the Bar had begun addressing staffmg problems at the pros-
ecutorial stage, though they acknowledged that turnover was a continu-
ing problem. Pay scales had been increased for both attorneys and secre-
taries. Additionally, computer resources were improved and additional
resources were now available to allow attorneys to conduct pre-trial
discovery.lI66
Substantive changes at this stage were evident as well. A new Office of
Chief Trial Counsel was created to supervise and coordinate both the
561. [d. at 102-03.
562. [d.
563. [do at 105-06.
564. [do at 105.
565. [d. at 106.
566. See id. at 109·116.
567. [do at 115.
568. See FeUmeth Final Report, supra note 458, at 33-340
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investigative and prosecution stages. The flfSt two Chief Trial Counsels
appointed were career prosecutors from outside the Bar. The flfSt Chief
Trial Counsel changed Bar policies to allow prosecutors greater discre-
tion in conducting settlements with respondent attorneys.1\69 Moreover,
the use of informal sanctions to deal with disciplinary cases increased
fairly substantially. By 1989, for example, Bar prosecutors had two new
informal discipline alternatives available to them. The flfSt, a "letter of
warning" (LOW), was an informal reprimand used to warn attorneys that
their behavior, while not currently subject to further disciplinary pro-
ceedings, is misconduct nonetheless and subject to re-examination
should the Bar receive additional information or complaints against the
attorney within two years. A LOW is thus similar to an "admonition"
letter. However, the LOW provides prosecuting attorneys greater flex-
ibility since Bar prosecutors can issue them unilaterally, whereas the
admonition letter generally requires the prior agreement of the respon-
dent attorney or must follow a formal hearing. ~70 .
The second alternative was "Agreements in lieu of discipline" (ALDs).
ALDs were intended as a diversion alternative for use in limited circum-
stances: where the matter had not caused serious harm, where restitu-
tion had been made, and where a program of treatment could be fash-
ioned that had a prior record of success.~71 The Bar initially used the
ALD option in cases where attorney alcohol and drug problems had con-
tributed to misconduct and the attorney might be amenable to aggressive
preventive treatment, such as monitoring program progress and unan-
nounced drug testing. By 1992, the Bar had also begun to use ALDs in
other circumstances, such as misconduct cases involving basic attorney
incompetence. In such cases, the ALD agreement could specify condi-
tions of future law practice, such as a promise not to practice in a partic-
ular substantive area of the law (e.g., family law or immigration), or to
require the respondent attorney to attend specified education classes
(e.g., ethics courses or classes in office management skills). The Bar
even established its own practically oriented "ethics school" with a cur-
riculum designed to acquaint lawyers with their ethical obligations and
with the resources available to help them improve their practice and
management skills.672
569. Id. at 92.
570. Id. at 97-111; see generally FeUmeth I, supra note 450, at 8-11, 56.
571. See generriuy FeUmeth Final Report, supra note 458.
572. See id. at 91-111.
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As indicated in Table 3, these refonns at the initial prosecution stage
are reflected in the changing mix of case dispositions produced. Between
1987 and 1992, the total output. of case dispositions at this stage more
than quadrupled. Despite this, the percentage of dismissed cases stayed
relatively constant-although it jumped rather inexplicably in 1991-and
the percentage of cases where formal charges were filed declined rather
substantially. NTSC filings, which accounted for 40% of the dispositions
in 1987 (and were the single most prominent case disposition that year),
declined to only 18% by 1992. Most disciplinary diversions remained fair-
ly constant over time. Admonitions, however, declined from a high of
17% of dispositions in 1988 to 5% of cases in 1989, and 4% in 1992. This
drop can be accounted for by the introduction of diversion alternatives
in 1988 and 1989 and their subsequent steadily increasing use. Agree-
ments in lieu of discipline (ALDs), for instance, were fIrst used in mid-
1988. While in 1989 they were used to process 1% of cases in 1989, their
use increased to 4% in 1992. More dramatic was the use of letters of
warning (LOWs) during this period. First implemented in 1989, they con-
stituted the most popular case disposition that year (at 30% of disposi-
tions). Moreover, they have continued to constitute the single most
prevalent disposition at this stage over time.
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Table 3
State Bar of California Lawyer Discipline System
Office of Trial Counsel!I'rials
COMPLAINT DISPOSITIONS' PROSECUTION STAGE''13.
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
TOTAL 598 712 1150 1721 2796 2511
DISPosmONS [100%) [100%) [100%) [100%) [100%) [100%)
OUTCOME:
Dismissal 105 139 204 255 676 298
[18%) [20%) [18%) [15%) [24%) [12%)
Tennination 86 71 90 271 435 822
[14%) [10%) [8%) [16%) [16%) [33%)
Admonition 69 118 54 60 119 89
[12%] [17%) [5%) [3%) [4%) [4%)
Resignation with 50 68 81 92 96 lOB
Charges Pending [8%) [10%) [7%) [5%) [3%) [4%)
Agreement in
Lieu of
Discipline · 2 11 50 125 94
(ALD) - [.3%) [1%) [3%) [4%) [4%)
Stipulated 47 48 41 67 122 110
Discipline [8%) [7%) [4%) [4%) [4%) [4%)
Notice to Show
Cause (NTSC) 241 266 316 376 603 444
rued [40%) [37%) [27%) [22%) [22%) [18%)
Letter of Warning
(LOW) Sent
·
. 353 550 620 546
·
. [30%) [32%) [22%) [22%)
~ote: l'ercen es are roumlel1 anl1 thuS not total lOU%.
573. State Bar of California, Lawyer Discipline in California: A Progress Report for
1988 and 1989, at 28-31; Annual Report, 1992, at 7 (on file with author); State Bar of
California, Member Statistics (on file with author).
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Therefore, at the pre-trial prosecution stage, most cases result in either
the filing of formal charges or the implementation of some form of infor-
mal sanction. Dismissals at this stage are significant, approximately 10%
of dispositions, but have become less frequent over time, due in large
part to the intense case screening that occurs at both the intake and
investigative levels. Informal sanctions, particularly LOWs, are increasing-
ly prominent at this stage of prosecution. In theory, this allows the Bar
to mildly sanction miscreant attorneys while at the same time keeping
the case for reactivation if warranted, thereby preserving full-blown adju-
dication for those cases likely to result in disciplinary sanctions greater
than an admonition.
d. Adjudication and review
Perhaps the most momentous changes in the contemporary lawyer
discipline system in California have occurred at the State Bar Court level.
The Bar Court is responsible for adjudicating and initially reviewing dis-
ciplinary cases. The State Bar Court's authority extends over original
disciplinary proceedings as well as various special proceedings.674 The
structure and functioning of the State Bar Court in 1987 lent credence to
critics' claims that the Bar disciplinary system was a "brotherhood" more
concerned with protecting lawyers than protecting the public. The Court
is composed of separate hearing and review departments, both of which
in 1987 were staffed almost exclusively by lawyers in private practice
who volunteered their services on a part-time basis to act as Bar Court
"referees."676 The hearing department had over 500 such referees and
the review department consisted of eighteen members, which included
six nonlawyer referees.678
Hearings were typically held before a single referee, although there
were also provisions for a three-member panel at this stage, at the Bar
offices in San Francisco and Los Angeles. The referee in charge of each
hearing admitted evidence and testimony, issued fmdings of fact, and
determined whether to dismiss a case or sanction the attorney, including
disbarment, as appropriate. These determinations were technically only
recommendations since all hearing department decisions were subse-
674. These include such matters as conviction referral cases, reinstatement petitions,
expedited disciPlinarY proceedings following an attorney's d1sclpllne In another state,
Incapacity proceedings, and several other specialized matters. See FeUmeth Initial Re-
port, supra note 448, at 21.
676. See id. at 20.
676. See id. at 21-22.
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quently examined by the review department whether or not either party
had appealed the matter.677
. A party also had the right to request review, in which case additional
briefmg and oral arguments could be scheduled. At the review depart-
ment stage, referees sitting en banc were free to make independent de-
terminations of fact, law, and appropriate discipline, although they were
to grant great weight to hearing level fmdings of fact. 678
Review department meetings were scheduled ten times per year for a
two-day period. All eighteen members participated in the review of every
case, but each case was also typically assigned to a single member for
more extensive review of the often voluminous record.678 Review de-
partment referees could collectively decide to uphold the hearing depart-
ment decision, alter it, or send the case back for rehearing.6IlO Final de-
terminations made by the review department were merely recommenda-
tions to the state supreme court. Every case in which the review depart-
ment recommended disbarment or suspension was automatically passed
to the supreme court for review.58) Additionally, parties had the right to
petition the court for formal review, which was generally granted in cas-
es where any substantial discipline had been recommended.682
There were formidable problems with this system of adjudication and
review. The State Bar Discipline Monitor, for example, excoriated the use
of volunteer practitioners as referees in disciplinary matters as they
might be colleagues or competitors of respondent attorneys. Such a sys-
tem, he argued, not only created an image of lawyers protecting their
own but was bound to be inefficient and lack uniformity, and thus lack
predictability. The volunteer referees were given only perfunctory train-
ing in Bar discipline procedural rules and the substantive law governing
lawyer discipline, a specialized area of the law most practitioners are
probably not familiar with.1I83 Additionally, hearing referees would typi-
cally handle only a few discipline cases per year and accordingly, few of
these part-time referees had a sophisticated understanding of the rele-
vant .review department decisions or supreme court rulings that were to
577. Id. at 25.
578. Id. at 25, 123-31.
579. Id. at 25.
580. Id. at 26.
581. Id.
582. See generally id. at 20-28, 131-39 (describing the hearing process and evaluating
its perfonnance).
583. Id. at 125-26.
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guide their detenninations.1l84 This lack of familiarity with relevant pre-
cedent and procedure was exacerbated by the unwieldy size of the ref·
eree pool. As might be expected under such a system, there was a great
deal of variation in referee quality and in the standards applied by refer-
ees. Because of this, it was difficult to predict how a particular case
would fare under a particular hearing referee or review panel. Conse-
quently, respondents often had little incentive to settle cases rather than
take their chances at a full adjudication of the matter.6116
In his initial report, the Bar Discipline Monitor strongly advocated that
the Bar replace its reliance on v.olunteer lawyer referees with a smaller
set of full-time administrative law judges for both the hearing and review
functions.686 The Bar resisted this suggestion, preferring instead to im-
plement its previous decision to replace many volunteer referees with
compensated attorney referees and retired judges.687 The Bar's primary
objection was the high cost of maintaining a full-time judicial staff for
disciplinary matters. Additionally, the Bar argued that removing practic-
ing attorneys from participating in the system would diminish the esprit
de corps which it felt underlay the volunteer system. Further, it simply
rejected outright the suggestion that the use of practicing attorneys as
referees constituted an inherent conflict of interest.688
Despite its initial reluctance, the Bar ultimately supported the refor-
mation of the State Bar Court system to include the use of a specialized,
full-time judicial staff appointed by the California Supreme Court.689 The
new State Bar Court hearing department now consisted of one presiding
judge and six hearing judges, one of whom must be a nonlawyer.500 Sim-
584. Id. at 126.
686. [d. at 126-27, 174-76. See generally id. at 123-27 (describing and criticizing the
referees).
686. Id. at 126-27.
687. See FeUmeth 1, supra. note 460, at 197-214 (Exhibit XII, attch. A:. State Bar
Court's Initial Response to ALl Proposal).
688. See id. at 211 (Resolution Adopted by the State Bar Court Executive Committee,
August 21, 1987). "(3) [T]here is no inherent conflict in the use of practicing attorney
referees and any suggestion that they are or have been biased either for or against re-
spondents due to some Improper motives is unsupported by any empirical evidence.'
Id.
689. Senate Bill 1498 mandated these changes. See generally supra. note 462 and
accompanying text. The Bar helped screen and recommend candidates to the supreme
court. The Bar selected the first judges from an applicant pool of 374. From this pool,
the Bar's Board of Governors choose 33 candidates for interviews. The Bar subsequent-
ly nomInated nine individuals from this group who were formally appointed to the Bar
Court by the supreme court. These judges began their appointments in 1989. For a
biographical sketch of the first judges selected, see State Bar of California, Lawyer
Discipline in California, A Progress Report for 1988 and 1989, at 33-37 (1989).
690. See FeUmeth VI, supra. note 467, at 66.
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ilarly, the new review department was composed of three judges: one lay
judge, the presiding judge of the hearing department, and a third review
judge. Judges in the hearing department were paid the salary of a munici-
pal court judge, and judges in the review department were paid at the
level of a superior court judge.1lO1
The creation of the new Bar Court in 1989 also changed the proce-
dures used in disciplinary cases. As in the old referee system, hearing
judges were still responsible for receiving evidence and testimony and
recommending disciplinary sanctions. But unlike the old system, these
disciplinary recommendations were no longer subject to routine review.
Instead, if no party requested review, all disciplinary recommendations
less than suspensions would stand as fmal. When a hearing judge rec-
ommended that a respondent attorney be suspended or disbarred, the
case would be transmitted directly to the supreme court, unless it was
appealed.1l92
If requested, formal review by the review department was granted as a
matter of right. The review department determination was based on the
record established at the hearing level, but review judges had the author-
ity to act independently in reviewing all fmdings of fact or law and could
decide cases at variance with the hearing level determination. Review
judges and hearing judges both write decisions, and the review depart-
ment opinions are reported in a newly-established California State Bar
Court Reporter.693 Having these decisions reported allows for greater
continuity in decisionrnaking by the Court.
In 1990, California Supreme Court rule changes-long advocated by
the Bar Discipline Monitor-greatly enhanced both the practical and
symbolic authority of the new Bar Court. These so-called "finality rules"
changed the effect of fmal decisions issued by the Bar Court.1lO4 There
are two aspects to these changes. First, all State Bar Court discipline rec-
ommendations now stand as the fmal decision of the supreme court
591. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6079.1, 6086.65 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994); see
also FeUmeth VI, supra note 457, at 65-73.
592. See also FeUmeth Pinal Report, supra note 458,. at 4ll-41, 116-20 (explaining the
set-up and approach of the State Bar Court). See generally State Bar Court Rules of
Practice, Rules 1200-71;
593. The Idea for the reporter was fonnulated In 1979 and repeatedly advocated by
the Discipline Monitor. However, the first volume remained unfunded and unpublished
until 1992.
594. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, A REVIEW OF THE STATE BAR COURT 6 (1991).
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Wlless review is sought by either party.69~ Second, review before the su-
preme court is discretionary rather than a matter of right. liOO Moreover,
the standard of review used by the Court is now an "abuse of discretion"
standard: The supreme court will only grant review in cases indicating
that the Bar has failed to afford a party due process or has clearly acted
outside its jurisdiction.697 Thus, within a year of the State Bar Court's
initial operation, the supreme court had delegated to the Court much of
its authority for disciplining lawyers in California.6ll8
Table 4 represents the aggregate case output at the State Bar Court
between 1987-1992 and shows one perspective on the reforms made at
this level of the disciplinary system. During this period, the mix of dis-
positions remained fairly constant. The percentage of disbarments rec-
ommended was an exception, however. The figure for 1987-89 was
around 20% of total dispositions, but was slightly less than 10% thereaf-
ter, corresponding with the establishment of the new Bar Court. Thus,
there is at least some evidence indicating that the new court is less likely
than its predecessor to recommend the most serious sanction. Yet this
conclusion is less dramatic when both disbarments and suspensions are
examined together. The total percentage of such serious sanctions com-
bined remained around 60% of dispositions between 1987-92, although it
went as high as 72% in 1989. Similarly, the incidence of less serious sanc-
tions (i.e., reprovals and admonitions) remained about the same at
around 20% of total dispositions for most of this period, before increas-
ing to 27% in 1992. Lastly, the dismissal rate showed similar consistency.
Between 16-20% of cases were typically dismissed, although these figures
dipped to 13% and 9% for 1988 and 1989 respectively. Thus, this data
595. See FeUmeth Final Report, supra note 458, at 121.
596. [d.
597. See Cal. Ct. R. 954 (1994). Rule 954 States:
The supreme court will order review of a decision of the State Bar
Court recommending disbarment or suspension from practice when it appears
(1) necessary to settle important questions of law; (2) the State Bar Court
has acted without or In excess of jurisdiction; (3) petitioner did not receive a
fair hearing; (4) the decision is not supported by the weight of the evidence;
or (5) the recommended discipline is not appropriate in light of the record
as a whole.
Denial of a review of a decision of the State Bar Court shall constitute
a final judicial determination on the merits and the recommendation of the
State Bar Court shall be rued as an order of the supreme court.
[d.; see aLso LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, supra note 594, at 8 ("[T)he high court an-
nounced that it will apply a discretionary review standard.").
598. This decision is also noteworthy because the supreme court originally considered
delegating review of Bar discipline matters to the courts of appeal. See Select Com-
mittee on Internal Procedures of the Supreme Court, Report to Honorable Malcolm M.
Lucas, Chi/if Justice of California, Feb. 16, 1988, at 24-25 (on file with author).
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gives little indication of what changes the new court has produced or is
likely to produce.
Table 4
State Bar of California Lawyer Discipline System
State Bar Court
Actions and Recommendations in Disciplinary Matters
, (Hearing and Review Departments Combined)
ACTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS"
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
TOTAL 296 292 424 495 581 600
DISPOsmONS [l00%] [100%) [100%) [100%) [100%) [100%]
OUTCOME:
Disbannent 66 69 89 44 65 47
[19%) [24%] [20%] [9%] [9%) [8%]
Suspension 18 12 17 15 20 27
without Probation [6%) [4%] [4%) [3%) [3%) [5%}
Suspension with 105 121 204 252 278 261
Probation [35%] [41%J [48%) [6O%J [48%) [44%)
Public Reproval, 18 24 32 46 25 70
Duties Added [6%] [8%J [8%) [9%) [4%] [l2%]
Public Reproval 11 7 14 7 9 1
[4%) [2%) [3%J [2%) [2%) [·2%1
PrIvate Reproval, 17 16 24 47 59 94
Duties Added (6%) [6%) [6%) [10%) [10%) [16%)
PrIvate Reproval 6 4 4 11 21 6
[2%) [1%) [1%] [2%] [4%) [1%)
Admonitions in 7 3 2 1 3 1
Fonnal Proceedings [2%) [1%) [1%] [1%] . [i%) [l%]
Dism1ssal 58 36 38 72 1ll 93
[20%) [13%) [9%) [15%) [19%) [l6%]
ote: k"ercemages are rounaea ana mus may not total lUU'Ib.
599. State Bar of California, Lawyer Discipline in California: A Progress Report for
1988 and 1989, at 35 (on file with author); Annual Report. 1992, at 9-12 (on file with
author); State Bar of California Member Statistics (on me with author).
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Perhaps a better indicator of State Bar Court effectiveness over time is
the rate of settlements produced. A court that is operating efficiently and
predictably can, in many cases, induce respondents to settle their cases
by stipulation rather than bear the substantial expense of full adjudica-
tion. Strong evidence shows that the new court has had such an effect.
Historically, the settlement rate for cases in State Bar Court has been
between 15% and 18%. In 1987, 73% of cases were fully adjudicated at the
hearing level, 25% were settled, and 2% were terminated. These figures
changed rather dramatically in the first years of the new court. In 1990,
35% of cases went to a full hearing, 47% settled, and 18% were terminat-,
ed. The 1991 figures include 27% of cases reaching a full hearing, and
45% settling by stipulation, with 28% terminated. These figures were simi-
lar in 1992. In that year, 26% of cases were adjudicated, 51% settled by
stipulation, and 23% were terminated. Thus, in 1987 almost three times as
many cases were fully acijudicated as were settled. But by 1992, this
trend reversed, with almost twice as many cases settled as reached full
adjudication. At least to the extent that these figures represent strategic
decisions by respondent attorneys based on their view of the new court's
predictability in decisionmaking, it appears that the new State Bar Court
is more effective than its predecessor.600
A second indicator of predictability and efficiency-review requests
from hearing department decisions-yields similar findings. For the five
year period prior to the establishment of the new court, the percentage
of cases appealed averaged over 27%. This figure dropped by over one-
half for the total period from November of 1989 when the Bar Court
began operation to the end of 1992. During this period, a total of 12.6%
of hearing decisions were appealed to the Review Department.601 This
figure is even more significant because, since its adoption of new "fInal-
ity rules" in 1990, the California Supreme Court has substantially de-
ferred to the State Bar Court determinations in disciplinary matters. 1lO2
For instance, in 1990 the supreme court granted thirty writs for review
from the Bar Court. Yet in 1991, this figure was down to a single writ
granted, which occurred prior to adoption of the "fmality rules." In 1992
the supreme court did not grant a single request for review, thus leaving
the Bar Court's determinations to stand in all disciplinary matters.603
600. The source for these figures is the State Bar of California, (unpublished statistics
on file with author).
601. See State Bar of California, Annual Report of 1992, at 9.
602. See supra note 594 and accompanying text (discussing the court's adoption of
the "finality rules").
603. See State Bar of California, Annual Report of 1992, at 11.
596
[Vol. 22: 485, 1995) Ideologies ofProfessionalism
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
e. Oversight: complainants' grievance panel
An important part of the transformation of the lawyer discipline sys-
tem in California was the institutionalization of the means for scrutiniz-
ing the Bar's disciplinary process. A perennial criticism of lawyer self-
regulation has been not only that the system is slow and overly deferen-
tial to lawyers' interests but also that it operates largely free from the
public gaze. Much of the impetus for creating the unique position of Bar
Discipline Monitor stemmed from the desire to create a means of over-
sight into the process of lawyer self-regulation. But the Discipline Moni-
tor position was intended from the start to be temporary.604 A second
and more permanent-even if less comprehensive-institution of over-
sight was the Complainants' Grievance Panel, which began operation in
May, 1987.606
The Panel is staffed by seven members, four attorneys who are ap-
pointed by the State Bar and three nonlawyer members. The Governor,
Speaker of the Assembly, and Senate Committee on Rules each appoint
one nonlawyer member.606 The Panel has review authority over the dis-
ciplinary system in two spheres. First, upon the request of a complaining
witness, it is empowered to review closed Bar investigations, "closed
inquiries, admonitions, warning letters, or agreements in lieu of discipline
issued prior to the issuance of a Notice to Show Cause."607 Second, the
Panel has the authority to audit a random sample of cases closed prior
to the issuance of a Notice to Show Cause (NTSC).608 In both instances,
the Panel can require that further investigation be performed in a partic-
ular case and can recommend to the Bar that an·NTSC be issued or even
that other disciplinary action be pursued.609
. Although the Panel was intended as a reform effort, it was clear from
early on that unintended consequences would result from institutional-
izing this new layer of oversight and review. These problems partly de-
rived from the unique organizational role the Panel was to play: essential-
ly to second-guess decisions and close or divert complaints in order to
604. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6086.9, 6140.8 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994). The
State Bar Discipline Monitor's appointment ended on January 1, 1992.
605. See id. § 6086.11 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994).
606. Ido
607. FeUmeth Final Report, supra note 458, at 111; see also FeUmeth VIII, supra
note 507, at 67; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6086.11 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994).
608. See FeUmeth Final Report, supra note 458, at 11.
609. Id. at 113-14.
597
ensure that the Bar disciplinary system lives up to its mandate to protect
the public as well as to enhance the legal profession. This second-guess-
ing tended to detract from what the Bar, and increasingly even the Bar
Discipline Monitor, viewed as a proper role ofthe disciplinary system: to
quickly cull those cases from the system that would not likely lead to
serious sanctions in order to direct the Bar's disciplinary resources effi-
ciently towards prosecuting complex, heinous, or repetitive miscon-
duct.6lo
One inherent difficulty, however, is that the Panel views its cases out
of context. Panel members do not see the entire universe of cases en-
tering the discipline system and hence are not privy to what consider-
ations have led the Bar to proceed with one case rather than another.
Consequently, Panel recommendations to reinvestigate cases are not
popular with Bar investigative staff. At a fundamental level, the Panel
represents a challenge and impediment to what the Bar views as the
prosecutorial discretion necessary to prosecute cases effectively.611
Thus, although the Panel generally agrees with the Office of Investi-
gations or Office of Trials decisions to close or divert cases over 70% of
the time,612 in exercising its mandated authority it exacerbates pressures
within the disciplinary system to deal with an increasing number of in-
coming complaints. The Complainants' Grievance Panel is certainly
aware of such problems, particularly since it suffers from case backlog
and delays serious enough to "alarm" the Discipline Monitor.613 But the
Panel has also highlighted what appear to be problems within the disci-
pline system that are quite resistant to change. The guiding ethos at the
initial intake and investigation stages is to categorize complaints and
determine their "worth" quickly.614 In this process, much subtlety is lost.
As both the Discipline Monitor and the Panel have noted, for instance,
there is a tendency at these levels to refer cases that might otherwise be
properly in the disciplinary system for alternative dispute resolution
wherever possible.6lB The danger in this is that complainants who have
610. [d.
611. [d. See generally id. at 111-16 (explaining the Panel's responsibilities and meth-
ods, and making recommendations for its improvement).
612. See Grievance Panel Report, supra note 479, at 31.
613. Ironically, the Discipline Monitor reported that his office received more consum-
er complaint letters about the Panel's operations than about any other aspect of the
discipline system. FeUmeth, Final Report, supra note 458, at 144-45.
614. Grievance Panel Report, supra note 479, at 5-6.
615. See FeUmeth Final Report, supra note 458, at 20-21. Both the Monitor and the
Panel have remarked that cases involving possible fee-issues-no matter how tangen-
tially related and notwithstanding how many other issues might be Involved In the
complaint-are routinely referred to arbitration programs because fee disputes are not
generally within the Bar's disciplinary jurisdiction.
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not articulated their problems in tenns of categories of obvious interest
to the Bar discipline system risk having their complaints de-valued.
Table 5 illustrates the functioning of the Complainants' Grievance Pan-
el. On average, over 70% of the cases reviewed by the Panel are consid-
ered to have been properly closed or diverted. And few cases, around 2%
of those reviewed, are recommended back to the system for the issuance
of fonnal charges or infonnal discipline. A similarly small percentage of
cases, between 1% and 3%, are either continued or highlighted as "train-
ing issue" cases, which do not themselves warrant further handling but
which illustrate potential weaknesses in training or policy within the
disciplinary system and are .therefore sent back to supervisors for their
consideration. But fully a fifth or more of the cases reviewed by the
Panel annually have been submitted for reinvestigation. This constitutes
a considerable number of cases (e.g., 506 in 1992). As this data shows,
there is ample evidence that the Panel does not simply rubber-stamp Bar
decisions but exercises independent discretion and review. But the very
perfonnance of the Panel's intended function nevertheless highlights
limitations in the disciplinary process.
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Table 5
State Bar of California Lawyer Discipline System
Complainants' Grievance Panel
PANEL DECISIONS"·
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
TOTAL 321 717 506 892 1361 2274
DECISIONS [100%) [100%] [100%] [100%) [100%) [100%)
OUTCOME:
Denied 251 410 344 625 1041 1663
[78%) [57%) [68%) [70%] [78%) [73%) .
Further
Investigation 49 279 139 251 281 506
Ordered (1596) [39%] [27%) [28%) [21%) [22%)
NTSC, Warning
Letter, or
Admonition 7 8 11 16 9 34
Recommended [2%) [1%) [2%) [2%) [.6%) [2%)
Continued 14 20 12 0 10 71
[5%) [3%] [3%] [0%) [.75%) [3%)
TrainIng Issue . . .
- 20 83
. . . . [1%) [4%]
~ote: percentages are rounaea ana mus may not total lUU'Itl.
616. Grievance Panel Report, supra note 479, at 31 (on me with author).
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f. Summary
In many respects, the Bar's system for regulating lawyers was so dys-
functional in 1987 that it made credible the claims of the Bar's harshest
critics. The initial acceptance and investigation of complaints about attor-
ney misconduct inspired little confidence. The primary function at the
intake and investigative stages was (and is today) to screen cases from
the voluminous number of complaints received in order to identify cases
most likely to lead to disciplinary sanctions. Yet in 1987, it was clear that
those in charge of screening cases often performed their task in an un-
systematic and haphazard fashion. Complaints alleging obvious criminal
misconduct or the most egregious forms of misbehavior were most likely
to survive the screening process. Numerous other potentially valid com-
plaints were dismissed or otherwise diverted from. the system because
they failed to clearly state a claim that the Bar's intake and investigative
staff considered within the Bar's jurisdiction, or a high priority matter.
Perhaps most alarming, much of the discretion to make these determina-
tions was delegated to Bar staff with little experience or education in the
relevant areas of law with which many complaints commonly deal. Nor
did Bar staff at this preliminary level of the discipline system have more.
than a rudimentary understanding of the procedural standards or rele-
vant case law to guide their determinations. Moreover, entry-level staff
often exercised this extraordinary discretion, largely without supervision.
The investigations and prosecutions suffered from other inadequacies
as well. Investigators were hindered by policies more solicitous of re-
spondent attorneys' privacy than concerned with aggressive investigation.
Just as at the intake level, investigators at the investigative stage (many
of whom have a background in law enforcement) were geared towards
identifying complaints that alleged obvious or criminal behavior, such as
fraud or theft of clients' funds, rather than more subtle forms of ethical
misconduct or even gross incompetence, which are also properly within
the Bar's disciplinary purview. The role of Bar investigators was to con-
duct sufficient preliminary investigation to identify cases warranting fur-
ther processing in the disciplinary system. Yet once a complaint case was
passed to prosecutors for further consideration, Bar policy largely pro-
hibited investigators from working or even speaking with Bar attorneys
who were subsequently assigned to the case they had investigated. This
left prosecutors with the tasks of learning about the case solely from the
written record and of attempting to settle or prepare the case for formal
charges without being able to conduct much subsequent investigation or
pre-trial discovery. Bar prosecutors were also hindered by policies that
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gave them little or no independent authority to enter into stipulated dis-
cipline agreeme'nts with respondent attorneys.
Adjudication and review in state Bar Court were, in 1987, handled by
part-time volunteer practicing attorneys who were often ill-trained in
disciplinary procedures817 and unfamiliar with the case law and review
department authority relevant to their decisions. As a result, adjudication
and initial review in State Bar Court suffered from obvious inconsisten-
cies, making full hearings and appeals both within the system and to the
supreme court a likely choice for many respondents.
By 1992, however, it was far less obvious that California's lawyer disci-
pline system was as ineffective-and as protective of attorneys-as it
had been in 1987. Part of the explanation, of course, rested in the fact
that the system in 1987 was simply so bad that any change at all would
likely be an improvement. But the system also underwent numerous and
often substantial reforms at all levels of its operations.818 Funding for
revamping the discipline system, which is supported solely by Bar mem-
bership fees, more than quadrupled between 1987-1992, and expenditures
on the discipline system constituted an increasingly large portion (almost
75% by 1992) of the total annual budget of the State Bar.819 Additionally,
Bar policies and organizational changes in the discipline system in-
creased supervision over decisions to close or divert complaints, less-
ened the barriers to effective investigation and prosecution of cases,
provided greater access to information about respondent attorneys and
their complaint and discipline history, and increased the potential for
coordination between Bar investigators and, prosecutors. Most eventfully,
the former volunteer-practitioner referees who staffed the State Bar
Court were replaced by full·time administrative law judges appointed by
the supreme court.
The supreme court itself, the ultimate authority in disciplinary matters,
gave the new Bar Court a strong vote of confidence by giving it authority
over matters previously reserved to the supreme court and by making
Bar Court decisions in most disciplinary matters final.
Statistical data on the output of the disciplinary system reflect some of
617. See generaUy FeUmeth Initial Report, supra note 448, at 60-63. By the time of
the Monitor's fIrSt progress report, and on his recommendation, the Office of investi-
gations discontinued the Volunteer Investigative Attorney Program. See FeUmeth 1, su-
pm note 450, at 47.
618. See generaUy FeUmeth Final Report, supm note 458.
619. In 1985, the Bar spent $7.8 million on its discipline function, which constituted
44% of Its total annual budget. By 1992, the Bar had spent $37.2 million for discipline,
which represented 74.3% of the budget. State Bar of California, Unpublished Financial
Reports (on file with author). As late as 1975, the Bar spent only slightly more than
$1 million on discipline, or 26% of Its total annual budget. See 1975 Annual Report,
supra note 310, at 423.
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these changes and refonns. The total number of cc;>mplaints received by
the system increased almost three and one-half times between 1987-1992.
Nevertheless, most cases continue to be screened or diverted from the
system from the start. Relatively few complaints are investigated; fewer
still result in formal charges, disbarments, or suspensions imposed by the
State Bar Court. Yet, an increasingly large number and percentage of
complaints are dealt with by informal disciplinary measures or result in
stipulated agreements. Thus, it is clear that the lawyer discipline system
in California has changed in more than superficial ways between 1987-
1992. What remains to be determined, however, is how these changes
affect the claims made by both the Bar and opponents of lawyer self-
regulation.
III. Is SELF-REGULATION IMPoRTANT?
A. Evaluating the Claims
Over a relatively short period of time, the California State Bar's lawyer
discipline system underwent major refonns. In 1987, the system operated
in a manner that supported critics' image of the Bar as a self-protecting
"brotherhood" more concerned with professional image than with public
protection. Both internal dissatisfaction with Bar regulation and external
pressures (including major reform legislation) forced the Bar to initiate
changes in the lawyer discipline system. Expenditures on Bar discipline,
which is funded solely from members' dues, increased substantially. The
Bar's annual budget for the years 1985-1992 increased from $17.8 million
to over $50 million, and the amount spent on the discipline system con-
stituted almost 75% of the total Bar budget by 1992, up from a total of
around 44% in 1985.620 Additional notable refonns were implemented
between 1987 and 1992, such as more adequate staffing and organization-
al procedures, computerization, the creation of a semi-autonomous State
Bar Court staffed by full-time judges, and the institutionalization of limit-
ed external oversight in the establishment of the Complainants' Griev-
ance Panel.
Because of these changes, the Bar's total disciplinary output increased.
The increased rate of sanctions indicates greater overall activity by the
620. State Bar of California, Unpublished Financial Reports (on file with author). This
shift is even more dramatic over a longer period of time. See supra note 619 (recount-
ing the difference between expenditures in previous years and those after the reform
process).
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discipline system and increased effectiveness in processing complaints.
But the full impact of these changes is difficult to assess. While the num-
ber of annual disbarments produced by the system did not rise signifi-
cantly, the total number of the most serious disciplinary sanctions (dis-
barments, resignations and suspensions taken together) did increase.
Moreover, a far greater number of informal sanctions were produced by
the system. By 1992, the system was more efficient and moderately more
autonomous from the Bar. In sum, the substantial reforms implemented
had produced incremental but significant changes in the disciplinary
process. What then, if anything, does this experience reveal about the
efficacy of the new and reformed model of Bar regulation? And what do
the reforms in California tell us about the competing claims about lawyer
self-regulation in general? .
How one evaluates the reforms in California depends on the perspec-
tive chosen, whether it be the internal perspective of the Bar or the ex-
ternal perspective developed by critics of professional self-regulation. As
it turns out, analyzing the California experience highlights limitations in
each view. Because both the defense and the critique of lawyer self-regu-
lation rest primarily on normative rather than empirical grounds, they
frame the debate over lawyer discipline too narrowly and thereby ignore
the broader context in which the discipline system operates. This limits
.both the theoretical reach of each perspective on self-regulation as well
as their utility for policy purposes.
1. Competing Perspectives on Self-Regulation
Froin the Bar's perspective, self-regulation serves the dual purposes of
protecting the public from a small number of miscreant lawyers and of
insulating the profession from harmful external regulation. According to
this view, the incremental changes resulting from the California reforms
represent a resounding victory and a confirmation of the wisdom of self-
regulation. The increases in both formal and informal sanctions produced
by the disciplinary system are seen as evidence that the Bar can effec-
tively regulate itself and has the will to do so. The assumptions underly-
ing this view are, first, that only lawyers have the expertise required to
understand the complexities of law practice and hence to regulate other
lawyers, and, second, that self-regulation promotes a socially useful inde-
pendent profession.
Both assumptions, however, are problematic. The claim that only law-
yers can properly regulate other lawyers simply misrepresents the actual
complexity involved in the majority of lawyer misconduct cases handled
by the Bar. Most lay people as well as lawyers are perfectly capable of
understanding whether a lawyer has stolen client funds or abandoned a
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client's case, two offenses that constitute the basis for many
complaints.52l Moreover, the claim of special competence is irrelevant to
the issue of whether the organized bar should have self-regulatory power
as opposed to, for instance, having lawyers staff an independent state
regulatory agency to regulate the profession. The claim that self-regula-
tion promotes a socially useful, independent profession is similarly irrele-
vant. An alternative model of lawyer regulation might replace Bar control
with control by a state agency under state supreme court supervision.
Such a system would not compromise the Bar's independence from the
executive or legislative branches of government.
The Bar's claims, then, are grounded in the normative assumption that
lawyer self-regulation is a good thing. Given this premise, the evidence
that reforms have generated even incremental changes for the better
quite naturally leads to the conclusion that the current system of self-
regulation is satisfactory. .
The critical perspective on self-regulation, while resting on quite dif-
ferent assumptions, similarly fails to advance our understanding of the
California reforms significantly. The central thrust of this critique of
lawyer self-regulation is that the organized bar either will not or cannot
effectively regulate its own members.622 This critique entails both empir-
ical and normative assertions. The empirical claim is that self-regulation
simply does not wor~ and that this is due in large part to lawyers'
621. See, e.g., State Bar of California, Lawyer Discipline in California: A Progress
Report far 1988 and 1989, at 23-24.
622. See generally ABEL, supra note 23; Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promul-
gate Ethical Rules? 59 TEx. L. REV. 639 (1981); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives
on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589 (1985)j Deborah L. Rhode, The Rhetoric of
Legal ~arm, 45 MD. L. REV. 274 (1986); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A
Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEx. L. REV. 689 (1981); Ostberg,
supra note 8 (Kay Ostberg is a representative of HALT, a consurner-oriented legal
refonn organization).
623. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 23, at 143: "The suspicion that professional associa-
tions promulgate ethical rules more to legitimate themselves in the eyes of the public
than to engage in effective regulation' is strengthened by the inadequacy of enforcement
mechanisms." [d. .
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natural solicitude towards each othetJ24 or, perhaps, the inherent inabili-
ty of a trade association to protect the public from its own members.625
Abel's work constitutes the most fully developed critique of lawyer
self-regulation. This critique derives from his larger theoretical perspec-
tive on the legal profession, which holds that lawyers are to be under-
stood primarily in terms of their orientation towards controlling the mar-
ket for their services and enhancing their collective social status.628
From this perspective, self-regulation is significant only as a means of
securing and legitimating professional status. The legal profession's claim
that it has the ability to self-regulate, Abel argues, is largely rhetorical.
Formal disciplinary mechanisms are not effective.621 Most lawyers do
not know the profession's ethical rules and, even if they do, do not inter-
nalize them.628 Moreover, the disciplinary apparatus fails because it pro-
duces few sanctions; in fact, most complaints are dismissed outright
without investigation. Historically, most self-regulatory systems have
produced few disbarments and few serious sanctions of any sort.629
Penalties for violating the profession's ethical rules are extremely light,
Abel tells us, as many miscreants are processed through the system hav-
ing received only reprimands.630 Finally, the system of self-regulation
"supports the status hierarchy within the legal profession" because it fo-
cuses almost exclusively on less prestigious solo and small fum practi-
tioners to the exclusion of elite corporate lawyers.631 Even in California,
Abel argues, where the Bar has provided significant resources for self-
regulation under the supervision of an independent Bar Discipline Moni-
tor, self-regulation is a failure because it leads to few formal sanc-
tions.632 Thus, Abel tells us that: "The California experience offers little
624. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 23, at 147. "There is reason to believe that this (i.e.,
low rates of disciplinary investigation and sanctions) expresses the solicitude practicing
lawyers feel for each other." Id.; see also Ostberg, supra note 8, at 9 n.l (MHALT be-
lieves that there Is no distinction between self-regulation and court regulation. TIJat Is
because judges are lawyers and share a commonality with lawyers that creates an
Mus/them" view of lawyers and nonlawyers.").
625. As Professor Rhode argued (in an exemplary expression of this view): MNo mat-
ter how well-intentioned . . . I think no vocational group is well situated to pass judg-
ment on matters that directly implicate its own economic interests, social status, and
self-image." See Joint Interim Hearing, supra note 11 (statement of Deborah L. Rhode,
member of the Task Force on the State Bar Discipline System).
626. See generaUy ABEL, supra note 23.
627. Id. at 144.
628. Id. at 143.
629. Id. at 145-48.
630. Id. at 147.
631. Id. at 144-45.
632. Abel's remark on California reflects changes in the disciplinary system imple-
mented by late 1987. Based on the structure of his argument, however, there Is little
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reason to believe that even the most vigorous and independent outside
monitor can transform a professional association into an effective disci-
plinary mechanism."633
Much of Abel's critique is compelling.634 It highlights many of the de-
fects in self-regulation found in the literature. But how well does this
critique help us understand the California experience? The results are
mixed. This is ostensibly a critique grounded in empirical analysis, the
key point being that self-regulation simply produces few serious sanc-
tions, in California or anywhere else. But this begs the questions of what
number or types of sanctions are optimal, or of how many sanctions an
effective regulatory system would produce. Moreover, from this perspec-
tive, the key indicator of system effectiveness is "serious" sanctions, in-
cluding disbarments, resignations, and suspensions. Such an approach
dismisses outright the significance of "minor" sanctions imposed for less
serious conduct or of disciplinary alternatives, both of which categories
have increased in California between 1987-1992. As will be discussed
below, it is not clear that merely relocating control over the lawyer disci-
pline apparatus to an independent body will, of itself, produce a greater
output of sanctions.635 Nor is it clear that this is the best criterion by
reason to expect that his critique would change in the face of the Bar's subsequent
refonus. [d.
633. [d. at 150.
634. To be precise, Abel's list of defects in lawyer self-regulation derives from other
critiques in the literature. Abel's contribution lies in locating these studies within the
critical theory of professions his work explicates.
635. This limitation Is also true with regard to other aspects of the critique of Bar
self-regulation. Both Abel and Rhode, for example, correctly highlight the historical bias
in lawyer regulation against the lower echelon of the bar, typically solo and small firm
practitioners. Carlin and Auerbach are Influential proponents of this criticism as well.
See generaUy CARUN, supra. note 9; JEROME E. CARUN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN (1962);
AUERBACH, supra note 21; Philip Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of
the Can01lS as a Group Moral Code, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 244 (1968). For a useful
empirical study of this phenomenon, see Bruce L. Arnold and John Hagan, Careers of
Misconduct: The Structure of Prosecuted Professional Deviance Among Lawyers, 57
AM. Soc. REV. 771 (1992). There can be little doubt that drafters premised early bar
. regulation on bar elite values and nativist sentiments. See, e.g., Matzko, supra. note 167.
The debate in CalIfornia over the newly-establlshed Bar's attempts in the 19308 to fo-
cus disciplinary attention on Issues such as "ambulance chasing" indicates that certain
segments of the Bar experienced the disciplinary system as unduly biased. See, e.g.,
James F. Brennan, The Bugaboo 'Ambulance Chasing', 6 STATE B.J. 37 (1931). Yet, this
critique yields no clue regarding what Institutional arrangement for lawyer regulation
would or could broaden the focus of professional discipline so as to Include misbehav-
Ior engaged In by elite or corporate lawyers. This Is a difficult and Important question
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which to evaluate the efficacy of self-regulation. Lastly, this critique gives
us little basis to evaluate the structural changes produced in the Califor-
nia lawyer disciplinary system, such as the creation of a semi-autono-
mous State Bar Court and Complainants' Grievance Panel. Thus, the
critique of self-regulation based on quantitative output alone provides
only a partial basis for evaluating the California experience with self-
regulation.
Perhaps the primary reason that the empirical critique of lawyer self-
regulation is ultimately incomplete is that, like the Bar's claims regarding
self-regulation, its evaluative premise is mainly normative rather than
quantitative. The key idea is that lawyer self-regulation is simply illegiti-
mate. There is no valid reason for any occupational group to be granted
special status to police its own members, particularly when to do so
appears to be a fundamental conflict of interest. In part, this normative
critique assumes that members of the same profession cannot place the
public interest over that of their fellow members. Yet in this regard the
critique is unpersuasive. It assumes, for instance, that all members of the
profession share a sense of interconnectedness and community. But
much evidence suggests that the notion of a professional community is
illusory. In fact, the legal profession is highly stratified and segmented
into two "hemispheres" of practice that have little in common other than
the label "lawyer."63& Bar prosecutors may have more in common with
other prosecutors than with the solo and small firm practitioners they
typically prosecute.
The strength of the normative critique is its capacity to de-naturalize
professional self-regulation. By questioning why lawyers and not other
occupations should erijoy self-regulatory powers, this critique forces an
examination of the historically and culturally contingent factors that
supported the rise of professional authority and the claim for self-regu-
lation. In light of this perspective, the Bar's claims regarding the legiti-
macy of self-regulation are attenuated. In the end, however, the critical
perspective on self-regulation remains problematic. While it demystifies
professional authority, it fails to provide an adequate conceptual or theo-
retical foundation for understanding alternative regulatory models likely
to be more efficacious than Bar discipline.637 Like the Bar's normative
because there are both structural and cultural components underlying the labelling of
certain professional behavior as deviant. See generally Ross E. Chelt, Corporate Ambu-
lance Chasers: The Charmed Life of Business Litigation, 11 STUD. 1.., POL., SOc. 119
(1991).
636. See HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 50, at 319-85.
637. This Is, of course, not the goal of this normative critique. Rather, Its central alm
Is to demystify professional authority. But, from a pragmatic perspective: this Is not
enough. ThIs explains why the Presley Task Force on Lawyer Discipline, which pre-
sented a penetrating normative critique of lawyer self-regulation, was not able to con-
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assertions, the critical claims provide little guidance for assessing the
California disciplinary refonns.
2. Models of Lawyer Regulation
Part of the disagreement over the efficacy of California's lawyer disci-
pline reforms stems from opposing normative premises that influence
how those incremental refonns are to be interpreted. Still other difficul-
ties derive, however, from tensions inherent in the regulatory process
itself and from the lack of conceptual clarity regarding the proper pa-
rameters of lawyer discipline.
The lawyer discipline system in California, as in most jurisdictions, is
based largely on a prosecutorial model. This model was constructed by
bar associations in the early years of their modem rise to prominence
and authority as they promulgated ethical codes to articulate profession-
al nonns and established the disciplinary machinery to enforce them.ll38
The underlying premise of the regulatory model was that professional
education, standards for admission, and socialization would increasingly
ensure lawyer competence and integrity, except for the few inevitable
"bad apples" of the bar. This prosecutorial model focuses disciplinary
attention on deviance from the profession's ethical nonns. It relies on
sanctioning such deviant behavior as a means of cleansing the bar of
miscreants and thus protecting both the public and its image of the pro-
fession. Moreover, the prosecution model necessarily focuses on instanc-
es of egregious misconduct so as to ration scarce prosecutorial .re-
sources. As a result, the initial stages of this model emphasize efforts to
screen complaints from the system in order to isolate those few com-
. .
vince the state legislature to divest the Bar of Its self-regulato!)' powers. The legisla-
ture understood the critique, but wanted to know what alternative model of lawyer
regulation would produce better results. See generally Joint Interim Hearing, supra
note 11. Following Stanford Law Professor Deborah Rhode's critique of lawyer self-
regulation, one legislator asked her to IdentIfY a single state agency that might be emu-
lated as a model for the independent regulato!)' agency she (and the rest of the Pres-
ley Task Force) advocated. Professor Rhode was not able to do so. ld. at 37-45. A
second legislator followed up on this Ilne of questioning by asking why anyone should
believe that an Independent lawyer regulato!)' agency would do a better rather than a
worse job than the Bar. ld. at 44 (Comments of Assembly Member Calderon). As one
legislator added: "I would only suggest that . . . 1 think our perhaps unique task Is to
tIY to predict the practical result of some of these theories . . . . That's why 1 ask for
an example In the real world of something that approaches the theoretical Ideal you
urge ..... ld. at 44-45.
638. See, e.g., POWELL, supra note 20.
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plaints most likely to lead to the imposition of sanctions. Such a model is
also largely reactive rather than proactive in its reach. It relies almost
exclusively on a complaining witness to recognize and properly identify
lawyer misconduct and to initiate a formal case.639
Although the prosecutorial model is dominant in most lawyer regula-
tion schemes, there is a second model, focusing on consumer dispute
resolution, with which it is in tension.8Ao This tension derives from the
fact that most client complaints received by the discipline system deal
not with ethical deviance, but with issues of basic competence and ser-
vice.641 Most regubitory systems must relieve this tension by making
some adjustments to orient themselves towards a consumer dispute reso-
lution model.642 This model focuses on responding to client concerns
about attorney competence and service rather than enforcing ethical
norms. Restitution and conciliation rather than punishment are the pri-
mary goals of this model. The dispute resolution model is also oriented
towards addressing all complaints in some manner and not simply deal-
ing with those deemed to be most serious.643
At a fundamental level, it is difficult to reconcile the competing goals
of these two models of lawyer regulation. Certainly in the California
reform experience the tension between these models was evident. For
example, from the beginning of his tenure, the Bar Discipline Monitor
advocated consumer oriented reforms such as increasing client access to
the disciplinary system, expanding disciplinary concerns to include issues
639. See generally Steele & Nimmer, supra note 7, at 919; Wilkins, supra note 9, at
799.
640. See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 7; F. Raymond Marks & Darlene Cathcart,
Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is It Self-Regulation?, 1974 ILL. L. F. 193.
64!. See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 7, at 923:
[ellient complaints tend neither to present allegations conforming to the
profession's definitions of unethical conduct nor to request agency action
consistent with Its enforcement emphasis. Insteiul, the complalnts tend to
deal with contractual disputes concerning the quality of legal services ren-
dered or an attorney's fallure to meet his client's expectations as to cost or
promptness of service . . . . Thus, an explicit tension is created within the
agency between its formal polley objective (the discipline of unethical con-
duct) and its actual caseload (complaints primarily concerning contract dis-
putes).
[d.
642. As Steele and Nimmer note, one way to relieve this tension is simply to ignore
the bulk of these client complaints by labelling them as insignificant, outside of juris-
dictional grounds, or frivolous or crank complalnts. Most systems, however, take at
least some measures to address these "minor" complalnts, such as Informal mediation.
643. See, e.g., OSTBERG, supra note 8, at 9 ("The Ideal consumer oriented system
would not be a 'discipline' system at all; It would be a consumer protection system
with the responsibility to mediate disputes.").
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of competence, and ensuring that the system did not screen out com-
plaints simply because they dealt witll "minor" issues.644 But the Moni-
tor also recommended changes designed to enhance the prosecutorial
capacity of the system, such as coordinating the investigative and prose-
cution functions, raising salaries to attract career prosecutors, and in-
creasing the discretion that prosecutors could employ.M6 But not all of
these changes fit well together. Increasing access, for instance, produced
greater pressure to process cases or divert them quickly.1l48 Establishing
the Complainants' Grievance Panel institutionalized a consumer perspec-
tive in the system. But the efforts of the Panel to ensure that complaints
were not summarily dismissed hindered the· capacity of the system to
focus attention on instances of serious misconduct.647 Thus, the very
competing goals involved.in the lawyer discipline system inherently limit
its potential effectiveness.
A second limitation on the efficacy of lawyer discipline derives from
the limited capacity of any particular system to address the varied con-.
texts and circumstances in which lawyers work. The parameters of disci-
plinary control under Bar regulation are, in fact, quite narrow. Increasing-
ly, there are other models of control that also regulate the profession.
These include liability controls, such as malpractice law, and institutional
controls, such as sanctions imposed by administrative agencies or the
federal courts (e.g., Rule 11) for lawyer misconduct that occurs in these
settings. Additionally, there are also complex informal controls affecting
lawyers in such settings as corporate law firms, where both colleagues
and clients are able to evaluate and sanction lawyers' behavior.648
Wilkins has provided the beSt analytical framework in which to un-
derstand the strengths and limitations of each of these forms of profes-
sional control.649 His central argument is straightforward and quite com-
pelling: no single mechanism for regulating lawyers can effectively reach
644. FeUmeth Initial Report, supra note 448.
645. Id.
646. For a similar example of such pressures in another context, see generally Susan
S. Silbey, Case Processing: Consumer Protection in an Attorney General's Office, 15
Law & Soc'y Rev. 849 (1980).
647. Indeed, in several of his reports, the Discipline Monitor warned that the Panel's
aggressive consumerist stance threatened to undermine necessary prosecutorial discre-
tion to focus resources on cases deemed most likely to lead to imposed sanctions. See,
e.g., FeUmeth VII, supra note 476.
648. See Wilkins, supra note 9, at 826.
649. Id. at 804-19.
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all types of lawyer misconduct or all contexts of professional prac-
tice.lIM
In the fIrst place, different actors in the process have different capa-
bilities and even different incentives for seeking redress when attorney
misconduct occurs. Some clients, particularly individual "one shot" users
of lawyer services, have little capacity or experiential basis to evaluate
lawyer conduct.661 Corporate clients, on the other hand, are "repeat
players" and have both the sophistication and resources to evaluate pro-
fessional services and conduct. Additionally, the incentives both types of
clients have to report various forms of misconduct itself vary. To expli-
cate this point, Wilkins makes the useful distinction between two main
categories of lawyer misconduct, what he terms "agency" and
"externality" problems.652 Agency problems involve instances where the
lawyer's action primarily harms the client. Examples of this type of mis-
conduct include overbilling, allowing the statute of limitations to lapse
on a client's claim, or representing interests adverse to a client.
Externality problems are those cases where both the lawyer and client
improperly harm third parties or iI\jure the legal system itself. Examples
of this latter type of misconduct include helping a client to flle a false or
misleading proxy statement,allowing a client to commit perjury, or filing
frivolous pleadings.663 The typical lawyer discipline system, Wilkins ar-
gues, "despite its formal breadth" must focus almost exclusively on agen-
cy-type problems.664 This is so because clients have little incentive to
report externality problems because these involve instances of "strategic
behavior" that are committed on the client's behalf.665
Moreover, even in focusing narrowly on agency problems, there will
likely be inherent limitations to any disciplinary enforcement scheme.
This point Wilkins labels the "paradox of agency problems."lIM In order
for agency problems to come to the attention of disciplinary enforcement
offIcials, the client must understand both that he has been iI\jured and
that the iI\jury resulted from lawyer misconduct.667
650. Id.
651. See Marc Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Lim-
its of Legal Change, 9 LAw Soc. REV. 95 (1974) (discussing the notion of "one shot"
vs. "repeat player" litigants).
652. Wilkins, supra note 9, at 819-20.
653. Id.
654. Id. at 823-34.
655. Id. at 823.
656. Id. at 824.
657. I would add further that the client must also be sufficlently sophisticated and ar-
ticulate to know where and how to bring a formal complaint against a lawyer and
ml,lst also make the determination that pressing a formal complaint is a better strategy
than "lumping It." See generaUy William L. Felstlner et al., The Emergence and Trans-
612
[Vol. 22: 486, 1996) Ideologies ofProfessionalism
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Paradoxically, Wilkins tells us "those clients in the best position to
make this detennination are the least likely to bring their complaints to
the attention of disciplinary authorities."668 Unlike most individual cli-
ents, sophisticated "repeat players," typically corporate clients, have the
skill and resources to screen lawyers or their firms for competence and
integrity. Additionally, they have the experience, and often in-house legal
staff, to supervise and evaluate lawyer behavior and to ensure that their
wishes are carried out. Finally, they also have the capability to sanction
agency-type misbehavior such as overbilling immediately by such tech-
niques as withdrawing business or threatening to do so.66lI There is thus
little incentive for corporate clients to bring agency problems to disci-
plinary authorities.660 Conversely, although "one shot" individual clients
have incentives to bring such complaints, they are often without the
sophistication or resources to do SO.661 Because disciplinary en-
forcement systems (like regulation by bar associations) rely so exten-
sively on client complaints, they necessarily fail to address much mis-
conduct within their nominal purview. And, because the disciplinary
system acts mostly reactively to instances of misconduct, the system
must bear the quite significant costs to investigate, prosecute, and adju-
dicate complaints. In sum, a discipline enforcement system for regulating
lawyer behavior is structurally unsuited to deal with the majority of cli-
ent complaints and the system is likely to incur high transaction costs
when it attempts to do SO.662
For these reasons, the California State Bar's claims for superior effi-
cacy in regulating lawyers must be significantly qualified. The reforms in
the California disciplinary system have produced significant changes in
the output of the system. But as of 1992, the system still screened-out
the vast majority of complaints that came to its attention. Moreover, the
reforms have come at great expense and will likely require additional
formation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming, 16 LAw & SOC'y REV. 631 (1980-
81); William L. Felstlner, Avoidance as Dispute Processing: An Elaboration, 9 LAw &
SOC'Y REV. 696 (1976); No ACCESS TO LAw: ALTERNATIVES TO THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL
SYSTEM (Laura Nader ed. 1980).
668. Wilkins, supra note 9, at 824.
669. [d. at 826-27.
660. [d. at 827.
661. [d. at 828-29 (explaining that Individual clients don't lmow what services they
need, are Inadequately Informed to predict the quality of lawyer services, and are un-
able to effectively evaluate the services after performance).
662. [d. at 828-29.
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expenditures to increase the system's ability to handle more or different
types of cases, including increasing the consumer perspective of the
system. On the other hand, critics' claims that an independent agency
would produce better results than Bar self-regulation are similarly sus-
pect. They ignore the difficulties and likely costs involved in achieving
these results and they fail to come to terms with the structural limita-
tions of any system of disciplinary control. mtimately, the critique of Bar
regulation is most effective as a normative argument but provides little
evaluative capacity to aid in understanding the significance of the Califor-
nia reforms in lawyer discipline.
B. The Symbolic Politics ojSelf-Regulation
In professions theory, self-regulation has traditionally been viewed as a
core attribute of professionalism, although scholars differ as to its pre-
cise significance. Functionalist theory, for example, has tended to stress
self-regulation as an obligation of public service arising from professions'
privileged standing in societr or as a special form of social control·
necessary to protect clients from the dangers of uncontrolled exper-
tise.664 In this view, an increasingly complex and differentiated society
needs specialized occupational groups who control technical knowledge
and expertise. It is difficult for non-experts to assess, or even to under-
stand the practical application of this expertise due to an "asymmetry of
knowledge" and power inherent in the professional-client relationship.
Such a relationship thus requires trust, including the primary trust that
the profession will constrain its self-interest in favor of the client's and,
ultimately, society's best interest. Self-regulation is both the solution for
that problem and symbol of that trust.665
Largely in response to functionalism's overly benign view of profes-
sions, later critical theorists highlighted the role that self-regulation plays
in furthering a professions' dual goals of monopolizing the market for
their services and enhancing their collective status.666 The function of a
system of professional ethics and self-regulation from this perspective is
ideological in a largely instrumental sense: it serves to legitimize the
professional monopoly by highlighting professional claims to special
competence, superior ethicality, and public service at the same time that
663. See, e.g., T.H. Marshall, The Recent History of Professionalism in Relation to
Social Structure and Social Policy, in CLASS, CITIZENSHIP, AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
(1965).
664. See generaUy Parsons, supra note 37; Parsons, supra note 5; Abbott, supra note
88.
665. [d.
666. See a180 ABEL, supra note 23; Abel, supra note 622, at 639; Rhode, supra note
622, at 689. See generally BERLANT, supra note 54; LARsoN, supra note 55.
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it denies the influence 'of the market on professional behavior.667
There is much insight produced by the critical tradition on professions.
Certainly by now there is little disagreement over the view that one func-
tion of professional ethics and self-regulation is to stave off state or oth-
er external regulation and thus to facilitate a profession's development of
distinct status and a secure market. Halliday, for instance, whose nee-
functionalist perspective on the legal profession is in many respects at
odds with critical professions theory, agrees with critical scholars that, at
least in the early stages of professionalization, self-regulation is an impor-
tant resource for achieving market control.668
Halliday distinguishes between "formative" and "established" profes-
sions and stresses that self-regulatory activities play an important role
only in the formative stage of professionalization.669 Mature professions,
Halliday argues, are able to devote their resources and expert knowledge
to the.service of the state, which he terms "civic professionalism."670
This argument for the decreasing significance of self-regulation is im-
portant, but makes the experience in California problematic. As Powell
667. As Larson writes:
Traditional claims of disinterestedness and public service, integrated into the
ideological model of profession, contradict the market orientation of the pro-
fessional project and the monopolization of competence to which it necessari-
ly tends. Ideologically, these claims deny the invidious implications of monop-
oly and are used to stave off possible attacks.
LARsoN, supra note 55, at 52.
668. Halliday notes:
I contend that the centrality of monopoly to the professional enterprise has a
developmental dimension. Control of the market for American lawyers was a
prominent task only in the formative stage of the profession's development.
In the first decades following the renewal of collegial organizations for law-
yers in the 1870s, substantial portions of time, effort, funds, and other organi-
zational resources were committed to programs that either were intended to
accomplish or resulted in domination of the market for legal services . . . .
In other words, the profession was committed to the task of constructing an
elaborate system of professional and market control. ThIs was not the only
component of professional activity, but it was prominent. It was also transito-
ry . . . . A preoccupation with market dominance marked only one . . . stage
in the emergence of the profession . . . . Once that stage was reached, and
its "developmental tasks" accomplished, the importance of monopoly in col-
lective professional action and to professional identity began to fade.
liALLIOAY, supra note 20, at 350-51.
669. [d. at 350-53.
670. [d.
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has shown, other bar associations, when faced with "crises" of their own,
have relinquished self-regulatory powers.071 Powell thus concludes that
self-regulation is not a significant source of power or authority for ma-
ture professions.o72 Because the examples Powell elaborates prove to be
so different from the California experience, they merit special attention.
1. Voluntary Relinquishment of Self-Regulatory Power
Powell's study of self-regulation in Dlinois provides an example of a
private bar association that voluntarily relinquished self-regulatory pow-
er.073 Unlike California, illinois never became a unified Bar state. Two
major voluntary bar associations, the Chicago Bar Association (CBA) and
the Illinois State Bar Association (ISBA), carried out professional regula-
tion in Illinois.074 In 1971, both organizations petitioned the state su-
preme court for permission to rid themselves of their responsibility for
lawyer regulation. Scholars have typically.explained this development
largely as the result of external challenges to the profession.075 Yet
Powell argues that factors internal to these associations and to the pro-
fession as a whole provide a more satisfactory explanation for this ex-
traordinary relinquishment of what historically had been a hard-won
professional prerogative.070
There were, of course, tremendous external pressures for reform of
lawyer discipline in the 1970s coming from both within and outside the
organized bar. In the CBA, for example, committees responsible for law-
yer discipline knew of inadequacies in their system and lobbied for bet-
ter funding to reform it.°77 Externally, the early 1970s were a period of
nationwide unrest and dissatisfaction with professional regulation. The
ABA's "Clark Report," published in 1970, warned of an urgent need for
reform of lawyer discipline.o78 Just prior to the publication of this re-
port, both the CBA and ISBA had begun to suffer from heavy criticism
for having ineffective lawyer discipline systems.679 In fact, an alternative
671. Powell, supra note 60, at 31. Powell argues that this development is a "national
trend," based on the fact that by 1983 control over lawyer discipline was located in
state supreme court or court-appointed committees In 33 out of 54 state jurisdictions
(54 because New York has four separate jurisdictions). [d. at 49.
672. [d. at 54; see also POWELL, supra note 20, at 144-50.
673. See Powell, supm note 60, at 39-49.
674. [d. at 36.
676. [d. External actors including a hostile legislature Imposed reform on reluctant
professions according to these scholars. [d.
676. [d.
677. [d. at 38.
678. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
679. See Powell, supm note 60, at 38.
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progressive bar association in Illinois, the Chicago Council of Lawyers,
published its own scathing report on lawyer reguiation in Illinois and
argued that control over professional discipline should be removed from
the private bar associations.680 Within a month of this report, the CBA
requested that it be allowed to relinquish control over lawyer regulation
and hand this responsibility to the state.681
Unlike the California example, in Illinois there was no significant
threat of outside intervention into lawyer discipline by the legislature.
Nonetheless, the CBA still suffered from a crisis of legitimacy.682 As a
volunteer association the CBA faced pressures to alter its membership to
be more inclusive of various under-represented segments of the bar, such
as women, minorities, and younger lawyers in general. The CBA became
viewed as an exclusive "lawyers club." Consequently, criticism over its
ineffective discipline system reinforced this view and was detrimental to
both the association's and the profession's image.683
Additionally, reform of lawyer reguiation would likely be very costly.
Yet the CBA chose not to raise its dues (as the California Bar did) to
finance disciplinary reforms. Powell argues, however, that funding was
not a decisive factor in the CBA's choice to divest itself of lawyer regula-
tion. The CBA could have chosen to raise dues, to petition the legislature
to have nonmember lawyers contribute funds for lawyer discipline, or
even to reallocate existing funding to fmance reguiatory reforms (since
expenditures on discipline constituted only 15% of the CBA's total expen-
ditures). Instead, the CBA chose to voluntarily relinquish control over
lawyer discipline. This, Powell explains, was a relatively painless way for
the CBA to deal with its legitimacy crisis, which was exacerbated by the
negative publicity generated by the ineffective discipline system. More-
. over, Powell argues, self-regulation was simply not as central to the iden-
tity or authority of the professional association (or of the profession) as
it had been at an earlier stage of development.6lI4
2. Involuntary Loss of Self-Regulatory Power
Powell's second explication of the decline of self-reguiation thesis
involves the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (ABCNY)
680. Id. at 39-40.
681. Id. at 40.
682. Id. at 41.
683. ·Id.
684. Id.
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which was forced to surrender control over lawyer regulation in New
York in 1980. Like the CBA, the ABCNY is a VOIWltary bar association.
Additionally, the ABCNY is one of the oldest bar associations in the
COWltry and was the first to acquire extensive self-regulatory power in
the 1870s. It was also established as an exclusive organization that was
more representative of elite corporate lawyers than of the bar as a
whole. Although this very elitism was a source of authority in the nine-
teenth century ("the best men of the bar"), Powell tells us, it helped to
undermine the bar's authority in the late twentieth century.lI8(\
Increasingly, non-elite segments of the bar in New York challenged the
ABCNY's exclusive control over lawyer discipline. In this challenge the
critics had a powerful ally, the Appellate Division of the New York Su-
preme Court.lI8(\ Elite lawyers, who, predominated in the ABCNY, had
little in common with the Appellate Division judges involved in disciplin-
ary reforms. The court was essentially a local court, and one before
which few corporate lawyers practiced. By the late 1970s, the Appellate
Division began to take an activist role in overseeing lawyer discipline in
the state, partly because of nationwide scandals over the inadequacies of
lawyer discipline, but also because it was motivated by concerns over
the ,elite association's power over an increasingly heterogeneous bar. The
Appellate Division, which bore much of the costs of the lawyer discipline
system, stopped simply passively fWlding the system and began to take a
more active role, such as appointing individuals to serve on the disciplin-
ary committee. Some of these appointments were not ABCNY members
and some of them were actively opposed by the ABCNY. The Appellate
Division also began to assert that disciplinary committee staff were its
employees rather than the bar association's. As the Appellate Division
exerted its control, Powell tells us, the ABCNY was forced to playa less
extensive role in lawyer regulation and ultimately surrendered its disci-
plinary authority entirely to the COurt.687
Powell argues that for both the CBA and ABCNY, self-regulation be-
came a liability to the bar. Ultimately, self-regulation was no longer cru-
cial as a source of professional power or authority for either association.
What, then, explains the contrary California experience? One explanation
may be that the California example is simply an anachronism or an outli-
er on an otherwise nationwide trend. However, such an accoWlt does not
explain why the Bar fought so vigorously to retain its self-regulatory
powers, spending over 80% of its total budget on the lawyer discipline
system by 1992. A second possible explanation may be that in California
it was the threat of legislative involvement that was the key. Such en-
685. [d. at 231-35.
686, The supreme court Is the'trial-Ievel court In New York.
687. See Powell, supra note 60, at 231-35.
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croachment on the Bar's traditional prerogative challenged the Bar's
identity as an autonomous profession and lawyers' identity as officers of
the coUrt. Yet another partial-explanation may be that the crisis in Cali-
fornia was particularly profound since, from the start, the attack on the
Bar focused not simply on the Bar's efficacy in self-regulating but its very
legitimacy in doing so. This is different from the Chicago example, where
the emphasis was on the CBA's inability to self-regulate effectively. But it
is not too dissimilar to the experience in New York, where the ABCNY
was attacked as an illegitimate and unrepresentative organization to
regulate the bar. However, a more complete and satisfactory explanation
for the California counter-example lies at the symbolic level.
C. The Symbolic Significance of Self-Regulation
The declining significance of self-regulation thesis shares with monopo-
ly theory an over-emphasis on a single aspect of self-regulation: its rele-
vance for monopoly control. But, as the California example illustrates,
the better view is to recognize the enduring symbolic function of self-
regulation.688 Professional status is never secure even' though (at least
for elite segments of the bar) a mature profession may have relatively
strong control over the market for professional services and the capacity
to create new legal needs and services to fill those needs.689 Rather, the
cultural authority of a profession is precarious in a liberal democratic
society and must continuously be rearticulated and renegotiated.6IlO
In his later work, Powell identifies three distinct symbolic functions
served by a system of professional self-regulation.691 The first is to legit-
imatize professional autonomy and thereby discourage external control
688. Powell himself discusses the symbolic importance of self-regulation in his study
Of the ABCNY. See POWELL, supra note 20, at 18-28, 245-49. Yet this does not lead him
to refine his thesis that self-regulation is not important to a mature profession.
689. See generally ABBOTI, supra note 26.
690. [d. See generally STARR, supra. note 19. In recent and quite interesting work,
Solomon and Schneyer discuss how the ideology of professionalism has been mobilized
by the Bar during periods of perceived crisis in order to bolster its claimed profession-
al status. See Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or One: The Concept of Legal Profes-
sionalism 1925-1960, in LAWYERS' IDEALSILAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds. 1992); Theodore Schneyer,
Professionalism as Politics: The Making of a Modern Legal Ethics Code:, in LAWYERS'
IDEALSILAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION (Rob-
ert L. Nelson et al. eds. 1992),
691. See POWELL, supra note 20, at 172-75.
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of the profession.692
A second symbolic function of self-regulation is to elevate inter-pro-
fessional status. It is a means by which an occupational group can dis-
tinguish itself from other occupations by reference to the group's supe-
rior ethicality and, hence, professional status.693 Finally, self-regulation
may also serve an intra-professional symbolic function. A system of self-
regulation allows dominant segments of the legal profession symbolically
to degrade work engaged in by lower status lawyers by labeling it as un-
ethical and immoral, thereby elevating the prestige of the dominant seg-
ment of the profession.694
In the California example, the theme of intraprofessional status was
not prominent because the crisis of authority addressed by .the Bar
stemmed from external attacks on the profession's prerogative of self-
regulation rather than from internal challenges to professional stratifica-
tion and hierarchy (which was a more prominent theme in the New York
case). Thus, the response by the Bar to this challenge was to construct a
traditional ideology of professionalism, which emphasized disinterested-
ness, public service, and special competence in order to justify its
claimed status.
Self-regulation is not the only mechanism by which the bar can re-
assert its mandate, but it is an important one. Nelson and Trubek, for
example, identify four settings or "arenas" where ideologies of profes-
sionalism are socially constructed.696 These include arenas of legal edu-
cation, of collective action (e.g., in bar associations), of work, and of
disciplinary enforcement.696 These scholars make the very useful obser-
vation that, with the legal profession becoming increasingly diverse and
stratified, there is a concomitant growing need for the profession to
appear unified.697 Claims for ethicality, which underlie the claim for self-
692. Id. at 172-73.
[T)he discipline system, despite Its limited reach, serves to demonstrate to
outsiders that the profession engages In self-regulation, even from time to
time expelling one of Its own, thereby discouraging interest In implementing
external controls . . . the bar's self-regulatory edifice provides ·symbolic re-
assurance" to Its supposed beneficiaries even though Its actual performance
falls far short of providing the protections to the public that It claims.
Id.
693. Id. at 173.
694. Id. at 173-74; see also Abbott, supra note 164, at 819.
695. See Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism: The Pro-
fessional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in LAWYERS' IDEAi&'LAWYERS' PRACTICES:
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL' PROFESSION (Robert 1. Nelson et al. eds.
1992).
696. Id. at 185.
697. Id. at 194.
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regulation, are group claims. They allow the profession as a whole to
collectively reassert its authority.698
In California, the importance of the symbolic function of self-regulation
was heightened by the legal context in which the debate over the Bar's
control over the discipline system took place; for not only was the Bar's
traditional self-regulatory authority challenged in the 19808, its legal ca-
pacity to do much of anything else in the public arena was seriously
limited by changing legal doctrine.
1. KeUer v. State Bar of California
Halliday has argued that established professions shift their attention
and resources away from primarily monopolistic pursuits towards a
broader range of functions less centered on professional self-preserva-
tion.6ll9 For Halliday, this mature stage of "civic professionalism" has, at
least for lawyers, allowed the profession to bring its knowledge and
expertise to the service of the state.7OO Though this argument too readily
ignores the continuing need of professions for symbolic renewal and
redefinition of mandate, it is important. It is also a welcome change from
the one-dimensional view of professions elaborated by monopoly theo-
rists. Moreover, it is of particular relevance to the California example.
Beginning in 1982, the California State Bar faced a formidable legal chal-
lenge that threatened to substantially limit the Bar's capacity to engage in
"civic professional" activities.T01
The legal challenge to the Bar stemmed from conservative members'
dissatisfaction with the Bar~s public stance on political issues. In his
inaugural speech in 1982, for instance, incoming California State Bar
President Anthony Murray advocated that all supreme court justices up
for retention be retained, absent any showing of incompetence or im-
698. There Is a sense in which professional disciplinary enforcement has a similar
function for the profession as criminal justice does for a society: Its symbolism Is di-
rected outward towards the public audience and its moral claims help to define and
sustain group identity and authority. For a recent discussion of the symbolic function
of a system of criminal justice, see generally David Garland, Punishment and Culture:
The Symbolic Dimension of' C:riminal Justice, 11 STUD. L. POL. SOc. 191 (1991).
699. See generaUy HALLIDAY, supra note 20.
700. [d.
701. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990). David Luban has an insightful
analysis of the relevance of the KeUer case for the legal profession as a whole. See
David Luban, The Disengagement of the Legal Profession: Keller v. State Bar of. Call·
fornia, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 163 (1990).
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propriety. The election itself was controversial because the four judges
facing the retention vote were judicially opposed to capital punishment,
which was a central issue to those opposing their retention. Murray's
speech, which was printed and widely disseminated by the Bar, was
viewed by conservative Bar members as an improper stance for the man-
datory Bar' to take on such a controversial issue. Eddie Keller, a state
deputy attorney general, along with twenty other Bar members brought
suit against the Bar seeking to prohibit it from using membership re-
sources to advance "political or ideological" causes.702
The plaintiffs claimed that the Bar's use of mandatory membership
dues to endorse such causes violated their First Amendment rights to
freedom of speech since they as individuals disagreed with the Bar's
political stances. Specifically, the plaintiffs objected to the expenditure of
dues to support such functions as lobbying the state legislature, filing
amicus curiae briefs in pending cases, holding annual meetings at which
public policy issues were discussed and corresponding resolutions
passed, and disseminating public and voter education materials on a
wide variety of subjects.703
The California Supreme Court held that the Bar may not use its mem-
bership dues to support election campaigns.704 However, the court also
held that, due to its status as a "governmental agency," the Bar was not
precluded from expending dues for the other protested activities, since
these were properly related to the Bar's mandated function to improve
the administration of justice.706
The United States Supreme Court disagreed. In a unanimous decision,
it prohibited the California State Bar from expending membership dues
for activities that were not "necessarily or reasonably incurred for the
purpose of regulating the legal profession or 'improving the quality of
legal services available'" to the public.706 The Court reasoned that, rath-
er than being a governmental agency, the Bar was best analogized to a
labor union. Relying on a line of cases restricting a union's ability to
spend dissident members' dues on activities unrelated to its core func-
tion (e.g., collective bargaining), the Court explained that the Bar may
only expend funds to improve legal services.707
702. See KeUer, 496 U.S. at 46.
703. [d.
704. See Keller v. State Bar of Callfornia, 767 P.2d 1020 (Cal. 1989), rev'd, 496 U.S. 1
(1990).
705. [d.
706. KeUer, 496 U.S. at 14 (quoting Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961)).
707. The Court stated:
The State Bar may therefore constitutionally fund activities germane to those
goals (i.e., of regulating the profession or Improving legal services) out of the
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At one level, the Keller decision was a victory for the Bar. The case
firmly upheld the Bar's status as a mandatory membership organiza-
tion-which some felt was the real threat posed by the case708-and the
Bar's public pronouncements highlighted that aspect of the case.709 But
Keller also clearly circumscribed the Bar's capacity to exercise its au-
thority in the public arena.710 Self-regulation was henceforth one of the
few permissible and highly visible public functions of the Bar. Because of
this, the debate over lawyer self-regulation was played out in a context
of particular urgency. The symbolic function of the profession's system
of ethics and regulation was thereby made even more important since it
remained one of the few ways for the Bar to assert its mandate.
2. Professions and Professional Ideology
Self-regulation has a core symbolic function of articulating and thus
helping to sustain professional ideology and professional authority. There
is, however, a second dimension to professional ideology that has re-
ceived less scholarly attention, although this is changing.71I As Nelson
and Trubek note, functionalist theory 13fgely ignored professional ideol-
ogy. Rather, it assumed "a close correspondence between formal decla-
rations of professional values, as in codes of professional ethics, and the
values actually held by individual pr~titioners."712
Critical professions theory, on the other hand, while focusing on pro-
fessional ideology, has tended to view it in a rather instrumental and
one-dimensional fashion. For critical theorists, professional ideology is
solely a tool for maintaining control over the market for professional
services,713 Yet professional ideology is more complex and nuanced than
mandatory dues of aU members. It may not, however, In such manner fund
activities of an Ideological nature which faU outside those areas of activities.
[d. at 14.
708. See generally Luban, supra note 701.
709. See The KeUer Decision: U.S. Supreme Court Upholds Concept of Unified Bar,
10 CAL. LAw., Apr. 1990, at 67 (discussing the effects of the Court's upholding of
KeUer)j Alan I. Rothenberg, Changes on Tap in California, 15 B. LEADER, Sept.-Oct.
1990, at 28 (discussing the effects of the Supreme Court's decision).
710. See Luban, supra note 701.
711. Nelson and Trubek provide a succinct account of the current, and preliminary,
state of thinking about professional ideology. See Nelson, supra note 695, 15-27 (Robert
1. Nelson et al, eds., 1992). .
712. [d. at 15.
713. [d. at 16-18. Only recently, and In a very preliminary way, one critical scholar
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the critical account suggests.714
This emerging perspective is important. It recognizes the role ideology
plays in maintaining jurisdictional claims, but is also !;lensitive to the
capacity of professional ideology to serve transformative ends. A number
of scholars have begun to explicate this point. Schneyer, for example,
examines how the ABA's drafting ·of a new ethics code (only seven years
after it revised its original 1908 rules for the fIrst time in 1969) was a
response to shore up the legal profession's beleaguered image and to dis-
play the ABA's primacy as "lawgiver for the entire profession."715 But, as
he shows, the newly-drafted code was also viewed by various segments
in the bar to actually have some "bite." Moreover, proposed ethical re-
forms generated immense and intense discussion by lawyers and public
commentators. This, Schneyer suggests, indicates that reforming the code
was .more than a rhetorical exercise. Rather, it articulated an ethical
vision that was viewed as meaningful and, consequently, was potentially
transformative.715
Gordon's work has also developed this theme persuasively. Gordon's
historical study of elite lawyers argues that they had "ideal" as well as
material interests and that they struggled to create the capacity to inte-
grate both into their work and their lives.717 The ideology of profession-
alism, Gordon and Simon tell us, can create a "set of legitimate and so-
cially desirable aspirations" and can be a "source of inspiration and ideas
for the reform of lawyering."718
has suggested that professional Ideology might be viewed in more than this instrumen-
tal fashion. See Richard L. Abel, Taking Professionalism Seriously, 1989 Annual Sur-
vey of American Law.
714. As Nelson, Trnbek, and Solomon state:
Over time, the American bar has constructed an account of the nature of
lawyer professionalism that constitutes a key element in the dynamic system .
we call the legal profession. The norms, traditions, and practices that make
up this account serve a variety of purposes. They generate the claims that al-
low lawyers to malntaln jurisdiction over work. They become part of each
lawyer's professional Identity, to some extent providing coherence and mean-
ing in everyday life ....(t)hey provide a set of dispositions that lawyers use
to interpret their situations and orient their choices according to an internal·
Ized world view that delimits but does not necessarily determine action.
LAWYERS' IDEAI.8lLAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROFESSION 22-23 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992).
715. See Schneyer, supra note 690, at 106.
716. Id. at 139-43.
717. See, e.g., Robert Gordon, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law, in PROFESSIONS
AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA (~erald L. Geison ed., 1983).
718. See Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professional-
ism?, in LAWYERS' loEAI.8lLAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROFESSION 22-23 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992).
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Haber, also makes a related point in his study of American Profes-
sions.719 He shows well how professional culture and ideology were re-
silient enough to be transplanted from England and thrive in a quite
different social and cultural milieu in pre and post-Revolutionary Amer-
ica. The core of this professional ideology, Haber argues, is a belief in
honor and gentlemanly authority. In Haber's view, a system of ethics is
adopted by professions to persuade both others and themselves that
professions such as law are more than mere businesses. The symbolic
message of a system of ethics is thus not simply that the professional
role derives from contract (i.e., to derme relations with others), but also
from duty.
What each of these studies demonstrates is that monopoly theory has
simply failed to comprehend the complexities of professionalism as a
social and cultural system. Its chief wealmess lies in its one-dimensional
understanding of professional motivation. A system of ethics and self-
regulation has symbolic importance both to maintain professional group
identity and to create a discourse with which those expectations can be
evaluated and reshaped.
In California, the debate over self-regulation resonated on several lev-
els. In terms of symbolic politics, the profession sought to maintain the
legitimacy of professional status and the primacy of the Bar as the
source of ethical rule making and enforcement. But the ideology of pro-
fessionalism that sustains the professional world view also incorporates
notions of ethicality and public service that properly create expectations
about the standards of professional behavior as well as the discourse to
critique it. As the California example shows, the organized bar is one
important source of professional ideology, particularly in its lawyer regu-
latory function. While self-regulation need not be an attribute of the legal
profession-and it may ultimately be viewed as illegitimate-it is improp-
erly dismissed as it has been in much of the literature as solely self-serv-
ing. Nevertheless, it is likely to remain a controversial and problematic
prerogative.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE FuTuRE OF SELF-REGULATION IN CALIFORNIA
Historically, self-regulation has played a significant role in allowing the
legal profession to successfully assert its mandate as a distinct and privi-
leged occupational group, whose jurisdiction and status are protected
719. See generally HABER, supra note 111.
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both by the state and by ideological control. In California in the mid-
1980s, both of these dimensions of professional control were fundamen-
tally challenged as the state threatened to assume a more intrusive
stance towards the Bar and as critics attacked the legal profession's
political and cultural hegemony. In response, the Bar mobilized its tradi-
tional ideology of professionalism in an attempt to justify its self-regula-
tory powers and reassert its cultural authority. The Bar's success was
mixed. Although it underwent considerable scrutiny, the Bar retained its
ability to self-regulate largely free from external control. But this was
due as much to the pragmatic concerns of the state legislature (which
was dubious of creating an alternative lawyer regulatory agency de novo)
as to the persuasiveness of the profession's ideological claims. What the
California experience makes clear nonetheless is that self-regulation,
while perhaps no longer an essential attribute of professionalism, contin-
ues to be an important resource for the Bar in its attempt to assert both
occupational uniqueness and the authority to speak for the legal profes-
sion as a whole. This is so because lawyer regulation remains one of the
most powerful public arenas to shape and articulate professional ideolo-
gy.
But, despite its continued significance for the Bar and for the profes-
sion, the future of self-regulation in California remains problematic, par-
ticularly when viewed from a user's perspective. The Bar responded to
these most recent challenges to its self~regulatory powers with vehe-
mence. It increased expenditures for discipline (and the Bar dues to pay
for them) and reformed its disciplinary system (albeit largely under out-
side pressure). Yet the data: from the California example far from vindi-
cates the Bar's record in "reforming" lawyer discipline. It is true that the
Bar does not do nothing in lawyer regulation, as its harshest critics sug-
gest. After all, numerous lawyers are processed through the disciplinary
system, many clients are reimbursed for their losses stemming from un-
scrupulous lawyers, and the disciplinary system does have an increased
capacity to identify repeat violators, and, at least in a very preliminary
way, to prevent some disciplinary violations. However, it is far from clear
that this is all that the system does or that even this amount ()f increased
disciplinary enforcement will prove to be adequate.
For example, one plausible interpretation of the California story is that
the Bar functions most effectively to respond to and quiet those com-
plaints and critics that create the most trouble for it, while the vast ma-
jority of matters remain effectively eliminated from the disciplinary sys-
tem. Such a skeptical interpretation of the "reforms" in the California
lawyer discipline system need not stem from imputing evil motives (or
even uniform motives) to the Bar. But it recognizes and highlights inher-
ent contradictions and tensions in the lawyer disciplinary system itself.
For example, as critics have effectively pointed out, there is a conflict of
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interest in having an organization serve as a trade association (whose
mandate is to further the profession's interests) and as a prosecutorial
agency (whose aim is to protect the public from members of its own pro-
fession). Much classic work in law and society scholarship has shown
how in different settings, at the micro-level, professional ideals of inde-
pendence and client interest are constrained by lawyers' needs for main-
taining the system in which the profession operates and, ultimately, by
self-interest.12o As the California example suggests, the same may be
true at the organizational level as well.
Further, both organizational and structural factors limit the very ca-
pacity of the Bar's system for lawyer regulation. The system itself often
embodies contradictory goals, since it is based on at least two competing
models, one focusing on efficient prosecution (i.e., identifying and pun-
ishing miscreants) and one animated by consumerist ideals (i.e., satisfy-
ing client needs for competence and service). Moreover, it is unlikely
that any single system of lawyer regulation can be effective (at least at a
cost that anyone is willing to pay) in addressing all forms of professional
'misbehavior in all the varied contexts and organizational forms in which
lawyers work. Indeed, for many lawyers in many practice settings (e.g.,
large firm lawyers, lawyers in governmental practice, and elsewhere
where the Bar's disciplinary apparatus has little reach) the current sys-
tem of self-regulation is, in many respects, simply irrelevant.
Because of this, self-regulation will remain a very costly, precarious,
.and controversial prerogative for California lawyers.121 Its legitimacy
720. See generally Abraham Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Corifidence Game:
Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, LAw & SoC'y REV. June 1967, at 15;
Stewart Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 LAw & SOC'y REV. 115
(1979).
721. One of the f1l'St actions taken by incoming State Bar President Margaret Morrow
in 1993 was to establish a committee of external evaluators to examine the efficiency
and effectiveness of the Bar's new-and costly-lawyer discipline system. See State Bar
of California, Report of the Discipline Evaluation Committee to the Board of Gover-
nors (August 27, 1994) CVAlarcon Report"). For the State Bar court's response to the
Alarcon Report recommendations, see Response of the State Bar Court to the Report of
the Discipline Evaluation Committee (November 1994).
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questionable, its efficacy debatable, Bar self-regulation has survived its
most recent "crisis" but will likely not remain unchallenged for long.722
722. Attacks on the Bar have continued, fueled In part by dissatisfaction with the
high cost of maintaining the current discipline system. On January 3, 1995, State Sena-
tor Quentin L. Kopp (I-8an Francisco) Introduced legislation (SB 60) that would reduce
annual bar dues dramatically-the same dues that have risen so dramatically to fmance
reforms In the discipline system. ThIs legislation would also require the Bar to conduct
a plebiscite of Its members to determine whether they want to retain the Bar as a
mandatory membership organization or transform It Into a voluntary organization, with
the California State Supreme Court taking over direct authority for lawyer discipline.
The State Bar Commission on the Future of the Legal Profession and the State Bar,
established In 1993, recommended by a 13-8 vote to maintain the Bar as a mandatory
membership organization. For a discussion of the Committee's m9Jority and minority
positions on this Issue, see CAl. BAR J., Feb. 1995, at 1, 14-15.
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